The development of African capital markets: a legal and institutional approach by Chimpango, BK
  
NOTTINGHAM  
                                 TRENT UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN CAPITAL MARKETS: A 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH  
 
BY 
 
BONIFACE KONDWANI CHIMPANGO 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Law  
 
 
Nottingham Trent University (UK) 
Nottingham Law School 
 
 
2014 
 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that 
appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to 
the work of others.  
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and no quotation from the thesis may be published without 
proper acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
  
-i- 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
Firstly, I would like to thank God for giving me the strength and grace to carry out this study. 
It was not easy for me to balance the different personal commitments that demanded my 
time and energy but God has seen me this far. There were times that I needed more than 
my own motivation to carry on with the study. I believe all has been possible because the 
Lord was with me. 
 
Secondly, I would like give a vote of thanks to my team of supervisors, Professor Graham 
Ferris, Professor Adrian Walters and Professor David Burdette for their invaluable input, 
support and encouragement throughout the long period this study has taken. Special thanks 
to Professor Graham Ferris for his exceptional contribution to the theoretical framework of 
this study from the beginning to the end of the study. His theoretical input and continued 
critiques tremendously helped to shape the work into its final form. I also would like to 
thank Professor Rebecca Parry, who has been my independent assessor, for her helpful 
critiques and insightful suggestions. 
 
Thirdly, I would like to thank my, wife, Tikha Chimpango, and my three children, Steve, Theo 
and Jarred, for their patience and understanding, as I carried out this work. My wife and 
children had to bear my weekend escapes from home to the Library as this was the only 
time I used to do the study. I did not have much precious time with my family but they kept 
encouraging me to go on with the work. 
 
Finally, I would like thank all the administrative staff at Nottingham Trent University for their 
relentless support with administrative matters including help with accessing materials from 
the Library. I am truly and hugely indebted to you all.        
 
 
 
 
 
  
-ii- 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The role and place of capital markets in economic development have received increased 
attention in recent times. Consequently, establishment of capital markets has become part 
of the prescription offered to developing countries in order to realise economic growth.  
However the precise legal and institutional framework that would induce rapid and 
sustainable growth of the newly established capital markets in developing countries appears 
to continue eluding policy makers and their advisers. As a result, most capital markets 
currently existing in most developing countries remain undeveloped and sluggish.  
 
This study seeks to explore optimal legal and institutional framework that can support and 
sustain capital market growth in developing countries. It is believed that once policy makers 
become aware of such a framework, they will be able to forge targeted legal and policy 
reforms that will help ignite emergence of vibrant capital markets in developing countries. 
The point of departure of this study is an observation that capital markets in most 
developing countries were established and continue to be operated on inappropriate legal 
and institutional underpinnings. This study looks at a number of theories and approaches 
that have formed and informed the legal and institutional framework for capital markets in 
developing countries, including law and economics, law and development and the 
Washington Consensus approaches and explains how they have contributed to weak capital 
markets in developing countries. 
 
This study then  proceeds to explore a possible development theory that can be used in 
designing and implementing legal and institutional reforms to promote development of 
capital markets in developing countries, in general and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) region, in particular. In this regard this study uses Douglass North’s 
framework of economic development as articulated in his work, Understanding the Process 
of Economic Change and his other prior works as a guiding light. North’s framework is part 
of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory that faults neo-classic economics, which has 
been used as a tool of economic analysis in the previous economic theories, for its 
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assumption of human rationality. Instead North’s framework recognises that formal rules 
(statutes, regulations and policy statements) will only be effective if they are compatible 
with existing informal rules (local practices, protocols and beliefs), which are determined by 
societal belief system. This study therefore argues that legal and institutional framework for 
capital markets in developing countries should be tailored to the unique informal rules 
prevalent in each country rather than being transplanted from developed countries.  
 
The study then proceeds to look at some specific formal and informal rules that are relevant 
to capital market growth. As part of this exercise we look at the ‘preconditions’ for strong 
capital markets as set out by Professor Bernard Black and set them out on the formal-
informal rule continuum as informed by North’s framework. In order to show how informal 
rules affect the formal rules, a comparative study of regulatory frameworks in United 
Kingdom, South Africa and Malawi is undertaken.   
 
The study concludes with some suggestions on how the legal and institutional reform for 
capital market development can be undertaken within the tenets of North’s framework in 
developing countries including countries in the SADC region. 
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1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The role and place of capital markets in economic development have received increasing attention 
in recent times. It is believed that there is a strong correlation between the level of development of 
capital markets and the level of economic development of their respective country or economic 
region1. Roth2 succinctly summarised this view as follows: 
 
“A well-developed capital market facilitates the capital formation that is essential to 
economic growth. Effective use of domestic savings allows many domestic enterprises 
that are unable to attract foreign capital to obtain needed capital from domestic sources. 
Moreover, foreign companies that find it possible to raise capital in the local market of a 
developing country are encouraged to establish new or expand existing operations in that 
country thereby making their products available without expenditures of foreign 
exchange.”  
 
With respect to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) there is an expectation that 
the development of capital markets in the region will make a significant contribution to the 
economic development of the member countries of this economic region. As it will be explained in 
detail in chapter 2 below, a well-functioning capital market is key to the overall economic 
advancement of a country. One of such roles is the efficient allocation of capital from those who 
have capital surplus to those who have capital deficit. Through such allocative efficiency, it is hoped 
that companies on the production side of the economy would be well resourced and consequently 
increase productivity in the economy. This would be very vital in the SADC region given that most 
                                                 
1
 Ajit Singh, ‘Financial Liberalization, Stock Markets, and Economic Development,’ *1997+ 107, The Economic 
Journal, 771-782. 
2
 A. Roth, ‘Capital-Market Development in Israel and Brazil: Two Examples of the Role of Law in Development’, 
(1967) 19 (6) Stanford Law Review, (1967) 1277-1306 at p. 1277.  
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of its member countries are predominantly import dependent countries due to lack of resources to 
support economic production that would help these countries to transition from import-based to 
export based economies. There is therefore a strong case for relevance of efficient capital markets 
in the SADC region. Further capital markets help with risk sharing for big and capital intensive 
projects. Investors would be reluctant to single-handedly fund a high cost project out of which they 
can only realised a return on capital after a relatively long period of time. Through the medium of 
capital markets however, investors are able to reduce their risk by only contributing to a portion of 
the overall cost of the project alongside other investors. Further, efficient capital markets have high 
liquidity levels. As such, investors are able to take out there money at any stage of the project by 
disposing of their equity. Thus capital markets help to assuage the fears of risk-averse investors of 
losing their money if they invest in big projects. Again this role of capital markets underscores the 
importance of capital markets in the SADC region where most countries are grappling with the 
problem of huge infrastructure deficit. Development of efficient capital markets is therefore vital to 
the infrastructure development efforts in the region. Capital markets would help both local and 
foreign investors to pool their investments together to fund different infrastructure projects. 
 
Finally, properly functioning capital markets help to reduce the cost of information gathering by 
investors. While institutional investors may have the resources to commit towards due diligence, 
small investors are sometimes scared away from in some companies because they do not have the 
wherewithal to extract the necessary information of the relevant stock. This increases the 
uncertainty of the safety of their investment and they therefore end up withholding their 
investment. Through the mandatory disclosure obligations that capital markets place on listed 
stocks, capital markets ensure that market participants have equal access to the relevant 
information they need to make informed investment choices. This role is very important in the 
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SADC region where, as we shall show later in chapter 5, self-enforcing attitudes of honesty, 
integrity and cooperative behaviour are in short supply among market players especially issuers. 
Full and frank disclosure is usually rare among issuers of stock most developing countries including 
SADC countries. Capital markets would therefore provide the much needed assurance that because 
issuers are under a legal obligation to disclosure material and price sensitive information, access to 
such information will be available at low cost.  
 
A number of empirical studies have found that stock markets are an important source of finance 
for funding the growth of large corporations in some African countries.3 For example, it was found 
that in Ghana, the stock market financed about 12 percent of total asset growth of listed 
companies in the period from 1995-2002.4  
 
Consequently, development of capital markets has become a common item on the development 
agenda of most developing economies including African economies. However, in Africa, an 
effective solution to develop its capital markets continues to elude policy makers. Despite various 
efforts and strategies5 to develop the markets by African state and economic authorities, African 
capital markets remain underdeveloped. Professor Nicholas Biekpe6 defined this problem in the 
following terms: 
 
“The basic question facing many policy makers in Africa is the identification of factors that constrain 
the development of successful and viable capital markets on the continent.  Many African countries 
                                                 
3
 Yartey C.A. and Adjasi C.K., ‘Stock Market Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Critical Issues and Challenges’, 
[2007] IMF Working Paper, Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07209.pdf  
4
 Ibid. 
5
 This has mainly involved removal of trade barriers and integration of stock exchanges. 
6
 In his paper entitled “African Capital Markets: Legal and Governance Framework” presented at the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa in November 2003. 
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have embarked on economic reform programmes; in most cases with the support of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These programmes have often included the 
liberalisation and restructuring of the financial sector. However, financial sector reforms have been 
least successful in many of these countries. The basic question, therefore, is why such reforms have 
not succeeded, despite the fact that they are an essential element in the development of efficient 
capital markets. For the further development of capital markets in Africa, useful lessons may be 
drawn from the experience of Asian and Latin American countries, as well as certain other African 
countries that have been able to promote the development of such markets successfully.” 
 
The above observation perfectly sets out the point of departure for this study which seeks to 
engage in a holistic diagnosis of the current malaise of capital markets in most developing 
countries, including Africa and provide possible alternative solutions for capital market growth in 
such countries.  
 
This study seeks to explore legal and institutional constraints that may be responsible for the slow 
capital market growth in developing countries particularly in Africa. Policy makers in Africa need to 
be properly guided in order to have the right focus of their resources in their bid to develop African 
financial markets. This research is therefore part of the overall economic development agenda in 
Africa. Several development programs have been initiated in Africa aimed at implementing legal 
and institutional reforms as an attempt to orchestrate economic growth across the continent. Such 
programs have been based on different theoretical underpinnings but little progress has been 
registered so far, as depicted in Table 1 below which gives a picture of state of the development of 
stock exchanges in SADC region. It is for this reason that this research seeks to develop a theory of 
development that may help in the implementation of the current development agenda generally 
and the development of strong capital markets specifically.  
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF SOME STOCK EXCHANGES IN THE SADC REGION 
 
COUNTRY 
YEAR 
FOUNDED 
STOCK EXCHANGE 
NO OF LISTED 
COMPANIES 
(AS AT 2009) 
MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION 
(USD-BLN) 
(AS AT 2009) 
Bostwana 1989 
Botswana Stock 
Exchange (BSE) 
31 4.26 
Malawi 1995 
Malawi Stock 
Exchange (MSE) 
15 1.48 
Mauritius 1988 
The Sock Exchange 
of Mauritius (SEM) 
40 4.82 
Mozambique 1999 
Maputo Stock 
Exchange (MSE) 
6 - 
Namibia 1992 
Namibia Stock 
Exchange (NSX) 
29 0.96 
South Africa 1887 
Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange 
(JSE) 
396 799.02 
Swaziland 1990 
Swaziland Stock 
Exchange (SSE) 
5 - 
Tanzania 1998 
Dar es Salaam 
Stock Exchange 
(DSE) 
15 3.57 
Zambia 1994 
Lusaka Stock 
Exchange (LuSE) 
21 5.27 
Zimbabwe 1993 
Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange (ZSE) 
96 - 
 
Source: Extracted from Capital Markets Authority, “A Comparative Analysis of The Performance of 
African Stock Markets For The Period 2008-2009 Volume II, June 2010. 
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1.2 AIM OF THE RESEARCH  
The aim of this research is to explore an effective development theory that can be used in designing 
and implementing legal and institutional reforms to promote development of capital markets in 
developing countries, in general and SADC countries, in particular7. The guiding light for this research 
is Douglass North’s framework of economic development as articulated in his work, Understanding 
the Process of Economic Change8.  North’s framework is drawn from the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) theory which rejects the neo classic economics concept of rational actors 
with respect to economic choices but recognises that mental models, ideas and ideologies 
play a major role in human choices and therefore must be integrated in any economic 
development theory. 
 
It will be argued that North’s framework of economic change and development is likely to 
succeed as a development theory because it brings to light realities that previous 
development theories and approaches overlooked. Specifically North’s model emphasises 
on the interplay between formal rules (statutes, regulations and policy statements) and 
informal rules (practices, protocols and beliefs) in any given society and posits that formal 
rules will only be effective if they are compatible with existing informal rules which are 
determined by societal belief system. This study therefore argues that legal and institutional 
framework for capital markets in developing countries should be tailored to the unique 
informal rules prevalent in each country rather than being transplanted from developed 
countries.  
                                                 
7
 SADC is a southern African organisation whose aim is to further socio-economic cooperation and integration 
as well as political and security cooperation among 15 southern African states. SADC member states include, 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo,  Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,  Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Madagascar.   
8
Douglas North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, (Princeton University Press, Oxford 2005).  
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In order to show the strength of North’s framework, several other theories will be analysed 
and compared and contrasted to North’ framework. These include legal anthropology, law 
and economics, law and development and Washington Consensus theories, comparative law 
and legal transplant theories. We will then proceed to show how North’s framework would 
be specifically applied to the development of capital markets in SADC region. 
 
The term capital market has a wide definitional scope as it embraces the whole complex of 
institutions and arrangements through which capital may be raised.9 However, this research 
will mainly focus on the stock markets because they currently form the most visible 
component of the capital markets in SADC countries. 
 
1.3 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES  
The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
(i) Re-theorise the role of legal and institutional infrastructure in capital market 
development with particular reference to the SADC region. 
 
(ii) Draw on North’s framework of economic development to provide the theoretical 
framework for understanding the role of legal and institutional infrastructure in 
capital market development in the SADC region. 
 
                                                 
9
 R. Burges, Corporate Finance Law, (2
nd
 edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1992) 5. 
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(iii) Use the theory to examine critically the existing legal and institutional infrastructure 
in SADC region, including the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions. 
 
(iv) Inform/enrich the different approaches taken by law and policy reformers with 
regards to capital market development. 
 
1.4 KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Starting from the position that sufficient evidence of a significant nexus between capital 
market growth and economic development can be identified, this research seeks to answer 
the following research questions: 
 
(i) Why are most new capital markets including capital markets in SADC region still 
underdeveloped despite different reform strategies that have been put in place?  
 
(ii) How can North’s framework of economic development help policy makers and law    
reformers design and implement effective capital market reform programmes? 
 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned above, this research is, in the main, based on North’s work on successful 
implementation of economic change. Part of this research is based upon doctrinal legal 
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scholarship in the comparative law tradition. According to Zweigert and Kötz10 this approach 
attempts to use a functional analysis of legal processes to describe the substantive and 
systemic aspects of different legal systems. There may be little or no convergence between 
the systems and their terminology but many legal systems attempt to protect similar 
interests. Only rules which perform the same function or address the same problem can 
profitably be compared. Zweigert and Kötz11 state that functionality is the basic 
methodological principle of all comparative law.  
 
In this study the functional analysis is based upon the regulation of capital markets in three 
jurisdictions and involves a description of aspects of regulatory and institutional 
arrangements that exist in those jurisdictions. 
 
Mindful of the epistemological challenges that are always associated with non-empirical 
desk based research, part of the methodology of this work is to seek support from related 
empirical studies based on different philosophical underpinnings but that confirm the 
working hypothesis of this research. This method, which is modelled on the “two source 
rule” of classic journalism12, was followed by Robert Putman in his work on Social Capital13 
who said:  
“Never report anything unless at least two independent sources confirm it. In this book I 
follow that same maxim. Nearly every major generalization here rests on more than one 
body of independent evidence, and where I have discovered divergent results from credible 
                                                 
10
Zweigert, K., and Kötz, H. Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998)  
11
Ibid., p. 34 
12
 This rule says that every rumour or tip must be double checked before it is published. 
13
 Robert D Putnam, Bowling Alone (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York 2000). 
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sources, I note the disparity as well. … I have sought as diverse a range of evidence as 
possible on continuities and change in American social life.”
14
 
 
Also Howard Gardner used a similar methodology in his Multiple Intelligences work.15 
In using this method, however, one needs to be mindful of the dangers of selecting from the 
evidence only that which supports the hypothesis and rejecting that which is obstructive to 
the same.16 
 
In this research we will look at a number of different researches, using different 
philosophical underpinnings and methodologies that support North’s model but will argue 
that the tools of analysis used by North in his work are intellectually far much superior to 
those adopted by other researchers and theorists.   
 
This research adopts a multidisciplinary approach in that it draws from law, economics and 
social science literature. The main scholarship traditions that inform this research include, 
law and society, law and economics, law and finance as well as the New Institutional 
Economics theory. Thus the approach is not restricted to an examination of formal legal 
rules and includes relevant contributions from practitioners and theorists from both legal 
and non-legal spheres. 
 
Finally, given the nature of this research, we adopt a high level approach to 
conceptualisation to avoid concept stretching. Concept stretching is defined as a form of 
                                                 
14
 Ibid, p.26 
15
Howard Gardner, ‘Beyond the IQ’ in The Development and Education of the Mind (2006) pp. 48-49. 
16
K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. (Routledge, London 2002) 124 
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measurement error that arises when scholars inappropriately apply established concepts 
and theories to new contexts17. We have therefore, purposefully, resorted to the use of 
general definitions of concepts to allow cross-area comparisons among heterogeneous 
contexts.18  
 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows; Chapter 2 discusses the role of capital markets 
in economic development. Specifically, this chapter looks at the legal position of stock 
exchanges, the functions of a stock exchange and the theoretical link between development 
of capital market and economic growth. This discussion is important because the hypothesis 
of this study is set on the premise that there is a direct correlation between the size and 
growth of capital markets and economic development. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the different theories and approaches that have in recent past informed 
development policy makers in designing reform agendas in developing countries. These 
include legal anthropology, law and economics, comparative law including legal transplant 
theories, law and development and Washington consensus theories. This chapter finishes 
with an introduction of the emerging new institutional economics theory from which, 
Douglass North draws his new approach to economic development reform. The purpose of 
this chapter is to show the shortcomings of the theoretical underpinnings on which 
economic agenda has, hitherto, been based and which, it is argued, explain the apparent 
                                                 
17
 Henry Brady  and David Collier,  Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, (Rowan & 
Littlefield, Publishers, Inc., 2004)  p 279. 
18
 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,’ (1970) The American Political Science 
Review, 64(4), p1034 at p. 1044. 
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elusiveness of an effective approach to economic development. This discussion will also 
help explain why North’s approach may succeed where these other theories failed. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion and analysis of North’s approach and explains how 
North’s framework compares with the theories and approaches that have been hitherto 
deployed as set out in chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 5 applies North’s framework to capital market development theory by looking at 
institutions and organisations that may propel or hinder development of capital markets. In 
this chapter macro and micro institutions or organisations that need to be focussed on 
when designing a capital market development agenda are explored. 
 
In chapter 6 the study focuses on the micro institutions and organisations necessary for 
capital market development as recommended by Professor Bernard Black. Black’s proposed 
institutions and organisations are particularly crucial to this study as they are based on his 
practical experience with the process of establishing capital markets in developing 
economies. Most importantly this chapter attempts to synthesize North’s framework and 
Black’s recommendations. This is considered to be one of the central planks of this study as 
it brings together theory and practice for capital market development. 
 
Chapter 7 engages in a comparative analysis of capital market regulatory regimes in three 
different jurisdictions, namely, United Kingdom, South Africa and Malawi. These countries 
have been carefully selected as they represent different levels of capital market 
development. Crucially, the South African capital market, which is a relatively well 
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developed market, is located in the same economic region as the Malawi capital market, the 
latter being one of the least developed markets. This intriguing disparity is then explained in 
light of North’s framework. 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the mechanics of institutional change as espoused by North and other 
related theories. The aim of this chapter is to explore the practical difficulties in 
implementing institutional change and provide some practical ways for achieving effective 
institutional change. 
 
Chapter 9 is the last chapter and discusses possible reform approaches that can be adopted 
in developing countries including the SADC region in order to carry out policy and legal 
reforms within the tenets of North’s framework for institutional change. This chapter 
finishes with a conclusion of this study. 
 
It should be noted that this study has deliberately avoided making firm recommendations as 
it is exploratory in its approach and it recognises that more research in this area is needed 
before a concrete road map to capital market development is drawn. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Capital markets have since the 1990s become popular due to a number of global as well as 
market factors. Global factors that have generated interest in capital markets include 
intellectual conversion of political elites to the power of markets as instruments of 
economic change, privatisation of public assets and the sustained recovery in equity 
markets and technology revolution. Market factors include innovation in financial products 
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and markets, the advent of institutional investors, development of derivative markets and 
liberalisation and internalisation of markets.19 
 
The relevant question for this study is; what is the role of capital markets in the overall 
economic development? It is necessary to examine the role of capital markets in national 
economies as the need to develop capital markets in emerging markets would only be 
justified if markets play a significant role in economic development. Before we do that, 
however, we need to look at the relevant terminology which will give this study a proper 
perspective. 
 
2.2 DEFINITIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The term capital market has a wider definitional scope as it embraces the whole complex of 
institutions and arrangements through which capital may be raised.20 Capital markets 
channel the money provided by savers and depository institutions such as banks, credit 
unions and insurance companies to borrowers and investors through a variety of financial 
instruments including bonds, notes, stocks which are collectively called securities.21 The 
capital market system is therefore made up of three major parts: (1) stock market, (2) bond 
market, and (3) money market. The Capital market is sometimes referred to as the securities 
market. 
 
This work will however mainly focus on the stock markets because trading of stock is more 
common in developing countries than other exchange traded products like bonds, forex and 
                                                 
19
B.J. Foley, Capital Markets, (Macmillan Education Ltd, 1991) pp 1-2.  
20
 R. Burges, Supra note 9. 
21
 See. Business Dictionary at www.businessdictionary.com (Last visited on 06/08/2014)  
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commodities. Stock markets are also called stock exchanges or equity markets.  A stock 
exchange is defined as a market for the sale and purchase of shares, stock and other 
securities.22 Stock exchanges are usually organized and regulated and securities are bought 
and sold at prices governed by the forces of demand and supply. Stock exchanges basically 
serve either as primary markets or as secondary markets of stocks. In its role as a primary 
market, a stock exchange allows new issues of equity or debt to be arranged in the form of 
an entirely new floatation or in the form of an offer to existing investors.23 The primary 
market therefore enables corporations, governments, municipalities, and other 
incorporated bodies to raise capital by channelling savings of the investors into productive 
ventures.24 On the other hand, the secondary market allows investors to sell their securities 
to other investors for cash, thereby reducing the risk of investment and maintaining liquidity 
in the system. The existence of a secondary market therefore makes the primary market 
operate more effectively.25  
 
The history of stock exchanges can be traced back to sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
when the modern business corporation and modern equity instruments were created 
following changes in the European financial sector and other geopolitical developments26. 
Stock exchanges were created to provide a platform for secondary trading of equity 
                                                 
22
 G. Cooper, and R.J Cridlan, Law and procedure of the Stock Exchange, (Butterworths, London 1971) 1. 
23
 Foley, Supra note 19, P.6.  
24
 G. Cooper and R.J. Cridlan, Supra. Note 22, p. 7.  
25
 Investors will be prepared to float their shares because they know that they will be able to raise the funds 
they need and at the same time investors buying on a primary market are assured that they can offload their 
investment at any time.  
26
 See: Charles Pouncy, ‘Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa:Western Legal Institutions as a Component of the 
Neo-Colonial Project’, (2002) 23 (1) Journal of International Law , pp 85-117 at  p.90. Pouncy notes that the 
stock companies were a response to the risk and reward structure of European efforts to exploit trading 
opportunities with non-European world.  One of the geo-political imperatives was the need to finance the debt 
resulting from Britain and France’s competition for political supremancy.  Ibid. Also See: Jonathan Baskin and 
Paul Miranti Jr, A History of Corporate Finance, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) at pp 47-50. 
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instruments so that the risk-reward function that was packaged in the instruments could be 
readily acquired or liquidated27. 
 
In terms of nature and status, stock exchanges exist in different forms.   In the case of 
Weinberger v. Inglis28, Lord Buckmaster described the character and status of London Stock 
Exchange as follows: 
 
“The London Stock exchange is in Reality a building vested in certain proprietors 
and used for the purpose of carrying on a market for stocks and shares. It is not 
regulated in any way by charter or statute. The Management owes no duties to 
the public and the business is subject to no regulations except those which from 
time to time (the council) think right to impose on those whom they chose to 
admit. The Prestige and authority of the institution depend entirely upon the 
reputation it has established for honest and efficient business methods. Any 
group of people who so desired could start another Stock Exchange tomorrow. It 
is not a public market – it is a private market and access to it is only obtained 
through membership.”29 
 
Of course, technological and regulatory advances have significantly changed the nature and 
status of modern day stock exchanges. In Lord Buckmaster’s time share dealing was face to 
face and socially relational. This is no longer the case as electronic trading has removed 
geographical and time zone boundaries that used to exist then. Also in the case of European 
stock exchanges like the London Stock Exchange, they now operate under the wider EU 
                                                 
27
 Ibid at p. 90. 
28
 [1919] A.C. 606 H.L. 617-619 
29
 Ibid at 618. 
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regulatory framework which is aimed at fostering free movement of capital within the 
union30. 
  
Apart from the formal stock exchanges, equity or debt is also traded on the Over the 
Counter market (OTC). This market deals mainly in securities which are not traded on an 
exchange, usually due to an inability to meet listing requirements. The market is operated 
by brokers/dealers who negotiate directly with one another over computer networks and by 
phone. Securities acquired in the OTC market are riskier than those quoted on the Stock 
Exchange for several reasons including lack of sufficient statutory protection to investors 
and lack of liquidity31. The role of OTC markets have now been significantly reduced 
following introduction of alternative markets where trading of most unlisted shares take 
place32.  
 
2.3 FUNCTION OF CAPITAL MARKETS.  
In order to understand the role of stock markets in economic growth, it is important to look 
at the distinct functions of the markets themselves. Generally the functions of capital 
markets may be summarised as follows: 
 
i. Capital markets maintain a free market by providing a meeting place and 
facilities for trading which in turn brings together a constant stream of buyers 
                                                 
30
 See the discussion of UK regulatory framework in chapter 7 below. 
31
 Foley, supra note 19, p. 19 
32
 Examples include AIM and NASDAQ 
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and sellers of stocks.33 In this way capital markets facilitate the flow of funds 
generated within the economy to be made available to those who need them 
on terms acceptable to those supplying them.34 In other words, capital 
markets provide a mechanism through which investible funds from economic 
agents in financial surplus are transferred to those in financial deficit.35 
 
ii. Capital markets supply a continuous measure of worth, making the securities 
useful as a basis of credit or exchange throughout the country at a figure 
based roughly on the market price in the exchange.36 Capital markets 
therefore act as an instrument for stock valuation which is key to determining 
management performance, timing further Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and 
capital gain for shareholders.  
 
iii. Perhaps the most crucial role of capital markets is that they provide liquidity 
for securities by providing the only substantial means by which an investor 
can withdraw his capital either for other capital employment or for personal 
expenditures. According to Berle & Means ‘the market is the paying teller’s 
window.’37 This is made possible through the state-of-the-art technology and 
the business of brokering which help traders to buy and sell securities quickly 
and efficiently.  
 
                                                 
33
A.A. Berle, and G.C Means, The Corporation and Private Property, (2002 ed, Transaction Publishers, London, 
1932)  255 
34
 R. Burges, supra, note 9. 
35
 Foley, supra, note 19. 
36
 Berle and Means, supra note 33. 
37
 Ibid. P. 263 
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iv. Finally, capital markets protect investors by upholding rules and regulations 
that ensure buyers will be treated fairly and receive exactly what they pay 
for. This is done both via the primary market where stock market disclosure 
rules set a quality threshold for shares to be listed on the market and via the 
secondary market where, the capital market in its role as a regulator, 
prevents a false market through the stock exchange rules, common law and 
statute which are mainly concerned to prevent insider trading or market 
abuse.38  
 
Given these functions of capital markets, there are a number of advantages that attach to a 
company that trades its shares on a stock exchange. According to Foley, selling debt or 
equity via an organised and recognised stock exchange yields a number of advantages 
including the following:39 
 
i. It promotes firm growth in that access to external sources allows the firm to 
grow more rapidly due to its ability to raise additional capital in a 
considerably easier and successful manner. Such growth can be realised 
either through internal organic processes or acquisition of other firms. 
 
ii. A stock exchange quotation confers on a company special status, which 
allows it to obtain bank credit on finer terms than would be the case for 
similar sized non-quoted organisation. Also the quoted status helps publicise 
                                                 
38
 Cooper & Cridlan, supra note 22. 
39
 Foley, supra note 19, p. 10. 
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the company to larger clientele and may allow it to exploit international 
sources of capital. 
 
iii. Further, availability of stock exchange finance gives a firm more flexible 
capital structure. It can be easily varied by altering the debt/equity mix to 
obtain finance on cheap terms. Besides conversional securities, the firm can 
also arrange issues in hybrid products like bonds with an option to convert 
into equity. 
 
iv. Finally owners of the company can, by selling their shares, use the stock 
exchange to realise part of their wealth. Also as the company grows, the 
value of the share holding will reflect that growth and an original investment 
of few thousand shares may grow into an extremely valuable claim on the 
assets of the company.   
 
2.4 STOCK MARKETS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. 
Having looked at the functions of the stock exchanges we are now in a position to explore 
the macro-economic impact of stock exchanges. It is believed that Stock markets play a 
crucial role in the allocation of capital resources within the economy which in turn plays a 
critical role in the determination of the rate of growth of the nation’s output. Baumol40 
observed that: 
 
                                                 
40
 W.J. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency, (Fordham University Press, New York, 1965)  2. 
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“If capital resources are not provided to those industries the demand for whose products 
is growing or is at least expandable, if capital is not available to sectors which are capable 
of increasing production and productivity and above all if there is no investment in 
research and development, we can be sure that the rate of expansion of the economy will 
suffer”  
 
The stock market is said to be well positioned to carry out this task. The stock market has 
also been described as a close approximation to a perfect market because it has all the 
necessary characteristics required of a pure competitive market including product 
homogeneity (because anyone’s share is identical, it does not matter which share one buys 
in a company) and free entry and exit i.e. anyone who owns a listed security can undertake 
to sell it and anyone who wishes to acquire one can purchase it.  
 
In order to have a meaningful impact on the economy, stock markets must not only focus on 
the processes of finance and trade but must also facilitate growth of the production side of 
the economy41.  This entails that trading of stock on the exchange markets must result in 
establishment of new companies or the expansion of the existing companies. 
 
This means that a well-functioning securities market is conducive to sustained economic 
growth. A number of studies have established robust relationship between the 
development in the securities market and the economic growth. For example, Levine and 
                                                 
41
C.  Pouncy, supra note 26 at 86.  
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Zervos42 found that stock market development is highly significant statistically in forecasting 
future growth of per capita GDP.  
 
A number of explanatory mechanisms are put forward in support of this relationship. Firstly, 
securities markets augment the quantities of real savings and capital formation from any 
given level of national income by providing a bridge between ultimate savers and ultimate 
investors thereby creating the opportunity to put the savings of the cautious at the disposal 
of the enterprising, thus promising to raise the total level of investment and hence of 
growth.43 Secondly, securities markets increase net capital inflow from abroad in that they 
provide a link between the national economy and the rest of the world thereby facilitating 
inflow of capital in the form of portfolio investment.44 At the same time, the existence of a 
domestic securities market will deter capital outflow by providing attractive investment 
opportunities within domestic economy. Thirdly securities markets raise the productivity of 
investment by improving allocation of investible funds. Further, a developed securities 
market successfully monitors the efficiency with which the existing capital stock is deployed 
and thereby significantly increases the average return. Also the fluctuation of share prices 
causes changes in net wealth for both investors and listed companies. As share prices rise 
and fall individuals may change their spending plans; banks and other financial institutions 
may revise their lending plans as the value of their assets rises or falls.45 Finally securities 
markets and its institutions help the user in many ways to reduce the cost of capital by 
                                                 
42
 R. Levine and S. Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’. 88 American Economic Review, 
(1998) 537-558. 
43
 G.N. Bajpai, ‘Stock Markets and Economic Growth’, Speech given at Global Corporate Gorvernance Meeting, 
Paris in November 2003. Web at http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/attachdocs/1293011165899.pdf.  
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Peter Howells & Keith Bain, Financial Markets and Institutions, (3
rd
 edition Pierson Education Ltd, Essex, 
2000) 171. 
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providing a convenient market place to which investors and issuers of securities go and 
thereby avoid the need to search for a suitable counterpart. Also, the market provides 
standardised products and thereby cuts the information costs associated with individual 
instruments. By specialising and operating on a large scale, the market institutions, cut costs 
through the use of tested procedures and routines.46 
 
It is also said that securities markets provide developmental benefits by firstly providing a 
fast-rate breeding ground for the skills and judgement needed for entrepreneurship, risk 
bearing, portfolio selection and management on the part of the user. Secondly, they help 
integrate the informal financial systems with the institutional financial sector by directly 
displacing traditional assets such as gold and stocks of produce or, indirectly, by providing 
portfolio assets for unit trusts, pension funds and similar financial Instruments that raise 
savings from the traditional sector. Finally, the existence of securities market enhances the 
scope, and provides institutional mechanisms, for the operation of monetary and financial 
policy.  
 
2.5 STOCK MARKETS AND MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOUR 
Emphasis on the role of capital markets in economic development has been criticised on the 
ground that the issue of securities to raise capital is not the most important way in which 
companies finance their activities.47 Financial statistics on sources of capital for industrial 
and commercial companies show that, on average, the most important source of finance 
derives from internally generated funds and of the externally sourced funds, bank 
                                                 
46
 Bajpai, supra note 43. 
47
 Foley, Supra note 19,  p. 6. 
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borrowing is the most significant source of funds with funds obtained from capital markets 
normally comprising less than 10% of the total funds raised at any given period of time.48   
 
However, despite this relative insignificance of capital markets as a source of corporate 
finance, capital markets play a distinct role in  corporate governance which in turn result in 
maximisation of shareholder value of the individual firm. In this way capital markets act as a 
direct supervisor of the efficiency of utilisation of the economy’s capital resources.49 It is this 
influence of capital markets on the corporation system that accentuates its relevance to the 
national economy. 
 
In order to appreciate the economic significance of the market in terms of its influence on 
the corporation system, it is important to understand the relevance of the firm to the 
economy. The starting point in this regard would be Ronald Coase’s Theory of the Firm. In 
his work, The Nature of the Firm,50 Coase attacks classic economic theory which posits that 
the allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the price 
mechanism in that it does not give a complete picture of the economic system as it excludes 
the role of economic planning in the economic system.51 Coase posits that organizations are 
factors of production such that while outside the firm, price movements direct production 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the (open) market, within a firm 
                                                 
48
 Ibid. P. 7.   
49
 Baumol, supra note 40. P. 78. 
50
R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, in R.H. Coase, The Firm, The Market and The Law, (The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988) 33. 
51
 Coase disagrees with Sir Arthur Salter who described the economic system as follows: “The normal 
economic system works itself. For its current operation, it is under no central control, it needs no central 
survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, production to 
consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive”. J.A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1921) 16-17. 
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these market transactions are eliminated and in place of a complex market structure with 
exchange transactions is substituted an entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production. 
According to Coase, therefore, a firm consists of the system of relationships which comes 
into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur within the 
limits of a contract. It is the existence of the entrepreneur coordinator in the process of 
coordinating production that makes any system that has capability to control the 
entrepreneur relevant to the economic system. As it will be shown below, capital markets 
have such capability. 
 
The main reason why a firm is relevant in the economic system is that it helps avoid the cost 
of using price mechanism. According to Coase, there are three aspects of such costs.52 The 
first is the cost of discovering what relevant prices are. Secondly, there is the cost of 
negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes 
place on the market. The firm helps to cut these costs as the owner thereof does not have 
to make a series of contracts with the factors of production with whom he is co-operating 
within the firm, as would be necessary if this cooperation were a direct result of the working 
of the price mechanism. And finally there is a regulatory cost in that exchange transactions 
on a market and the same transactions organized within a firm are often treated differently 
by governments or other bodies within regulatory powers. 
 
Finally, Coase says a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction 
by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in another firm. 
                                                 
52
 Coase, Supra note 50, p. 38. 
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According to Coase, all things being equal, a firm will tend to be larger (a) the less the costs 
of organising and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the transactions organised; 
(b) the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in 
mistakes with an increase in the transactions organised. (c) the greater the lowering (or the 
less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production to firms of larger size. Also a firm 
can expand through combination when transactions which were previously organised by 
two or more entrepreneurs become organised by one or through integration when it 
involves the organisation of transactions which were previously carried out among the 
entrepreneurs on the market.  
 
The capital market is clearly well placed to facilitate growth of the firm in as far as it reduces 
transactional costs, makes corporate managers more accountable, reduces cost of capital 
and facilitates mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Although, corporations take the place of an effective instrument of productivity in the 
modern world,53 the potential risk of abuse of the corporation system has been lamented. 
The first attack on the corporation system was by W.W. Cook in his publication, ‘The 
Corporation Problem’54 where he observed that the corporate device had helped some 
capitalists to become “the greatest benefactors of the age” and that big corporations had 
openly corrupted all branches of government and that for many, the polestar of existence 
was not what is honest but what is profitable.55 Cook further observed that: 
 
                                                 
53
 W. Werner, ‘Management, Stock Markets and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered’, 77 
Columbia Law Review, (1977) 388 at 390.  
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 W.W. Cook, ‘ The Corporation Problem’ (1891), cited in W. Werner, Ibid. P. 390. 
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“The spoliation of corporations and stockholders by the corporate managers have been 
systematised into well-known methods of proceeding and that carrying out of such plans 
has become a profession and an accomplishment….Corporations become insolvent and 
stockholders lose their investment, while individuals become millionaires. Illegitimate 
gains are secured and enormous fortunes are amassed by the few, at the expense of the 
defrauded but generally helpless stockholders.”
56
 
 
Cook recommended a restoration of an internal distribution of power that would enable 
shareholders, as owners of the corporation, to elect directors who would manage on their 
behalf and be accountable to them. 
 
The stock market collapse of 1929 gave rise to more questions about shareholder rights and 
the corporation’s place in the economy.57  This led to the debate about separation of control 
and ownership championed by Berle & Means58 who observed that the traditional wisdom 
had failed to account for the behaviour of the new public corporations and the economic 
and organisational systems they were creating. Their main concern was that the economic 
power was being concentrated in a small number of large corporations whose ownership 
was increasingly dispersed over a large number of shareholders. That dispersion, they 
argued, coupled with gradual elimination of majority and large minority shareholdings, 
enabled managers owning few shares or none to control these corporations and that the 
resulting separation of ownership and control was dissolving the atom of property.59  
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 Ibid. P. 81 
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Berle & Means feared that non-owner controllers might lack the owner-entrepreneur’s 
incentive to maximise profits and that controllers motivated by desire for personal 
monetary gain could use their power position against the interest of ownership. They also 
observed that the problem had become a serious public concern since, for the first time, 
many of these owners were members of the “investing public”60 who had purchased 
common stocks as property interests which purported to assure participation in corporate 
earnings and assets. According to Berle & Means, controllers held and exercised corporate 
powers for the benefit of all shareholders such that corporate law ought to be regarded as a 
branch of law of trust.61 
 
Berle & Means however expressed their confidence in the public market as a device for 
fulfilling shareholder expectation. They argued that the shareholder had a piece of paper 
with an open market value and although these were merely uncertain expectations, when 
“aggregated, interpreted by public market and appraised in security exchange, they do have 
a concrete and measurable value; and it is to this value that the shareholder must and in 
fact does address himself. His thinking is coloured by it; and in large measure the corporate 
security system is based on it.”62 They therefore recommended that “the appraisal of the 
various expectations under the mechanism which permits the immediate turning of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
from management, instead of amounting to a sharp cleavage, takes the form of gradual shading-off in the 
degree of coincidence between managerial and stockholder objectives. Baumol, supra note 40, P. 85 
60
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61
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62
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expectations into cash, becomes a focal point in the corporate system of today.”63 
According to Berle and Means, the mechanism was the stock market. 
 
The stock market was, therefore, thought as key to shareholder protection and in order to 
fulfil this role it had to be open and honest market, providing shareholders with accurate 
corporate information and with adequate remedies for market fraud and manipulation. This 
requirement is now being met by robust securities regulation of modern securities 
exchange.  
 
The regulated stock market has resulted in a change in corporate goals as today 
management is more wary about the market evaluation of its company’s prospects. As 
Werner observed “the old strategy of steady earnings to permit steady dividends has been 
replaced by a strategy of constantly increasing earnings to support constantly advancing 
share prices”64 As such the management has become amenable to the invisible hand of the 
market. Some of the reasons why company managements are continually concerned about 
the market prices of their shares include the following:    
 
i. Share price influences availability and cost of capital in that the performance 
of a company’s shares can influence the terms on which it can obtain funds 
from other sources.65 Thus share prices will affect the issuer’s standing with 
credit rating agencies, its ability to borrow from banks, to sell commercial 
paper and to sell publicly or place privately long-term debt securities.  
                                                 
63
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64
 Werner, supra note 53, p. 404. 
65
 Baumol, supra note 40, p. 81. 
  
- 32 - 
 
 
ii. Poor market evaluation of a company’s shares will result in shareholder 
dissatisfaction and will expose the company to a takeover bid which, if 
successful, will result in change of management. Consequently corporate 
managers will strive for high performance of its shares to shield itself from 
this threat.66  
 
iii. Further, market appraisal of shares directly affects the value of 
management’s shareholdings and options to purchase company stock and 
this gives managers a significant personal interest as shareholders to 
maximise value of their shares.  
 
iv. Finally, failure to match share price action of other companies is interpreted 
as a public evaluation of inferior management performance, threatening 
management’s power position, and depreciating its value on the job 
market.67 Market price is also said to be a measure of success in the contest 
among top managers-as among investors –to outperform each other. It is a 
score card in the game that managers play in a culture that equates winning 
with success, which in turn brings reputation and prestige.68 
 
                                                 
66
 Werner has noted that while wide dispersion of shareholdings before 1932 allowed management to 
perpetuate itself by masterly of the proxy machinery, management could be removed only after dissidents had 
won a proxy fight, which was difficult even where the insurgents possessed a substantial minority shareholder 
interest. Today management control is far less secure. It is frequently turned over, often despite incumbents’ 
opposition, as the takeover bid in the public market has become a potent instrument of displacement. 
Ironically the stock market has helped to convert the share dispersion that was once management’s strongest 
defence weapon into a powerful threat to its survival. Werner, Supra 53, P.  404. 
67
 Manne, ‘Mergers and the market for corporate control’, (1965) 73 Pol. Econ. 110  
68
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The stock market therefore has, to some extent69, removed fears that were initially levelled 
on the corporation system of plundering the property of investors by management. It is this 
role of the stock market, which is expressed as market for corporate control that gives it a 
prominent place within the economic system. Its ability to tame corporate managers 
enables the corporation system to roll efficiently thereby facilitating economic growth.   
 
2.6  IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE SADC COUNTRIES. 
 
In light of the above theoretical role of capital markets, there is a valid expectation that the 
development of capital markets in the SADC region will make a significant contribution to the 
economic development of the member countries of this economic region. As discussed above, a 
well-functioning capital market facilitates efficient allocation of capital from those who have capital 
surplus to those who have capital deficit. Through such allocative efficiency, it is hoped that 
companies on the production side of the economy would be well resourced and consequently 
increase productivity in the economy. This would be very vital in the SADC region given that most 
of its member countries are predominantly import dependent countries due to lack of resources to 
support economic production that would help these countries to transition from import-based to 
export-based economies. There is therefore a strong case for relevance of efficient capital markets 
in the SADC region.  
 
Further, capital markets help with risk sharing for big and capital intensive projects. Generally, 
investors would be reluctant to single-handedly fund a high cost project out of which they can only 
realise a return on capital after a relatively long period of time. Through the medium of capital 
                                                 
69
 The existence of developed stock markets in developing countries has not completely eliminated corporate 
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markets however, investors are able to reduce their risk by only contributing a portion of the 
overall cost of the project alongside other investors. Given that efficient capital markets have high 
liquidity levels, investors are able to take out there money at any stage of the project by disposing 
of their equity. Thus, capital markets help to assuage the fears of risk-averse investors of losing 
their money if they invest in big projects. Again this role of capital markets underscores the 
importance of capital markets in the SADC region where most countries are grappling with the 
problem of huge infrastructure deficit. Development of efficient capital markets is therefore vital to 
the infrastructure development efforts in the region. Capital markets would help both local and 
foreign investors to pool their investments together to fund different infrastructure projects. 
 
Also, properly functioning capital markets help to reduce the cost of information gathering by 
investors. While institutional investors may have the resources to commit towards due diligence, 
small investors are sometimes scared away from investing in some companies because they do not 
have the wherewithal to extract the necessary information of the relevant stock. This creates 
uncertainty of the safety of their investment and they therefore end up withholding their 
resources. Through the mandatory disclosure obligations that capital markets place on listed 
stocks, capital markets ensure that market participants have equal access to the relevant 
information they need to make informed investment choices. This role is very important in the 
SADC region where, as we shall show later in chapter 5, self-enforcing attitudes of honesty, 
integrity and cooperative behaviour are in short supply among market players especially issuers. 
Full and frank disclosure is usually rare among issuers of stock in most developing countries 
including SADC countries. Capital markets would therefore provide the much needed assurance 
that because issuers are under a legal obligation to disclosure material and price sensitive 
information, access to such information will be available at low cost.  
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Finally capital markets provide a reliable alternative source of corporate financing. Apart from the 
traditional bank loans, companies are able to raise more money through share issuance. A number 
of empirical studies have found that stock markets had been an important source of finance for 
funding the growth of large corporations in some SADC countries.70 For example, it was found that 
in South Africa, new equity issues accounted for 18 percent of total asset growth between 1996 
and 200071. External debt contributed 61 percent of total financing, and retained earnings financed 
the remaining 21 percent72. Another study found that in Zimbabwe, equity finance contributed 8 
percent to the funding of listed corporations between 1990 and 1999. Equity financing was the 
most important source of long term finance at 7.8 percent. Long term bank loans and bonds were 
each a very minor component of total external financing.73 Empirical evidence was also found 
which confirmed that in Mauritius, the stock market financed about 9 percent of total asset growth 
with retained earnings and external debt contributing 30 and 61 percent respectively to the 
financing of total asset growth between 1992-1999.74  The foregoing shows that the stock markets 
were for these companies the single most important source of long term external finance.   
 
However, as stated in chapter 1 above, capital markets in the SADC region are not yet efficient 
relative to capital markets in developed countries. As such their contribution towards the overall 
economic growth of the respective national economies is sub-optimal. As we will discuss further in 
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this thesis, there are a number of factors that contributes to the slow realisation of the full 
potential of capital markets’ role with respect to economic development in developing countries 
including the SADC countries. One of such factors is the circumstances under which most of these 
capital markets were established. Capital markets in SADC countries, as is the case with most 
developing countries, were established as part of the World Bank and IMF economic structural 
adjustment reforms.75 One of the policies that were being deployed under these reforms was 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises and most stock markets in SADC region with the exception 
of the South African Johannesburg Stock Exchange were established to act as vehicles through 
which issues of the privatised firms would be traded.76  
 
Consequently it is observed that most of the offerings on the Sub-Saharan Africa Stock exchanges 
have resulted from privatisation.77 Pouncy makes the following interesting observation: 
 
“The Malawi stock exchange, for example, has only conducted IPOs of securities in privatized firms since its 
establishment in 1996; Zambia's Lusaka stock exchange has only offered the securities of privatized firms since it began 
operations in 1994; … Although the exchanges in Kenya and Tanzania have offered the securities of private issuers, the 
privatizations of the Kenya Reinsurance Company, the Housing Financing Company of Kenya, and Chemii Sugar 
Company will again place the Kenyan exchange in the position of refinancing formerly public entities. It is fair to say 
that with the exception of the stock markets in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, the majority of all of the issues 
on the SSA stock exchanges have resulted from privatization.”
78
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It is therefore said that the capital markets in the Sub-Saharan Africa (which include SADC 
countries) are not playing the type of role that capital markets have played in the West and in Asia 
in that they are not providing financing for the development of innovative independent domestic 
industries. Instead, they have largely served to provide a means for multinational corporations to 
acquire controlling stakes in firms whose assets are exploitable natural resources and exportable 
agricultural commodities.79 As a result capital markets have not made any meaningful contribution 
to the development of national economies in the region. 
 
2.7  CONCLUSION 
Capital markets have a distinct role in the promotion of sustained economic growth. There is 
a clear positive correlation between well-developed capital markets and strong national 
economic development. This is so mainly because capital markets create liquidity in the 
market, provide a channel through which financial surplus and financial deficit levels off and 
also provide a mechanism for checks and balances on the behaviour of corporate managers, 
resulting in improved economic performance. This modern relevance of capital market 
creates a need for each economy, more especially developing economies to develop robust 
capital market markets, hence the relevance of this study to economic development in 
developing countries. SADC countries therefore stand to benefit from well-functioning 
capital markets although the history of most capital markets in the region has so far limited 
their relevance to economic growth. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: IN SEARCH OF A CAPITAL MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in chapter 2 shows that capital markets can effectively be developed when 
appropriate legal and institutional frameworks are in existence. This begs the question; how 
should such legal and institutional frameworks be developed in countries or economic 
regions where they have never existed before or where they are not robust enough to 
generate capital market growth.  
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A number of techniques have been adopted before but history has not judged most of them 
favourably and as a result the search for an effective development theory appears to be well 
and truly still ongoing. This section looks at different techniques, methods and theories that 
scholars and practitioners have called to aid as a tool for legal and institutional reform in 
developing countries.  
 
3.2  LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Legal anthropology seeks to explore the genesis and function of law and of the legal action 
within a society by direct observation.80 Legal anthropologists believe that each society has 
its own rules that are embedded in its social order and can only be properly understood by 
observing the society’s way of life.81  Llewelyn et al82 in their study of Cheyenne society 
found that the rules that are legal are those that have authority among the people and are 
engaged with regularity and such rules provide satisfaction among members of the society. 
They conclude that it is these rules that are effective in the ordering of the society because 
they have “legality” as opposed mere “legalism” which is “marked by unsatisfactory 
results”.83  
 
When applied to legal reform, the theory of legal anthropology posits that, in order to bring 
about an effective change of law, law reformers should concentrate on the society’s social 
order and determine what rules have legality in the society. Llewelyn and Hoebel, in The 
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Cheyenne Way, developed a theory of investigation in which they insisted on the need to 
discover: 
(i) The norms and rules which are felt proper for channelling and controlling 
behaviour. They called this the “right ways.” 
(ii) Practice or “what really happens”. 
(iii) The “trouble case” that is what was the trouble and what was done about it.    
While this theory may have a role to play in legal reform its relevance would be watered 
down by the realities of modern world that has been turned into a global village by the 
invasion of modern technology. As Mc Dougal observed, “ ...In this contemporary world, 
people are increasingly demanding common values that transcend the boundaries of nation-
states; they are increasingly interdependent in fact, irrespective of nation-state boundaries, 
for controlling the conditions which affect the securing of their values; they are becoming 
ever more realistic in their consciousness of such inter-dependences and hence widening 
their identifications to include in their demands more and more from their fellow men.”84 As 
stated above however, it shall be argued that legal anthropology has a place in the process 
of legal reform for economic development. 
 
3.3 LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Another theory that has informed previous law reform programs is Law and Economics. The 
two basic premises of law and economics were that (i) people act as rational maximisers of 
their satisfactions in making non-market decisions and that (ii) rules of law operate to 
impose prices on or subsidize these nonmarket activities thereby altering the amount or 
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character of the activity.85 The proponents of Law and Economics theory therefore believed 
that a change in the rule of law would change human behaviour by altering the relative 
incentive structure, which ultimately determined human decisions. By using economic 
analysis, the law and economics theorists argued, it is possible to predict the change of 
behaviour that will result from a change of a particular law. Thus in his work, The Economic 
Approach to Law,86 Posner advocated the adoption of economic analysis throughout the 
legal system including the judiciary and the legal education.  
 
As a tool of law reform, law and economics used the efficiency approach whereby reformers 
first defined an efficient way of dealing with a set of particular problem and then derive 
rules, legal structures or institutions that are regarded most likely to achieve the efficient 
outcome.87 As it will later be shown, in so far as law and economics theory mirrored neo 
classic economic theory and relied on the assumption of rationality of economic actors, it 
was therefore ill-conceived in as far as economic development reforms are concerned. 
Indeed there is now a realisation among Law and Economics theorists who acknowledges 
that the “rational actor” model of human motivation is rather too crude and most of them 
are drawing instead and increasingly on behavioural economics, which is a fusion of 
economic theory and individual/social psychology. 
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3.4 COMPARATIVE LAW  
3.4.1 Definition 
 
Since, as seen above, most developed countries have registered success with the rules and 
institutions they have adopted long time ago, comparative law stood as the first port of call 
for law reformers. Unfortunately, comparative law as an area of legal scholarship has been 
muddled with a lot of controversy and misunderstanding with respect to its academic 
respectability and practical functionality especially as a tool of legal reform88.   
 
Comparative law is defined as the study of and research in, law by the systematic 
comparison of one or more legal systems or of parts, branches or aspects of two or more 
legal systems.89 Legal comparatists emphasise the importance of understanding that 
comparative law is not a distinct branch of law but rather that it signifies the systematic 
application of the comparative technique to the field of law.90  Zweigert and Kotz91 describe 
comparative law as an intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as its 
process.92  Adoption of a proper definition of the concept of comparative law is important as 
the way in which one defines “comparative” will determine its use or misuse.93  There are 
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two levels of comparison that comparative lawyers may engage in. Macro-comparison is 
where the spirit and style of different legal systems, the methods of thought and procedures 
they use are compared while under micro-comparison specific legal institutions or problems 
and rules used to solve actual problems or particular conflicts of interest are compared.94 
 
Comparative law studies can take different forms and shapes including (a) comparison of 
foreign systems with domestic system in order to ascertain similarities and differences (b) 
studies that analyse objectively and systematically solutions which various systems for a 
given legal problem (c) studies that investigate the causal relationship between different 
relationships of law (d) studies that compare the several stages of various legal systems and 
(e) studies that attempt to discover or examine legal evolution generally according to 
periods and systems.95 Categories (b) and (e) have particular relevance to this study. 
 
3.4.2 Function 
 
Despite the long standing controversy and mixed views on the usefulness of comparative 
law theory, the emergence of the global village concept has birthed new opportunities for 
comparative law to claim pride of place in legal research.  McDougal96 observes that “in a 
world shrinking at an ever-accelerating rate because of a relentlessly expanding, uniformity-
imposing technology, both opportunity and need for the comparative study of law are 
                                                                                                                                                        
law and the nature of legal development.” Watson’s emphasis of the historical relationship between legal 
systems or between rules informs his orientation on the use of legal transplants as we will explain below. 
94
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unprecedented.”97 The interconnectedness and interdependence of the modern world has 
resulted in a high demand for “common values that transcend the boundaries of nation-
states.”98 
 
There are thus a number of closely related academic and practical aims which may be 
served by the systematic application of the comparative technique to legal study and 
research in the modern world.99 The main functions and purposes include serving as (a) an 
academic discipline (b) an aid to legislation and law reform (c) a tool of construction (c) a 
means of understanding legal rules and a contribution to the systematic unification and 
harmonisation of law.100 For purposes of this research we shall concentrate on the role of 
comparative law as an aid to legislation and law reform. 
 
The role of comparative law in law reform has been well known since the coming into being 
of the concept of comparative law itself. Actually during infancy stage of comparative law, 
legislation and law reform was regarded as the principal function of comparative law. Maine 
who is generally regarded as the founder of comparative law stated that “the chief function 
of comparative jurisprudence is to facilitate legislation and the practical improvement of the 
law.”101  
 
It is, therefore, perfectly feasible to look to the experience of countries at a different stage 
of legal, political, social and economic evolution in order not only to modernise and modify 
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the laws but also to evaluate it and be highly eclectic in selecting which laws might be 
adopted and adapted to particular local needs and conditions.102 Zweigert & Kotz explain 
this role as follows: 
 
“ If one accepts that legal science includes not only the techniques of interpreting the texts, 
principles, rules and standards of a national system but also the discovery of models for preventing or 
resolving social conflicts, then it is clear that the method of comparative law can provide a much 
richer range of model solutions than a legal science devoted to a single nation, simply because the 
different systems of the world can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a 
life time by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in his own system. Comparative law is 
an ‘ecole de verite’ which extends and enriches the ‘supply of solutions’ and offers the scholar of 
critical capacity the opportunity of finding the ‘better solution’ for his time and place.”
103
  
 
Zweigert & Kotz observe that  comparative law has been proving extremely useful in the 
countries of central and eastern Europe where legislators face the need to reconstruct their 
legal systems after the collapse of the Soviet system in that the experiences of other 
European countries help them choose the solution which best suits their own legal 
traditions. They further note that even outside Europe states which used to be soviet 
republics are finding that foreign laws can be of assistance in framing domestic legislation, 
as have the republic of China and many of the developing countries in Africa.104  
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There are generally three areas of legal reform for which comparative law is useful105. 
Firstly, comparative law is very useful in the creation of new rules and solutions or 
modifying or abolishing existing ones. In this process the experience of other systems of law 
would be valuable not only in suggesting a foreign legal institution or solution as a model or 
guide, but also in showing what solution to avoid.106 Secondly, comparative law is employed 
in regard to the technique of drafting or formulation of legislation. In this regard, Morrow107 
states that: 
 
“Any intelligent group of draftsmen charged with a task of any importance, will consider similar 
legislation in other states, and perhaps in England, and will not confine their efforts necessarily to a 
restatement of what they conceive to be ‘the law’ of their jurisdiction.”
108
  
 
The final area that stands to benefit from comparative law is the question of practicability of 
the proposed law in that the experience gained by one legal system as to the effectiveness 
of some legal solutions may be most valuable to another.109 
 
However, while comparative law can be a powerful tool in the legislative process and law 
reform, it has often time been an object of misuse by law reformers as we shall see below. 
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3.5  LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AND LAW REFORM 
One aspect of comparative law, which has been prone to misuse is legal transplants. Watson 
describes legal transplants as the moving of a rule from one country to another or from one 
people to another.110 Legal Transplants therefore refer to the transferring of rules, systems of 
law, institutions, doctrines, ideas, and methods, from one country, body, organisation or 
jurisdiction to another. The debate on the effectiveness of legal transplants became prominent 
in 1974 with two polemic theories from Watson111 and Kahn-Freud112. According to Watson, 
legal rules may be very successfully borrowed where the relevant social, economic, geographical 
and political circumstances of the recipient are very different from those of the donor system113. 
To Watson, what the law reformer should be after in looking at foreign systems was an idea 
which could be transformed into part of the law of his country. On the other hand, Kahn-
Freund opined that the degree to which any rule can be transplanted depends primarily on 
how closely it is linked with the foreign power structure. He suggested that the use of 
comparative method requires knowledge not only of the foreign law but also of its social, 
and above all its political context.114 According to Kahn-Freud the use of comparative law for 
practical purposes becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores 
this context of law.115 The battle lines on this debate therefore were drawn between the 
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transferists and culturalists.116 Kahn-Freund has been supported by other culturalists 
including Legrand117 and the Siedmans 118who believe that law is a culturally determined 
artefact, which cannot be transplanted.  Legrand reasoned that given that the meaning of a 
rule is specific to a particular culture, the meaning stays behind if the culture itself cannot 
be transplanted as well and if the meaning stays behind, the transplant never happened and 
all that was displaced from one jurisdiction to the other was ‘a meaningless form of 
words’.119 
 
Comparatists now are seeking to find a middle ground between the above extreme theory 
positions.  One of such intermediate views has come from Du Plessis120 who has put forward 
what he calls Mixed Legal System concept. He describes mixed legal system as a result of 
some process on introduction of foreign law into a jurisdiction and that lawyers in these 
jurisdictions are able to identify the foreign origin of their laws and do not deny that the law 
derived from a foreign law acquires a new meaning in its new environment.121 He further 
reasons that since culture is not genetic and can be learnt, then not only rules but legal 
culture itself can be transplanted. According to Du Plessis, the experiences of mixed legal 
systems are powerful evidences of the potential for successful borrowing or transplantation 
                                                 
116
 N. Foster ‘Transmigration and Transferability of Commercial Law in a Globalized World’, in Harding, Andrew 
and Orucu Esin (eds) ‘Comparative Law in the 21
st
 Century’, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The 
Netherlands, 2002) 59.   
117
 P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’’, 4 Maastritch Journal of European and Comparative 
Law (1997) 111. 
118
 A. Siedman and R.B. Siedman, ‘State and Law in the Development Process: Problem Solving and Institutional 
Change’ in The Third World (MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1994) 44-46. 
119
 Legrand, Supra note 117. 
120
 J. Du Plessis, ‘Comparative Law and the Study of the Mixed Legal System’ in Reimann and Zimmermann, The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 478 - 510. 
121
 Ibid, p 488. Du Plessis suggests that “if a change in meaning implies that the term “legal transplant should 
not be used, because that which is transplanted by definition may not change in the process of transplanting, 
then another term should be used such as ‘legal borrowing’.” 
  
- 49 - 
 
of laws according to function synthesis rather than failure.122  Another different view has 
been expressed by Teubner123 who prefers to describe a foreign legal element as an 'irritant' 
rather than a transplant. According to Teubner, the transfer of a legal concept from one 
system to another will have unpredictable affects, because structural coupling will change. 
He explains that: 
 
"When a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic culture…it is not transplanted into another 
organism, rather it works as a fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new 
and unexpected events… 'Legal irritations' cannot be domesticated; they are not 
transformed from something alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new cultural 
context, rather they will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule's 
meaning will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo fundamental change." 
 
3.6 LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE ‘WASHINGTON CONSENSUS” THEORIES 
The law and development concept provides a perfect example of how scholars and 
practitioners have sought to use comparative legal theory as a tool for legal reform. Close 
examination of the law and development philosophy shows that the concept was premised 
on Watson’s thesis of legal transplants. The rise and fall of the law and development 
movement is axiomatic of the disastrous shortfalls of the transferist view of legal 
transplants. 
 
Law and Development theory was launched by American scholars in the 1960s apparently as 
part of the general response of Universities to pressures from development agencies who 
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were at the time in the process of expanding their development assistance activities in third 
world countries after the end of World War II. The idea of law and development movement, 
as it was later known, was part of the then prevailing modernisation school of thought.  
Modernisation theory posited that a society’s underdevelopment was both caused by and 
reflected in its traditional (as opposed to modern) economic, political, social and cultural 
characteristics or structures and that in order to advance, underdeveloped societies would 
have to undergo the same process of evolution from traditionalism to modernity previously 
experienced by more developed societies.124 It was therefore thought that the 
modernisation of the Third World would be accomplished by the diffusion of capital, 
institutions and values of the First World.125  Drawing on the modernisation theory and a 
conception of law as an instrument of development126 , proponents of law and development 
thesis sought to diffuse, Western law, which was believed to be the functional prerequisite 
of an industrial economy127 to the Third World. 
 
In order to implement their model, law and development theorists adopted a top-down 
approach by emphasising the reform of legal education and the legal profession and the 
reform of formal legal rules although this was to a lesser extent.128 It was believed that the 
reform of legal education and the legal profession would orchestrate other forms of 
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modernisation, including the emergence of other institutions integral to an effective 
modern legal system such as those responsible for administering and enforcing legal rules. 
Ohnesorge129 observed that “reforming legal education became an important fulcrum for 
gaining leverage to reorient entire legal cultures...the goal was Americanisation”. 130 It was 
further thought that properly educated lawyers and Judges would help close the gap 
between the law on the books and the law in action in developing countries.131  
 
The first era of Law and Development was however short-lived as by 1974, Trubek and 
Galanter132 declared it history. Several factors were identified as having caused the 
movement to fail. Firstly it is contended that the movement lacked any theory of the impact 
of law on development, and practitioners thus had no way to prioritize reforms or predict 
the effects of various measures. As Lowenstein observed, the idea was supported by 
nothing more than "hopeful speculation" that education could overcome values instilled by 
family, class, religion, and other social forces.133 Secondly, it is said that there was too little 
participation by the lawyers and others in the target country who would either have to carry 
out the reforms or who would be affected by them; instead foreign legal consultants, 
through a combination of expertise and access to funding, were often able to dictate the 
content and pace of reform134. Another problem was that the movement focused on the 
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formal legal system to the exclusion of customary law and the other informal ways in which 
many in developing nations order their lives.135 
 
However the most significant reason for the failure of the law and development movement 
is said to be the naive belief that the American legal system (and American legal culture 
generally), could be easily transplanted to developing countries136. Berkwitz, Pistor and 
Richard137 note that “the strong quest at the time for extensive research and better theories 
on the role of law and legal institutions in economic development did not materialise, 
mostly because the erstwhile proponents of the law and development movement turned 
inwards to the American legal system.”138 Trubek and Galanter explain that the theory of 
law and development was based on a tacit set of assumptions which they call "liberal 
legalism," in the form of a series of propositions about the role of law in society and the 
relationship between legal systems and development.139 Legal liberalism views a legal 
system as an integrated purposive system, which draws on the power of the state but 
disciplines that power by its own autonomous and internally derived norms and through 
which the behaviour of social actors is aligned with and guided by legal rules.140 The 
problem with the legal liberalist model is that it was ethnocentric and could not fit into the 
jurisdictions which the reforms targeted. For instance, Trubek and Galanter note that the 
model assumed social and political pluralism when at the time, in most of the Third World 
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countries social stratification and class cleavage juxtaposed with authoritarian or totalitarian 
political systems were the order of the day.141  
 
Further, the model assumes that state institutions are the primary locus of social control, 
while in much of the Third World the grip of tribe, clan and local community is far stronger 
than that of the nation state.142 Also the model assumes that rules both reflect the interests 
of the vast majority of citizens and are normally internalised by them, while in many 
developing countries rules are imposed on the many by the few and are frequently 
honoured more in the breach than in the observance. The final assumption made by this 
model is that courts are central actors in social control, and that they are relatively 
autonomous from political, tribal, religious, or class interests. However, in many countries 
courts are neither very independent nor very important.143 Thus while in the United States, 
judges play a significant role in policymaking, and as a result, lawyers are often able to 
engineer significant changes in policy through litigation, this is not true in civil law systems 
or indeed even in the United Kingdom and other nations that share the same common law 
background as the United States.144 
 
The second era of Law and Development theory emerged in the 1990s following the 
collapse of the Soviet System. The new law and development was born out of 
disenchantment with socialist ideas and central planning, which had created a need for an 
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alternative set of ideas on how to organise economic and political life.145 As Ohnesoge 
observes “the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the socialist world presented the 
development world with the problem of how to nurture market economies in Eastern and 
Central Europe, the Baltics and Central Asia, where legal systems were geared to socialist 
rather than capitalist economics and at the same time it left developing countries with 
nowhere to turn except the U.S.-dominated West, in which views on economics and the role 
of the state in society had taken a strong turn towards the market.”146  
 
The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson,147 who attempted to 
summarize, with particular reference to policy reform in Latin America, “the conventional 
wisdom of the day among the economically influential bits of Washington, meaning US 
government and the international financial institutions”148  Williamson codified the 
approach as a set of 10 axiomatic generalizations149 which, given certain values, are 
generally shared by scholars and practitioners concerned with economic growth in 
developing countries.150 In broad terms, the “Washington Consensus” approach 
recommended that governments should reform their policies and, in particular: (a) pursue 
macroeconomic stability by controlling inflation and reducing fiscal deficits; (b) open their 
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economies to the rest of the world through trade and capital account liberalization; and (c) 
liberalize domestic product and factor markets through privatization and deregulation.151 
 
The Washington Consensus or neoliberal Rule of Law, as the approach was also known, 
sought to provide bottom to top approach to legal reform. Its reform agenda was well 
articulated by Gray,152 principal economist in the World Bank’s Policy Research Department, 
who stated that:  
 
“Formerly socialist economies must+ establish the institutions of a private market economy. 
Socialism either crippled or reoriented these institutions to reflect the goals of central 
planners. Legal frameworks defining property rights, private contract regimes, fiduciary 
liability, dispute resolution mechanisms, and rules of entry and exit for private firms 
atrophied. Courts lost much, if not all, of their independence as well as their role as 
adjudicators of commercial disputes and enforcers of commercial laws. Banks lost their 
independent monitoring role over firms and became instead passive funnels for channelling 
state funds. "Watchdog" institutions that provide critical information for markets to 
function, such as credit-rating and consumer protection services, accounting and legal 
professions, and independent journalism, had neither reason nor permission to exist. 
Finally, socialism inhibited (indeed, often classified as illegal) the development of basic 
norms and ethics of market conduct and fiduciary responsibility on which so much 
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behaviour in advanced market economies implicitly rests. These laws, organizations, 
professions, and commercial norms must now be rebuilt, sometimes from scratch.”
153
   
 
The goal of the neoliberal rule of law was, therefore, to achieve a well-functioning legal system 
in a market economy, which required a supply of market-friendly laws, adequate institutions to 
implement and enforce them, and a demand for those laws from market participants.154  
 
The new law and development model was propagated by the World Bank and IMF through its 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) which were imposed on developing countries to 
ensure debt repayment and economic restructuring155.  Adopting a one-size-fits-all approach 
and applying the conventional text-book economics, the World Bank sought to implement its 
structural adjustment programmes by providing similar comprehensive policy packages for all its 
third world borrowers. Firstly, it offered aid only to governments which reduced their 
intervention in domestic and foreign markets upon the neoclassical assumptions that excessive 
governmental intervention is the reason for inefficiency and poverty; then it insisted on 
privatisation to encourage the growth of the private sector competition; thirdly, it insisted on 
the opening up of the economy to international competition by relaxing import/export licensing 
and tariffs laws in the aid of promoting efficiency among local producers; fourthly it requested 
the devaluation of currency to render exports more competitive by lowering export prices; and 
fifthly it insisted that governments cut public expenditure to reduce budget deficits; finally, it 
demanded that the governments create a hospitable climate for international investors.156 
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The structural adjustment program, however, brought about contrary outcomes. For instance, 
decreased government spending led to cutbacks in essential services such as education, health, 
and welfare programs.157 Also currency devaluation made foreign equipment and spare parts 
expensive while high interest rates promoted speculation rather than savings and trade 
liberalisation encouraged dumping of foreign products in developing countries’ markets.158 In a 
bid to correct a rather discouraging development trajectory, the multilateral institutions added 
the development of stock markets as an additional reform that would promote economic 
prosperity in developing countries.159 
 
However despite all these efforts, the new law and development theory, as its precedesor, still 
failed to achieve its intended results. One main criticism of neoliberal rule of law is that it paid 
more attention to the prescription of the laws on paper than to enforcement of the same. 
Berkwitz, Pistor and Richard explained the demise of this model in this way: 
 
“While nobody has yet stood up and declared the death of the second law and 
development movement, there is a broad consensus that the impact of legal reform efforts 
has been at best limited. The most common complaint is that while the transplanted law is 
now on the books, the enforcement of these new laws is quite ineffective. In fact, empirical 
analysis suggests that there is little correlation between the level of legal protection 
afforded by statutes on the one hand, and the measures for the effectiveness of legal 
institutions on the other. While Russia today can boast with the most refined corporate law 
in the region thanks to American advisors, shareholder rights are systematically trampled 
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and Russia performs poorly on performance measures for the effectiveness of the judiciary 
and the trustworthiness of legal and administrative institutions.”
160
 
 
3.7 THEORIES OF LEGAL CHANGE 
The general theories discussed above have been crystallised into a stream of theories used 
in legal reform circles collectively known as theories of legal change. These are theories that 
have, over the years, been advocated by different scholars, on how law changes in society. 
The first of these legal theories is the Evolutionist approach.161 Early evolutionary theorists 
believed that legal development occurs automatically as a society passes from one stage of 
economic development to another.162 Others thought that cultural or other factors than 
economic differences determined stages of legal development.163 Through Henry Maine’s 
Ancient Law,164 the evolutionary approach was systemised and it was believed that societies 
transition from “archaic” to “tribal” to “territorial”165 and that law, in the sense of abstract 
principles, would only effectively exist in territorial societies.166 The general feature of the 
evolutionist approach is that human intervention is removed from the process of legal 
development. As such legislation is either relegated to a distinctly subordinate place167 or in 
some instances considered altogether useless especially if it involves borrowing ideas across 
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systems that are at different stages of cultural or economic development.168 For 
evolutionists therefore nothing proceeds from individual will and everything comes from 
the situation of particular countries.169  
 
The second theory of legal change is the Utilitarian Approach.170 Unlike evolutionists, 
utilitarian theorists do not find the sources of legal development in cultural or economic 
development of societies but believe that legal innovations emanate from demonstrations 
of social need171. The focus of the utilitarian approach is on the efficiency of legal rules and 
regards the increases in efficiency as the end-product of change.172 According to Robert 
Clark,173 legal change based on cost reduction follows a four-step sequence involving 
changes in the economy and society that create opportunities to reduce costs, followed by 
the emergence of a legal principle that does in fact reduce costs, which is followed by new 
costs and then by new rules to reduce them as well as to regulate the struggle over the 
distribution of cost savings.174 Clark observes that the great increase in the past two 
hundred years in the size of business firms, in the number of investors or capitalists, and in 
the amount of wealth in the economy have given rise to new forms of organisation, new 
roles and the laws governing them, new legal doctrines and new kinds of legal 
proceedings.175 It is argued that this kind of change will obviously require some legal 
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invention and therefore changes will not occur automatically176 as the evolutionists seem to 
suggest. This approach is however criticised on the grounds that it is unrealistic to take out 
ideology and other interests from the process of legal change.177  
 
Another documented approach to legal change is the social change approach178.  This 
approach views law as a reflection of social structures and opinions prevalent in a society 
and that as these change law changes accordingly179. Another view of the social change 
theorists holds that changes in the social structure of society result in changes in people’s 
altitude and these changes produce a gap between what the law on the books could offer 
and the desired outcome. This forces lawyers and judges to move in to narrow the gap 
through legal fiction and judicial interpretation and later legislators jump in to close the gap 
through legislation180.  
 
Finally, other theorists of legal change have advocated an intentionalist approach. 
Proponents of this approach believe that law cannot change without an agent as the other 
theorists seem to imply. They believe that legal innovation requires legal innovators181. This 
theory traces its origin from the “transferist” school of thought with regard to the use of 
comparative law for legal reform. As discussed above one of the proponents of the 
intentionalist approach is Allan Watson who argues that the legal elite and its culture 
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determine the timing, extent, and nature of legal change182.   Watson further argues that 
the adoption of legal innovations depends on, inter alia, the range of potential innovations 
that are known to lawyers and seem natural or fitting to them whether or not the 
innovations are well adapted to the society at large183.  It is emphasised that the most 
important method of change is borrowing and that lawyers will always borrow from systems 
they understand184 and that they tend to be fixed on a single donor system that is more 
prestigious than their own, more culturally akin to their own, or unusually accessible.185 The 
determinants of the shape of change therefore will be the knowledge, the traditions and the 
interests of the lawyers.186  
 
Another intentionalist view holds that legal innovations are the product of the interplay of 
the agents of state authority with the legal profession.187 It is believed that political leaders 
always attempt to align the legal system with their own ideas and interests. However, in 
order to do this they will have to secure the cooperation of the lawyers and use different 
devices in the stock of ideas held by those lawyers.188 As such the shape of the legal change 
that will eventually emerge will be an “amalgam of political preference and professional 
interest.”189  
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3.8 NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
The new institutional economics (NIE) has been described as ‘an interdisciplinary enterprise 
combining economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology and 
anthropology to understand the institutions of social, political and commercial life.’190  
According to Coase, NIE refers to the branch of economics that concerns itself with the ways 
that economic behaviour, whether by individuals or firms, is affected by the institutional 
setting in which actors find themselves.191 The term ‘new institutional economics’ was 
originated by Oliver Williamson192 and draws its logic from Coase’s analysis of the nature of 
the firm.193  
 
In essence NIE seeks to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics. NIE accepts neo-
classical economics’ fundamental assumption of scarcity of resources but denies its 
rationality postulate in respect of individual economic actors.194 According to North, 
 
“the new institutional economics builds on, modifies, and extends neoclassical theory 
to permit it to come to grips and deal with an entire range of issues heretofore beyond 
its ken. What it retains and builds on is the fundamental assumption of scarcity and 
hence competition--the basis of the choice theoretic approach that underlies micro-
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economics. What it abandons is instrumental rationality--the assumption of 
neoclassical economics that has made it an institution-free theory.”
195
 
 
According to NIE theorists, the concept of rational actors presupposes a world where 
individuals act on complete information with full mental capacities. In reality however, 
information is incomplete and there is limited mental capacity by which to process 
information and this determines the cost of transacting which underlies the formation of 
institutions.196 NIE uses cognitive science to explain its objection to the assumption of 
instrumental rationality. It is believed that individuals possess mental models to interpret 
the world around them, which are culturally derived through intergenerational transfer of 
knowledge, values and norms which vary radically among different ethnic groups and 
societies and as a result there is immense variation in mental models, hence different 
perceptions of the world and how it works.197 It is further believed that societies impose 
constraints on human interaction in order to structure exchange. However, since such 
constraints or institutions are based on incomplete information and imperfect subjective 
mental models, there will be transaction costs that will result in imperfect markets.198 
Further, since individuals make choices on the basis of their mental models, ideas and 
ideologies will play a major role in human choices. 
 
NIE therefore extends economic theory by incorporating ideas and ideologies into the 
analysis and models of the political process as a critical factor in the performance of 
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economies, as the source of the diverse performance of economies, and as the explanation 
for "inefficient" markets.199 
 
NIE distinguishes institutions from organisations. Institutions are defined as the rules of the 
game in a society, that is, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. 
For institutional economists, an institution is not a material or physical phenomenon but a 
socially constructed belief system about the way things are and the way things should be. In 
other words, institutions are prevalent patterns of thought that impact the structure, 
operation and consequences of all processes in societies, including its economic and 
financial processes.200 Institutions are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, 
regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, and self imposed codes 
of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. 
 
On the other hand, organisations are players in the game in the form of groups of 
individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve common objectives. They include 
political bodies (political parties, the senate, a city council, a regulatory agency); economic 
bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives); social bodies (churches, clubs, 
athletic associations); and educational bodies (schools, colleges, vocational training 
centres).201  
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The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable, 
although not necessarily efficient, structure to human interaction.202 Institutions affect the 
performance of the economy through their effects on the costs of exchange and production. 
According to Coarse,203 the cost of transacting arises because information is costly and 
asymmetrically held by the parties to the exchange. Transactional costs include the cost of 
measuring the multiple variable dimensions of the goods or services exchanged or of the 
performance of the agents and the costs of enforcing agreements. According to NIE, 
therefore what is important in order to improve economic performance of an economy is 
the creation of institutions that will facilitate low transaction costs. In this way NIE provides 
a middle ground between hitherto polemic view of economic analysis about the state as the 
major catalyst of economic growth on the one hand and the neo-classic economics’ 
emphasis on the all-importance of the market on the other. As stated by Toye:204  
 
“The recognition of transaction costs, and the consequent retreat from the Walras-Pareto view 
of markets, disposes of the automatic preference for provision of goods and services through 
the market. Equally their presence undermines an ideal view of governments as benevolent 
and omnicompetent. Market failure is clearly with us, to a greater or lesser extent. But so is 
government failure. So the questions of public policy become more complicated. Should 
imperfect governments be used to correct imperfect markets, or contrariwise should imperfect 
markets be brought into play to improve the resource misallocations of imperfect 
governments? What NIE tells us is that neither answer is invariably correct. Rather, the task is 
to estimate the respective net changes in transaction costs in comparison with the anticipated 
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allocative improvement, to find out whether policy should be favouring additional government 
intervention or further privatisation.”
205
 
 
So how does NIE fit into the development and economic performance discourse? As stated 
above, NIE calls for the modification of the neo-classical theory that market forces will bring 
about economic change on their own. According to neo-classical theorists, market forces 
not only generate the most Pareto-efficient206 outcome possible in a static framework, but 
they also do so in a long run dynamic framework in that institutional adaptations which 
favour Pareto-efficiency are favoured over the long term, while those which do not are 
abandoned.207 This ‘natural selection’ view of institutional development is denied by NIE for 
being based on a mechanism that has no place for conscious motivation, decision-making or 
choice and can therefore not be applied to social practices which reflect human aspirations 
and endeavours.208 NIE posits that the existence of norms, customs and organisations 
require that people have to choose how conventional to be and whether they want to join 
certain institutions or to try to subvert them.209 This clearly shows that implementing 
foreign policies or rules without proper consultation within the borrowing country is an 
inappropriate reform strategy. 
 
Further, the understanding of the interplay between institutions and organisations 
advocated by NIE provides a new vein of thinking about the design of institutions and 
organisations for development. Distinct institutional arrangements can shape organisational 
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behaviour and alternative sets of organisations may impact on institutions.210 The impact of 
the NIE theory on to the development agenda is summarised by Toye who stated that: 
 
“The NIE suggests that development should be redefined as economic growth plus 
appropriate institutional change, meaning institutional changes which facilitate further 
economic growth. Appropriate institutional change has been elevated by the NIE to a central 
place in the theory of development, by contrast with neo-classical growth theory’s central 
focus on saving and population growth.”
211
 
 
The question then is how institutional change can be effectively implemented. The answer 
to this question continues to elude policy makers and it is this answer that North has 
attempted to provide in his work, Understanding the Process of Economic Change212. North 
notes that institutions are path determined and that the reason why reversal of such 
institutional paths is usually difficult is because ‘we still know too little about the dynamics 
of institutional change and particularly the interplay between economic and political 
markets.”213 In this work, North sets out a dynamic model of economic change. It is to this 
model that we now turn in the next chapter. 
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
The above discussion has shown how policy makers and legal as well as institutional 
reformers have grappled with the process of development reforms using different 
theoretical foundations. Most of these theories and concepts have proved ineffective over 
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time. As explained above some of the theories were misconceived with respect to the 
process of economic change in that they were premised on neo-classic economic theory’s 
presumptions of a rational decision maker with access to all the information needed to 
make efficient decisions. New Institutional Economics (NIE) on the other hand has brought a 
significant paradigm shift in economic development thinking by calling for the modification 
of the neo-classical theory that market forces will bring about economic change on their 
own and through its emphasis on the role of institutions and organisations in economic 
development. This is why the North’s framework for economic change is considered in this 
study as the best theory to form and  inform modern development agenda.   
 
This study is however not advocating an outright abandonment of the theories in question 
but rather that the said theories should be used in the light of North’s framework so that 
the impact of prevailing belief system as well as the path dependent nature of the 
development trajectory is fully taken into account when formulating the reform agenda. For 
instance, the comparative law method is still a useful tool of legal and institutional reform. 
However, according to this study, it is the culturist view of comparative law and not the 
transferist view that should inform policy makers for purposes of legal and institutional 
reform. A detailed comparison of the rest of the theories and North’s theory is provided in 
section 4.10 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
- 69 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 CHAPTER FOUR: NORTH’S FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 
4.1 INTRODUCTON  
The underlying premise of North’s framework is the centrality of human mental models to 
the process of economic change. North observes that economics is a theory of choice and 
that people choose among alternatives that are themselves constructions of human mind 
and that therefore how the human mind works should form the foundation of any inquiry 
on economic development.214 According to North therefore, economic change is the result 
of changes in, the quantity and quality of human beings, stock of human knowledge 
particularly as applied to the human command over nature and institutional framework that 
defines the deliberate incentive structure of a society and that therefore there is need of a 
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complete theory to integrate theories of demographic, stock of knowledge and institutional 
change.215   
 
In a classic intellectual journey North has over a period of time developed a framework for 
economic change that is capable of plugging most of the gaps in economic theory that were 
unattended to by classic economic theorists. Aided by his economic history pedigree, North 
firstly sought to understand the development of legal institutions that orchestrated the rise 
of the Western powers to economic dominance.216 With this understanding, he later 
developed an institutional framework describing how the West achieved its economic 
success at a structural level.217 He then reinforced this framework by explaining the 
dynamics and the processes that are involved in the process of economic change by 
incorporating work from other human sciences other than economics, and economic 
history.218 This is why North’s framework is so unique as it goes beyond the usual tenets of 
economic theorising.  
 
The starting point of North’s framework is the analytical distinction between “institutions” 
and “organisations”. Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society”219 or the humanly-
devised constraints that structure human interaction and may either be formal or informal. 
Both types of institutions are important to how an economy functions. Examples of formal 
rules include statute law, common law and regulations while informal rules manifests in the 
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form of conventions, norms of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of conduct. The 
distinction between formal and informal rules is very vital in order to understand the 
process of economic change. Thus while laws are formal institutions, how people 
understand laws, and whether they respect them, are elements of society’s informal 
institutions. On the other hand, organisations are the players of the social game. 
Organisations are basically groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve 
objectives. 
 
It has been noted that the terms “institution” and “organisation” are analytical terms, not 
expressive of any essential nature.220 This entails that a single feature of the world, such as a 
court, may be viewed as either institutional; when seen as a part of the context in which an 
organisation is situated; or, organisational when viewed as a group of people that act in 
concert to protect or extend their power and influence. The significance of the institutional 
structure and the organisations that develop within that institutional structure is that they 
determine the incentives of the society which in turn determine how a society operates. 
These incentives may determine whether a society will have either higher or lower 
transaction costs, cooperation or predation behaviours, will encourage effective investment 
and productivity growth or focus on rent seeking behaviour.221  
 
North identifies three major challenges to economic change, namely, uncertainty, the 
evolving human environment (he calls this non-ergodicity) and institutional path 
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dependence. According to North any development agenda should take into account these 
potential problems and be able to devise ways of getting around them. 
 
4.2 UNCERTAINTY 
North posits that uncertainty is the key challenge for economic development. He observes 
that we live in an uncertain world and market economies operate within the context of 
uncertainty. According to North, the key to understanding the process of change is the 
intentionality of the players enacting institutional change and their comprehension of the 
issues and the source of human intentionality is the constant human effort to reduce 
uncertainties.  
 
With regards to economic development, certainty is a relevant factor in that investors will at 
the very least look for some degree of certainty that they will have a return on their 
investment before committing their resources to a particular country or economic region. 
One of the things that investors will be looking for in order to be certain of a return on 
investment is the institutional structures available that will protect their property rights. Any 
semblance of uncertainty as to the safety of their investment will cause investors to shy 
away.  
 
According to North there are different degrees of uncertainty and he counsels that it is 
important to understand the ability of any given society to deal with the different levels of 
uncertainty before devising strategies for institutional change. These include: 
 
  
- 73 - 
 
(i)   Uncertainty that can be reduced by acquiring more information and using it 
within existing theories of explanation. Here predictability can be brought about 
by collecting and collating more information about the characteristics of a 
particular human activity.222  This type of uncertainty, therefore, can be reduced 
to risk, through the collection of enough data.223 
 
(ii)      Uncertainty that can be reduced by increasing the stock of knowledge within the 
existing institutional framework. This type of uncertainty cannot be resolved 
without the development of some new explanatory theory either through 
coining of new and more powerful explanations with reference to pre-existing 
subjects of inquiry or development of new subjects of inquiry.224 Thus, where this 
type of uncertainty exists there will be need for societal reorganisation and 
redirection of resources and acquisition of new knowledge albeit without 
necessarily changing the institutional structures. 
 
(iii)      Uncertainty that can be reduced only by altering the institutional framework. This 
kind of uncertainty requires changing the incentive structure of the players or 
social actors. Such incentives will either encourage or discourage social actors to 
act or from acting in a particular direction. Examples include institutional changes 
altering the pay-off to cooperative activity like legal enforcement of contracts, 
increasing the incentive to invent and innovate like patent laws and lowering 
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transaction costs in markets like the creation of a judicial system that lowers the 
costs of contract enforcement.225 This uncertainty can therefore be best tackled 
by governments and legal systems.  
 
(iv)      Uncertainty in the face of novel situations that entails restructuring beliefs. North 
says the response of humans to novel situations depends on how novel they are 
and on the cultural heritage of the actors. He says to the extent that their 
cultural heritage has equipped them to deal with such problems, they may make 
responses that make the environment more predictable but if they have not 
been so equipped they may make inappropriate responses.226 This type of 
uncertainty differs from the second and the third types of uncertainty in that it 
emanates from the “beliefs” and the “culture” of a particular society. It therefore 
differs from the second type of uncertainty because “beliefs involve normative 
aspects that are not present in the idea of knowledge and explanatory 
frameworks”227 and from the third category of uncertainty because culture is not 
the same as institutional framework as it offers a broader conception that 
includes but is not exhausted by the institutions of a society. 
 
This is, therefore, the most crucial type of uncertainty in as far as the process of 
economic change is concerned and it accounts for most of the differences in 
economic performance of national economies with similar institutional 
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structures and it explains why institutional framework borrowed from a different 
society may not work the same trick in the borrowing society. 
 
(v)      Residual uncertainty that provides the foundation for “non-rational” beliefs. This 
is uncertainty that remains after every effort has been done to establish 
predictability through the above means. North says such residual uncertainty 
leads to non-rational beliefs which play a critical role in decision making. These 
include religious belief systems such as Islamic Fundamentalism and secular 
ideologies and belief systems such as communism.228 This category of 
uncertainty is that which at any time and place cannot be reduced by rational 
means and therefore gives rise to irrational modes of explanation and resolution. 
Every reform agenda therefore needs to make allowance for such non rational 
beliefs that are bound to make implementation of reforms less perfect. The best 
policy is to take into account as much of such beliefs as possible. 
 
What can be deduced from the foregoing is that in order for any economic model to be 
effective, there must be a proper understanding of the type of uncertainty being dealt 
with and relevant strategies must be devised to help reduce the uncertainty in question. 
 
4.3 NON-ERGODICTY 
North says that the efforts of economic players to reduce uncertainty, is frustrated by 
the non-ergodic world that they operate in. He notes that we live in a world of 
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continuous novel change and that comprehending such a world that is constantly 
evolving entails new theory, or modification of the existing institutional framework. 
Usually the alteration of institutions that has led to the reduction in the uncertainties of 
the physical world has created the complex social world which has produced a whole 
new set of uncertainties. The key problem for agents, therefore, is one of uncertainty 
over time. Importantly it is not risk over time and the most relevant category of 
uncertainty is uncertainty caused by novel problems because repetitive problems can be 
reduced to risk229  The challenge therefore is that as the social world itself generates 
novel uncertainties, then even if human beliefs were perfectly aligned with reality, and 
sufficiently worked out to allow agents to act with confidence, the world would change 
and undermine this perfect correspondence between model and reality230. 
 
Thus, while the law of merchants, patent laws, the institutional integration of distributed 
knowledge and the creation of a judicial system are important parts of efforts to make 
markets more efficient in developed countries, when such institutional changes are 
applied to third world economies, they frequently alter income distribution and produce 
political instability leading to consequences that are the very reverse of the intended 
objection231. It is therefore important that any development model should include 
strategies of dealing with the likely new uncertainties that would follow the institutional 
change undertaken. The starting point would be inbuilt institutional review mechanisms. 
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4.4 RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND NON-ERGODICITY. 
The concept of non-ergodicity as described above may be confused with the concept of 
uncertainty and risk. However these three concepts are different. It is therefore 
important to look at their distinct meanings before proceeding with the rest of North’s 
proposition of development theory. 
 
Risk and uncertainty has sometimes been used interchangeably but they are completely 
different concepts. In its simplistic form, uncertainty denotes lack of complete certainty, 
that is, the existence of more than one possibility.232 The possibilities may be either 
positive or negative. On the other hand risk refers to a state of uncertainty where some 
of the possibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, or other undesirable outcome.233 The 
distinctions between these two concepts was ably analysed by Knight in his 
groundbreaking work Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit234, (1921) where he stated that: 
 
 “... Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, 
from which it has never been properly separated. The term ‘risk,’ as loosely used in everyday 
speech and in economic discussion, really covers two things which, functionally at least, in their 
causal relations to the phenomena of economic organization, are categorically different. ... The 
essential fact is that ‘risk’ means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at 
other times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and 
crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on which of the two is really 
present and operating. ... It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we 
                                                 
232
 Douglas W. Hubbard, The Failure of Risk Management: Why It's Broken and How to Fix It, (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2009) 
233
 Ibid. 
234
 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, And Profit (1921),  (Signalman Publishing, 2009). 
  
- 78 - 
 
shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an 
uncertainty at all. We ... accordingly restrict the term "uncertainty" to cases of the non-
quantitative type.”
235
 
 
Thus risk can be defined as uncertainty based on a well-grounded (quantitative) 
probability and can be measured as a product of the probability that some event will 
occur and its consequences if it does occur. Uncertainty, however, cannot be assigned 
such a well-grounded or measurable probability.236 Risk, therefore, is a condition in 
which it is possible to derive a probability distribution of outcomes and can therefore be 
insured against; while uncertainty is a condition in which no probability distribution 
exists and it cannot be insured against237. It is generally impossible to theorise under the 
condition of uncertainty238. Risk can be easily managed by gathering relevant 
information about the phenomena in question and their causes while uncertainty 
cannot be often reduced in this way. 
 
As stated above, non-ergodicity, as coined by North, is a distinct concept from both risk 
and uncertainty. Non-ergodicity refers to new uncertainties and risks that usually come 
about following human efforts to manage current uncertainties and risks. Non-ergodicity 
results from the constantly changing nature of the human environment and as such 
there is little that can be done to avoid it other than adapting human strategies to new 
challenges.  
                                                 
235
 Ibid. P. 19. 
236
 Tom Ritchey, Anna-Lena Lövkvist-Andersen, Richard Olsson and Maria Stenström, ‘Modelling Society’s 
Capacity to Manage Extraordinary Events’, (2004), Web: http://www.swemorph.com/pdf/sra.pdf. Last 
accessed on 01/02/2014. 
237
 North (2005) supra note 8 at p. 13. 
238
 See, Kenneth Arrow, ‘Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk Taking Situations’ 19 (4) 
Econometrica (1951) 404-437. 
  
- 79 - 
 
 
4.5 PATH DEPENDENCY 
According to North, economic change is path dependent in that the way by which 
institutions and beliefs were derived in the past, influence present and future choices of 
a society. The explanation for this is that institutions, together with standard constraints 
of economic theory, determine the opportunities in a society. Organisations are created 
to take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organisations evolve they alter the 
institutions. The resultant path of institutional change will therefore be shaped by the 
lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the 
organisations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by 
those institutions and the feedback process by which human beings perceive and react 
to changes in the opportunity set.239 Thus Institutional path dependence will exist 
because of (i) network externalities-where more people are buying into a particular 
institution thereby increasing its value or usefulness, (ii) economies of scope – the 
demand for more and related institutions in order to reduce transactional costs and (iii) 
complementarities – the synergies derived from existing institutions that make them 
more useful, that exist with a given institutional matrix.240 Also, relatively small 
differences in starting conditions can have unpredictable and large effects on eventual 
outcomes, because of the reflexive nature of society working through feedback loops, 
and other mechanisms. Feedback loops can be positive or negative in effect.241 The 
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potential power of such feedback loops can make initially small differences in starting 
conditions potentially determinative over time.242 
 
A good example of the effect of path dependence would be where the political elites are 
reaping benefits from an existing institutional framework and they therefore oppose any 
institutional change that would take away those benefits regardless of the economic 
efficiencies the proposed framework would bring. This is why, says North, once an 
economy is on an ‘inefficient’ path that produces stagnation it can persist because of the 
nature of path dependence243. According to North, “understanding the process of 
change entails confronting directly the nature of the limits to change that path 
dependence imposes in various settings”.244 
 
The concept of path dependency, therefore, provides a general theoretical explanation 
for the relative unpredictability of legal transplantation because in most cases the 
recipient will respond to the transplanted law in novel ways peculiar to the new social 
environment. It is therefore important to note, when considering a reform proposal, 
that the merit of the proposal will be contingent upon the nature of the recipient 
society. Transplanting will only work in a straightforward manner if the recipient society 
shares very similar belief and institutional structures with the donor society. 245 It is 
further noted that “even in the most propitious circumstances the match of beliefs and 
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institutions will not be identical, as we are dealing with complex systems that are path 
dependant”.246  
 
Thus, local conditions are always as important as the contents of any reform attempt. 
What is needed is the establishment of effective adaptive institutions within a society. 
The starting point in this regard is an understanding of the interplay between beliefs and 
institutional systems of a given society as discussed below. 
 
4.6 BELIEF SYSTEM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The central plank as well as the point of departure of North’s framework for institutional 
change is the role of human mental constructs or belief system in making human 
choices. North posits that the structure that humans create to order their political and 
economic environment in the form of formal rules, informal norms and the enforcement 
characteristics of both is derived from their belief systems and is the basic determinant 
of the performance of an economy in that it provides the incentives which shape the 
choices that humans make.247 North says there is an intimate relationship between 
belief system and institutional framework as the belief system may be seen as the 
internal representation of the human landscape and institutional structure the external 
manifestation of that representation.248  
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The emphasis on the relevance of the system of belief distinguishes North’s framework 
from classic economic theory, which ignores the beliefs of agents, taking little interest in 
their origins or effects249. Classic economics is predicated on the rationality assumption, 
that is, every human being is capable of making rational decisions. North expresses his 
misgivings with the rationality assumption as follows: 
 
 “The substantive rationality assumption of the economist works well in competitive 
posted-price markets. The competitive environment so structures the situation that 
price can effectively be viewed as a parameter and only the quantity to buy or sell 
need be chosen. If all choices were simple, were made frequently, had substantial 
motivation, then substantive rationality would suffice for all purposes...But as soon as 
we move away from this simple competitive model and the price depends on the 
behaviour of other buyers and sellers the complexity of the decision increases and we 
need to delve much more deeply into the cognitive process.”
250
     
 
Belief system causes individuals either to believe or not to believe in a particular 
institution and where there is no belief in an institution; the same will not operate in 
practice. For instance, rule of law will only operate and facilitate people’s plans if the 
rule of law is believed in by the people.251   
 
Thus the institutional structure of a society will reflect the accumulated beliefs over 
time and change in the institutional framework is usually an incremental process 
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reflecting the constraints that the past imposes on the present and the future.252 This 
explains why, while the formal rules can be changed overnight, the informal norms will 
only change gradually. In this regard, North observes that since it is the norms that 
provide the essential legitimacy to any set of formal rules, revolutionary change is never 
revolutionary as its supporter’s desire and performance will be different.253 
Consequently, societies that adopt the formal rules of another society are likely to have 
very different performance characteristics than the original country because both the 
informal norms and the enforcement characteristics will be different. It is for this reason 
that transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western market 
economies to Third World and Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition 
for good economic performance.254 
 
 
4.7 ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. 
Based on the above analysis, North has developed five propositions that define the 
essential characteristics of institutional change as follows:  
 
1. Competition is the key to institutional change in that it bleeds continuous 
interaction of institutions and organizations in the economic setting of 
scarcity. North says the opportunities provided by the institutional matrix 
determine the kinds of organisations that will come into existence and the 
entrepreneurs of organisations induce institutional change as they face 
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competition derived from an economic world of scarcity by altering the rules 
either directly by political bodies or indirectly by economic or social 
organisation pressuring political organisations or by deliberately altering the 
kinds and effectiveness of enforcement of rules or the effectiveness of 
sanctions and other means of informal constraint enforcement.255  
 
2. Competition forces organizations to continually invest in skills and knowledge 
to survive. The kinds of skills and knowledge individuals and their 
organizations acquire will shape evolving perceptions about opportunities 
and hence choices that will incrementally alter institutions. The ubiquity of 
competition in the overall economic setting of scarcity induces entrepreneurs 
and the members of their organisation to invest in skills and knowledge with 
the aim of improving the efficiency of the organisation relative to that of 
rivals.256 
 
3. The institutional framework dictates the kinds of skills and knowledge 
perceived to have the maximum pay-off. The institutional matrix defines the 
opportunity set which may either be those that make the highest pay-offs in 
an economy income redistribution or those that provide the highest pay-offs 
to productive activity. The organisations that will come into existence will 
reflect the pay off structures and the direction of their investment in skills 
and knowledge will equally reflect the underlying incentive structure.257 
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4. Perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the players. The 
mental constructs individuals form to explain and interpret the world around 
them are partly a result of their cultural heritage, partly a result of the ‘local’ 
everyday problems they confront and must solve, and partly a result of non-
local learning. As a result, individuals from different backgrounds will 
interpret the same evidence differently and in consequence make different 
choices.258 
 
5. The economies of scope, complementarities, and network externalities of an 
institutional matrix make institutional change overwhelmingly incremental 
and path dependent. Institutional change will be incremental because large 
scale change creates too many opponents among the existing organisations 
that will be harmed and therefore oppose such change and path dependence 
will occur because the direction of the incremental institutional change will 
broadly be consistent with the existing institutional matrix and will be 
governed by the kinds of knowledge and skills that the entrepreneurs and 
members of organisations have invested in.259  
 
4.8 INSTITUTIONS AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURES 
 
The above propositions are very crucial tools for understanding the role of 
institutions in providing incentive structures in an economy. According to North, 
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individuals will be incentivised to invest in skills and knowledge perceived to have 
the maximum pay-off. Their perceptions will be derived from the opportunity set 
that is defined by existing institutions in the economy. Thus in an economy where 
the highest rate of return comes from piracy, it will be expected that the 
organisations will invest in skills and knowledge that will make them better pirates 
whereas if there are high returns to productive activities, organisations will devote 
resources to investing in skill and knowledge that will increase productivity. 260 
Therefore, the extent to which societies will invest in formal education, schooling, 
the dissemination of knowledge and both applied and pure research will mirror the 
perceptions of the entrepreneurs of political and economic organisations. However, 
the root source of these perceptions is the mental constructs that individuals form to 
interpret the world around them. Consequently, the different ways in which 
societies interpret the evidence surrounding them and the subsequent choices they 
make, set them on different developmental paths. 
 
4.9 DESIGNING AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE. 
North concludes his framework by providing specific guidelines on how an 
institutional framework for economic change can be designed. North says that when 
humans understand their environment as reflected in their beliefs and construct an 
institutional framework that enables them to implement their desired objectives, 
there is consistency between those players in a position to shape their destiny and 
the desired outcome. North observes that efforts to achieve economic change have 
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been “a trial and error process with lots of errors, endless losers and no guarantee of 
getting it right in spite of the enormous accretion of knowledge over several past 
centuries”.261 According to North, achieving a sustainable economic change requires 
perceiving correctly changes in the human environment, incorporating those 
perceptions in the belief system and altering the institutions accordingly. This 
process would result in the following: 
 
1. “The implications of the novel changes would be understood with respect to 
the effects on the three fundamental sources of change i.e. demography, the 
stock of knowledge, and institutions and the resultant new interaction among 
them. 
 
2. This new knowledge would be incorporated in the belief systems of those in a 
position to modify the institutional matrix. 
 
3. The formal rules, the informal constraints and the enforcement characteristics 
would be altered accordingly and would produce the desired change.”262 
 North has set out the following recommendations on what needs to be considered 
when designing an institutional framework for economic change: 
 
1. The world and any new events or interventions will be apprehended by 
agents through systems of belief and in the contexts created by social and 
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economic institutions. How a problem is perceived and what strategies are 
readily available to deal with it are determined by the previous experience of 
a society as embodied in its institutional structure.  It is, therefore, essential 
to change both the institutions and the belief systems for successful reform 
since it is the mental models of the actors that will shape choices.263 
 
2. Any institutional framework for development must promote a common 
cultural heritage, which provides a means of reducing the divergent mental 
models that people in a society possess and constitutes the means for the 
intergenerational transfer of unifying perceptions. North gives an example of 
modern western societies like the US that embody a rich cultural heritage 
which has led to the immensely complex artifactual structure that not only 
gives them command over nature in an unparalleled fashion but equally 
extends their range of easy decision making over space and time in ways that 
would be beyond the comprehension of their ancestors.264 
 
3. The institutional framework must also promote competition among 
economic players. Continuous interaction between organisations and 
institutions in the economic setting of scarcity is key to institutional 
knowledge hence the need for competition. Competition forces organisations 
to continually invest in skills and knowledge. Therefore, all well-functioning 
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factor and product markets must be structured to provide incentives for the 
players to compete at the margins that induce growing productivity.265  
 
4. Order is a necessary condition for long-run growth and establishment and 
maintenance of a variety of conditions underlying freedom of person and 
property. Disorder, says North, increases uncertainty because rights and 
privileges of individuals and organisations are up for grabs resulting in 
disruption of existing exchange relationships in both political and economic 
markets and disappearance of conformity as a result of disintegration of 
norms and/or change in enforcement.266 Solving the development puzzle 
therefore requires the crafting of political institutions that provide the 
necessary underpinnings of public goods essential for a well-functioning 
economy and at the same time limit the discretion and authority of 
government and of individual actors within government.267 North identifies 
four characteristics of the ideal political model as follows: 
 
i. “An institutional matrix that produces a set of 
organisations and establishes a set of rights and 
privileges. 
ii. A stable structure of exchange relationships in both 
political and economic markets 
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iii. An underlying structure that commits the state to a set 
of political rules and enforcement that protects 
organisations and exchange relationships; 
iv. Conformity as a result of some mixture of norm 
internalisation and coercive enforcement”.268  
 
5. Further the existence of a non-ergodic world entails that the environment is 
continually being altered in new ways and the challenge is to understand 
correctly the changes in the environment, develop appropriate institutions 
and implement policies to solve the new problems we will face. This calls for 
a flexible system of institutions that will respond to the constantly changing 
world. This is where the ability to deal with novel situations comes handy. 
North notes that institutions adopted at a particular time, even if optimal at 
the time, may be far from optimal as the human environment changes over 
time.269  
 
6. The institutional framework must promote impersonal exchange. Impersonal 
exchange requires the development of economic and political institutions 
that alter the pay-offs in exchange to reward cooperative behaviour. The 
creation of the necessary institutions requires a fundamental alteration in the 
structure of the economy and the polity which frequently is not in the 
feasible set given the historically derived beliefs about institution of the 
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players. The move from personal exchange270 to impersonal exchange is 
critical to achieving economic growth but at the same time it is not easy. The 
difficulty arises from what North calls “the genetic architecture” from man’s 
3 million years as a hunter/gatherer which predisposed humans to engage in 
small-scale cooperative behaviour manifesting as clan, tribe and other small 
group interactions necessary for survival in a hostile physical environment.271 
Impersonal exchange requires economic institutions and organisations like 
bills of exchange, banks, corporate structures, firms and various economic 
institutions engaged in long distance trade. Such institutions and organisation 
needs to be bolstered by impersonal enforcement mechanisms to provide 
effective enforcement of agreements in impersonal exchange.272  
 
7. The institutional framework must promote specialised knowledge. North says 
specialisation of knowledge is a necessary condition to realising Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations.273 Specialisation and division of labour in a society 
leads to dispersed knowledge which must be integrated. In order for 
developing countries to survive and grow in the context of the competition 
from already developed world, they must construct an effective price system 
and supplement it by creating the institutions and organisations to integrate 
that knowledge at low costs of transacting.274 However, integrating dispersed 
knowledge at low transactional costs requires novel institutional and 
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organisational connections to overcome the public goods attributes, 
externalities and informational asymmetries that prevent the price system 
from fully integrating distributed knowledge.275 A well-functioning market 
must provide an institutional framework that will allow goods or service to be 
designed in such a way that the new user does not have to have the detailed 
knowledge of the specialist.276 Examples of such institutions would include 
warranties, guarantees and trademarks. 
 
8. Further, the institutional framework must reduce transaction costs. 
Transaction costs arise from the cost of measuring the multiple valuable 
dimensions of a good or service, protection of individual property rights, 
integration of dispersed knowledge of a society and enforcement of 
agreement. Production and transaction costs can be lowered by (i) the 
development of a uniform system of weights and measures, technological 
research for better measurement, and improved specification of property 
rights, (ii) the creation of an effective judicial system to reduce the costs of 
contract enforcement, and (iii) the development of institutions to integrate 
the dispersed knowledge in a society as well as to monitor and meter 
agreements and adjudicate disputes. In this regard North counsels that the 
institutions and that have emerged in the Western world, such as property 
rights and judicial systems, do not have to be faithfully copied in developing 
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countries as the key is the incentive structure that is created for individuals 
and organisations to engage in productive activity.277  
 
9. Finally, North says it is adaptive rather than allocative efficiency which should 
be the guide to policy formulation as allocative efficiency is a static concept 
with a given set of institutions while the key to continuing good economic 
performance is a flexible institutional matrix that will adjust in the context of 
evolving technological and demographic changes as well as shocks to the 
system.278 He says the foundations of such flexible institutions reside in 
widely held beliefs embodied in the informal constraints of society.279 
 
4.10 NORTH’S THEORY COMPARED WITH OTHER THEORIES. 
What North’s framework for economic development has achieved is the provision of a 
hither to elusive explanation as to why certain approaches to legal and institutional reform 
adopted under comparative law methodology and legal transplant theories proved 
ineffective and why other theorists within these schools of thought could be right. 
 
As stated above, legal anthropology theory is relevant in so far as it recognises the 
importance of informal rules. However, the theory lucks any explanation why they are 
relevant other than that ethnographic observation shows the rules as having authority and 
being used regularly by the members of the community. North’s framework however 
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properly explains why informal rules are relevant to behaviour ordering. North goes further 
to acknowledge the role of formal rules as long as the society has developed the necessary 
sophistication through learning to use them. 
 
However, the law and economics theory is out rightly rejected by North in that it is based on 
the wrong assumption of rationality of economic actors. The flaws of this theory are 
manifest in the failure of the Washington Consensus development model which was 
market-oriented. As stated above these flaws have been acknowledged within the law and 
economics circles which has resulted in shift towards behaviour economics, which has 
traces of North’s framework with regards to the role of human mind and belief system in 
economic choices.  
 
It is also clear that most legal reforms that have been undertaken using comparative law 
methods have not worked because they only involved transfer of formal rules without any 
consideration of the informal institutions in the transferee countries. Examples in this 
regard are the reforms that were sought to be done under the first law and development 
movement. As explained above, the concept of legal reform under the first law and 
development studies was modelled on Watson’s approach that legal rules may be very 
successfully borrowed where the relevant social, economic, geographical and political 
circumstances of the recipient are very different from those of the donor system.280 However, 
Kahn-Freud’s and Legrand’s approach to legal transplants ties in with North’s model as they 
believed that the use of comparative method requires a knowledge not only of the foreign 
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law but also of its social, and above all its political, context.281 Further, Kamba, has 
advocated a three-stage technique of comparative law. He suggests that the process of 
comparison should involve (i) the description phase which may take the form of a 
description of the norms, concepts and institutions of the systems concerned, (ii) the 
identification phase identifying differences and similarities of systems compared and (iii) the 
explanatory phase, which should give an account of the resemblances and dissimilarities 
between systems, concepts or institutions. This methodical approach clearly seeks to take 
into consideration the unique local conditions of the transferee community. However, it 
does not go far in its explanation as to why this is necessary. This lacuna is filled by North’s 
framework. 
 
 
 
A number of empirical studies that have been carried out recently confirm the premise of 
North’s framework. One of such studies was carried out by Berkowtz, Pistor and Richards.282   
The aim of the study was to assess the impact of the way in which a country received its 
formal laws on the effectiveness of the law (the authors call this legality). This study 
concluded that the process of law making rather than the contents of legal rules determines 
the effectiveness of legal institutions. They found that where law develops internally 
through a process of trial and error, innovation and correction and with the participation or 
involvement of users of the law, legal professionals and other interested parties, legal 
institutions tend to be highly effective. By contrast where foreign law is imposed and legal 
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evolution is external rather than internal, legal institutions tend to be weak. Berkowtz et al 
argued that: 
 
“...for law to be effective, a demand for law must exist so that the law on the books will actually 
be used in practice and legal intermediaries responsible for developing the law are responsive 
to this demand. If the transplant adapted the law to local conditions, or had a population that 
was already familiar with basic legal principles of transplanted law, then we would expect that 
the law would be used. Because the law would be used a strong public demand for institutions 
to enforce this law would follow. And, legal intermediaries that are responsible for developing 
and enforcing this imported law would be able to develop the law so as to match demand, 
because the strong demand for law would provide resources for legal change. Where these 
conditions are present we would expect the legal order to function just as effectively as in an 
origin country where the law was developed internally. However, if the law was not adapted to 
local conditions, or if it was imposed via colonization and the population within the transplant 
was not familiar with the law, then we would expect that initial demand for using these laws to 
be weak. Legal intermediaries would have a more difficult time developing the law to match 
the demand. Countries that receive the law in this fashion are thus subject to the “transplant 
effect”: their legal order would function less effectively than origins or transplants that either 
adapted the law to local conditions and/or had a population that was familiar with the 
transplanted law.”
283
  
 
The above reasoning and findings chime with North’s framework as it emphasises on 
adapting the law to local conditions and also the internal generation of legal rules as 
opposed to imposition of external rules. However North has given a better explanation why 
this is necessary. 
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Similarly the various theories of legal change make very interesting comparisons when 
juxtaposed to North’s framework. In so far as the evolutionist approach associates legal 
development with particular cultural or economic attributes of a society and disagrees with 
borrowing of legal ideas from dissimilar societies, it compares with North’s framework. 
However, the fact that it undervalues “the role of cognition, of ideas, of goals, and often of 
individual legal innovation”284 it removes itself from the ambit of North’s framework, which 
recognises the role of formal rules as long as they are properly aligned to the existing 
informal rules.   
 
The Utilitarian theory of legal change conforms to North’s framework in its recognition that 
legal change is orchestrated by the human desire to increase efficiency and reduce 
transactional costs, which is one of the main planks of North’s framework. Douglas North, 
for instance, has given examples of laws pertaining to trademarks and patents as well as 
limited corporate liability as some of the innovations, which came about in an attempt to 
increase the private rate of return285.  However, the emphasis of this approach on efficiency 
considerations only as the sources of legal change makes it incomplete compared to North’s 
framework. As observed by Horowitz, “the outcomes of legal change are too various to be 
subsumed under the rubric of any self-regulating functionalism”286. 
 
However, of all the theories of legal change, the social change theory comes closest to 
North’s framework in that it depicts the importance of informal rules and the process in 
which informal rules can influence the introduction of formal rules. This approach espouses 
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the bottom up approach to legal change which is advocated by North’s framework. It also 
recognises the relevance of people’s attitudes or belief systems to the process of legal 
development. However, while the premise of this approach is sound, it is not the case that 
changing social structure is the only source of legal change. So this approach is rather too 
narrow for a general theory of legal change. 
 
With regard to the intentionalist approach, despite the weaknesses, in so far as it advocates 
wanton borrowing of legal rules, for purposes of developing a practical theory of legal 
change, the “intentionalist” view is still useful in that it recognises the need and the role of a 
“visible hand” in the process of legal reform. This is also a central theme under North’s 
framework, which emphasises that the agent of change is an entrepreneur (social, economic 
and political) and that the nature and direction of change is determined by the belief system 
of the entrepreneur.287 
 
The forgoing shows that all the different theories of legal change that have been posited by 
different legal theorists, over time, find their expression in North’s framework  as such they 
are all correct to some extent. North’s framework recognises the evolutionary element of 
institutional change overtime, recognises that institutional change is need-based in that the 
ultimate purpose of change is reduction of transaction costs. Further, North’s framework 
emphasises on the role that changing social structure through changes in the belief system 
of the society, play in inducing institutional change. Finally North’s framework recognises 
the role of an agent including the polity in the process of change. This means that all the 
four different strands of theories of legal change are embodied in North’s framework. This 
                                                 
287
 North (1990) supra note 202 at 73 
  
- 99 - 
 
lends huge credibility to North’s framework and justifies our choice in using the framework 
as a tool of analysis for purposes of designing the necessary legal reform for capital market 
development.  
 
In the next chapters we will seek to show how North’s framework of economic change can 
be applied to the development of capital markets in developing countries.   
   
 
 
 
 
5 CHAPTER FIVE: NORTH’S FRAMEWORK AND CAPITAL MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The institutional foundations for capital markets are clearly alien to most developing 
economies. The roots of capital markets or capitalism are traced to the West288. Capitalism 
as a system requires certain conditions to exist in order for it to take hold. It has been said 
that the notion of “capitalism is identified with a system of unfettered individual enterprise: 
a system where economic and social relations are ruled by contract, where men are free 
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agents in seeking their livelihood, and legal compulsions and restrictions are absent.”289   
According to Pejovich, the two cornerstones of capitalism are classical liberalism and 
methodological individualism.290 We proceed on the assumption that these qualities or 
characteristics are usually in short supply in most developing economies. Consequently, 
introduction of capital markets in these economies would bring about a certain level of 
uncertainty on the part of economic agents whose mental models are not yet prepared to 
operate within such a system. Further, such actors will lack the requisite skill and knowledge 
for such a system to work efficiently. 
 
There is therefore a case for capital market institutional reform in developing economies in 
order to realise sustained capital market development. However, as discussed above, 
designing and implementing such reforms will require a clear understanding of the intricacy 
of the process of institutional change.  
 
First and foremost, it is necessary to understand the interaction between institutions (rules 
of the game) and organisation (players of the game) in the process of institutional change. 
According to North, organisations and their entrepreneurs engage in purposive activities 
aimed at maximising wealth, income or pursue other objectives defined by the 
opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of the society.291 The wealth 
maximising activities by the organisation result from learning by doing and investing in the 
kinds of skills and knowledge that will pay off.292 It is this maximising behaviour of economic 
organisations that will shape institutional change by (a) the resultant demand for 
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investment in knowledge of all kinds; (b) the ongoing interaction between organised 
economic activity, the stock of knowledge, and the institutional framework; and (c) 
incremental alteration of the informal constraints as a by-product of maximising activities of 
organisations.293  
 
The above realities and dilemmas ought to be considered when developing an institutional 
framework for capital markets. According to North’s framework, the first step of the task 
should be a comprehensive analysis of both formal and informal rules that exist in a given 
society or in this case in a given economy. Such analysis will help to identify aspects of both 
formal and informal rules as well as organisations that work and those that do not work for 
purposes of capital market development. Once the analysis is done, the findings thereof will 
form and inform a framework for institutional reform.  
 
5.2 FORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
So what are the formal institutions that economic actors put or ought to put in place in 
order to achieve sustainable capital market growth? Pejovich294 described formal rules295.  
as follows: 
 
“Formal rules are constitutions, statutes, common laws and other governmental 
regulations. They usually take a written form and are externally enforced. They define 
the political system (the hierarchical structure, decision making powers, the 
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individual’s rights); the economic system (property rights, freedom of contract, open 
entry into all markets); the protection system (judiciary, police, military).”
296
 
 
Given that they are politically orchestrated, formal rules are easy to change compared with 
informal rules but they are attached with a high risk of non-observance if they conflict with 
the informal rules of the society.297 
 
Different studies in economic development show that there are many institutional pre-
requisites for capital market development and that unless such preconditions are achieved 
by those seeking to implement it, their efforts to establish thriving capital markets will not 
be properly rewarded. Pardy298 contends that there are two basic building blocks necessary 
for a thriving securities market: (1) a macroeconomic and fiscal environment conducive to 
the supply of good quality securities and sufficient demand for them; and (2) a market 
infrastructure capable of supporting efficient operation of the securities market. In this 
study we shall call these two categories of formal institutions, “macro infrastructures” and 
“micro infrastructures” of capital market growth respectively. 
 
The macro infrastructures are the broad and high level institutions and organisations that 
help create a conducive environment to facilitate and sustain capital market growth. It is 
recognised that the demand for and supply of securities is crucially linked to the state of the 
macro economy.299 If the macro economy is conducive to profitable business operation, a 
sufficient number of sound businesses can develop to a stage where access to securities 
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markets is useful for their continued growth. It is therefore argued that the starting point for 
capital market development policies on the part of government is to tend to 
macroeconomic fundamentals which will foster business profitability, savings growth, and 
investment confidence.300 Examples of these institutions include the rule of law and the 
judicial system, political environment, anti-corruption regime, secure property rights, entry 
requirements for new and foreign companies, taxation and corporate insolvency rules. 
 
On the other hand, micro infrastructures are those which attempt to directly enable the 
securities market operate in an efficient, fair and stable manner. These are the legal, 
regulatory and institutional infrastructure upon which the market's operation is based301. 
Examples may include investor/shareholder rights, accounting and audit rules, listing 
requirements, regulation of intermediaries, capital market structure, etc. The purpose of the 
micro infrastructure is to promote market transparency and prevent market manipulation 
and abuse. 
 
5.2.1 Macro Infrastructures 
 
i. The Rule of Law 
 
Rule of law is a concept that lends itself to so many descriptions and expressions. In essence 
however rule of law is used as an appeal for “the imposing of effective inhibitions upon 
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*state+ power and the defence of the citizen from the state power’s all-intrusive claims”302. 
The World Bank has had different working definitions of ‘rule of law’ at different times of its 
use of the concept during the implementation of a development agenda in emerging 
economies303. During the era of Ibrahim Shihata,304 as General Counsel, the Bank proceeded 
on the basis that rule of law requires that: 
 
“(a) there is a set of rules that are known in advance (b) such rules are actually in 
force (c) mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the rules and to 
allow departure from them as needed according to established procedure (d) 
conflicts in the application of the rules can be resolved through binding decisions 
of an independent judicial or arbitral body, and e) there are known procedures for 
amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose.”
305
  
 
When Ko-Yung Tung was General Counsel however, the Bank adopted a slightly different 
understanding of the rule of law by stating that rule of law prevails where “a) the 
government itself is bound by the law, b) every person in society is treated equally under 
the law, c) the human dignity of each individual is recognised and protected by the law, d) 
justice is accessible to all.”306 It was emphasized that rule of law requires transparent 
legislation, fair laws, predictable enforcement and accountable governments to maintain 
order, promote private sector growth, fight poverty and have legitimacy.307  
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In modern day political economy, rule of law is a term used to describe the presence or 
absence of specific, observable criteria of the law or the legal system including a formally 
independent and impartial judiciary; laws that are public; the absence of laws that apply 
only to particular individuals or classes; the absence of retroactive laws; and provisions for 
judicial review of government action.308  
 
The relationship of the rule of law and economic development is better understood by 
looking at the role of law in facilitating economic markets. Sunstein309 has posited that the 
concept of free markets depend, for their existence, on law. He stated that: 
 
“We cannot have a system of private property without legal rules, telling people who 
owns what, imposing penalties for trespass, and saying who can do what for whom. 
Without the law of contract, freedom of contract, as we know and live it, would be 
impossible.”
310
 
 
Further, the law is used to assign the roles of different economic actors and prescribe the 
rights and obligations of the holders of those roles. This brings order, consistency and some 
level of predictability of the outcomes of different economic actions. Thus in terms of 
North’s framework of economic change, law (both in its formal and informal nature) can be 
a powerful tool for changing norms and beliefs and bringing about certainty.  
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The rule of law is said to be the container that holds the rest of the formal rules311. It has 
therefore been argued that “if private property rights, the law of contract, an independent 
judiciary and a constitution are major institutions in the container of the rule of law, their 
economic implications must be largely responsible for the observed performance of the 
free-market and private property economy. And differences in the credibility and stability of 
those four institutions, on a country-by-country basis, should explain differences in 
economic performance.”312 Thus the rule of law is said to have been a major vehicle for the 
institutionalisation of classical liberalism into capitalism.313 
 
In their empirical study, La Porta et al314 found that in countries where there is less efficient 
judicial system and observance of the rule of law, there are weak and shallow capital 
markets.  This therefore confirms that poor institutions and low observance of the rule of 
law would mean that contract/property rights are weakly enforced or subject to arbitrary 
governmental override.   
 
ii. Judicial System 
 
The judiciary is one of the important formal institutions that promote economic change. 
Judges interpret new formal rules thereby shaping the actual application of the rules in 
practice. In this way judges are the agents of change - hence the need for an efficient and 
effective judicial system. 
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Where the judiciary is inefficient and ineffective, corruption, risk of expropriation and 
contract repudiation will be unchecked and this will result in less developed capital 
markets.315  
 
iii. The Political Order 
 
Political order subsisting in a given economy is said to have a significant bearing on the 
development trajectory of the economy.  As discussed above, the political order-economic 
development nexus is one of the centre pieces of North’s thesis. According to North, 
achieving economic growth requires the crafting of political institutions that provide the 
necessary underpinnings of public goods essential for a well-functioning economy, and at 
the same time limit the discretion and authority of government and of individual actors 
within government.316  
 
The intrinsic differences in political and social governance structures between developed 
and developing countries, has been further explored recently by North et al, in their work, In 
the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development.317  North et 
al draw a distinction between what they call “Open Access Orders” (OAO) and “Limited 
Access Orders” (LAO).   According to North et al, a typical LAO structure involves two 
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powerful groups who have capacity to instigate violence against the other. Each group is 
controlled by an elite subgroup,318 which is in charge of its subjects or client organisations 
and have privileged or exclusive access to the resources within the group through special 
arrangements that are put in place enabling them to extract “rent” from the subject in 
exchange of protection and other services received from their elite group. Each of the elite 
groups of the two groups stands to suffer reduced rent if violence erupts between the two 
groups. Consequently, the two groups are incentivised to keep peace with each other by 
entering into a “dominant coalition” to avoid violence.319  
 
North et al therefore portray the rule of law as generated by mature and normalised power 
relations between elites. Rather than resort to violence, powerful organisations resolve 
disputes through legal forms. Consequently, the dispute resolution mechanism adopted by 
the ruling elites are applied to non-elite groups. In this sense, rule of law is the institutional 
manifestation of an approach to power by the elite groups who are enjoying the gains of 
cooperation.  
 
LAOs constrain economic development in that “limited access to organisations and 
economic rights limits competition and economic productivity.”320 Also, LAOs breed local 
monopolies and restrictions on economic entry, thereby hindering competitive markets and 
long-term economic growth.321  
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OAOs on the other hand are characterised by institutions that support open access and 
political as well as economic competition. Unlike LAOs where there are two or more 
powerful groups capable of instigating violence, in OAOs government has a monopoly on 
violence through the military and police forces. Consequently, in OAOs “entry into 
economic, political, religious, and educational activities is open to all citizens as long as they 
meet standard (impersonal) requirements.”322 OAOs thrive within the milieu of functional 
rule of law. In order for a LAO to transition to an OAO there is a need to put in place 
institutional arrangements that support impersonal exchange,323 and members of the 
dominant coalition must find it in their interest to expand impersonal exchange. The result 
will be a transformation from a system of “limited access rent creation to open access 
entry.”324 
 
The relevance of political order to economic development is as old as classic economics 
itself, it being at the very centre of Adam Smith’s ground-breaking Wealth of the Nations325 
treatise. According to Smith, economic development hinges on two important factors, 
namely (1) the secure existence and efficient operation of the basic institutions of 
production, exchange and accumulation: property, contractual relationships, markets, 
currencies and credit systems; and (2) the strength of social attitudes conducive to 
economic endeavour, especially the motivations of the people to better their condition 
through labour, savings and productive investment.326 These conditions can only exist 
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where there are sufficient checks and balances to political power as arbitrary authority and 
insecurity will effectively restrict economic creativity and the growth of economic 
exchange.327 Smith also noted that in countries where there are weak governments and 
political disorder, the rich often fail to employ their wealth at all, preferring to hoard or hide 
a considerable part of it. He observed that: 
 
“In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid of the violence 
of their superiors, they frequently bury and conceal a great part of their stock, in order to 
have it always at hand to carry with them to some place of safety, in case of their being 
threatened with any of those disasters to which they consider themselves at all times 
exposed.”
328
 
 
While patriotism may urge domestic investment, when this necessitates a high risk of being 
plundered by arbitrary power, or through expectations of political disorder and violence, 
those who are more prudent than patriotic will seek a shelter for their wealth in the more 
developed countries.329 
 
Finally, political instability is antithetic to economic development. Generally, “no investor 
wants to pour money into a country where a new government can shoot its way to power, 
kill the old government, and steal its money.”330  
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iv. Anti -Corruption Rules 
 
Corruption has long been recognised as being anathema to economic growth and as such 
would have an adverse effect on capital market development. The effect of corruption on 
economic development is explained in a number of ways.   
 
Firstly, corruption affects economic efficiency in that it discourages innovation. Murphy et al 
(1993)331 argue that since innovators will need several government permits and licences in 
order to start a new enterprise, and given that most new entrants on the market are cash- 
and credit-constrained, requiring them to pay hefty sums to bribe government officials 
would turn innovators away from the market thereby reducing the number of potential 
players in the market.332  Further, in his study of the relationship between corruption and 
investment, Maori333 found that corruption reduces private investment. He observed that 
corruption acts as a tax on the returns to private investment thereby reducing the quantity 
of investment, and also that corruption redirects scarce investment capital to less 
productive uses, thereby impairing the quality of investment. 
 
On a practical level, in an economy where corrupt practices are prevalent, companies will 
bribe their way to the official exchange list even if they do not strictly meet all the listing 
requirements. This would be detrimental to investors who blindly believe that any company 
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listed on a stock exchange is worth investing in.334 Similarly, it would also be possible for 
regulators to gloss over the monitoring of compliance of listed companies’ continuous 
disclosure obligations as well as the enforcement of market rules where there is a breach, 
because corporate officials would be in a position to bribe regulators away from their 
companies’ operations.  
 
The negative correlation between corruption and capital market growth has also been 
empirically confirmed by La Porta et al,335 who observed that most common law countries 
have less incidence of corruption due to strict enforcement of investor rights and that in 
consequence they have strong and deep capital markets in comparison to countries with 
Franco - German legal systems, where there is high incidence of corruption.336 
 
Therefore, the existence of effective anti-corruption rules and an efficient anti-corruption 
agency would help curb corrupt practices in an economy, and thereby improve corporate 
productivity and efficiency which would in turn encourage growth of capital markets. Anti-
corruption rules would provide the necessary incentive structure for market players not to 
engage in corrupt practices. It should of course be noted that corruption is not a simple 
phenomenon because in LAO society, corruption may be used by the political elites to 
extract rent and therefore to sustain the polity non-violently and allow progress towards 
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doorstep conditions and OAO. Therefore dealing with corruption will require a nuanced 
approach that is sensitive to the existing social and economic structures (organisations). 
 
v. Secure Property Rights 
 
The term property has an elusive meaning.337 Property may mean the thing that is owned or 
the relationship between the owner and the thing.338 Property rights have been defined as 
the rules that govern the use of scarce resources.339 Property may be personal or real 
property. For purposes of this work therefore property shall refer to both real and personal 
property as they both are relevant to capital market development. 
Of particular relevance to capital market development is the concept of a company share as 
an incident of property.  A share has been described as the “interest of a shareholder in the 
company measured by a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of 
interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all 
the shareholders inter se...”340 The legal nature of share ownership has generated 
interesting debate and it has been argued that a share does not exhibit some of the key 
characteristics of property and as such describing shareholders as owners of the shares they 
hold smacks of a “legal fabrication.”341 Be that as it may, it is acknowledged that “the legal 
protection of the share asset as private property is key to stimulating economic activity in 
relation to the investment market, arguably towards maximum efficiency.”342 
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Security of private property rights is said to be directly correlated to investment in different ways. 
The ground breaking work on the role of property rights in economic development was carried out 
by Professor Hernado De Soto.343 De Soto asserts that capital markets fail in emerging economies 
because of lack of formally titled property. He says that while the majority of residents in 
developing countries do own property, ownership of the property is secured informally, through 
neighbourhood associations or mafias, for example, rather than through formal titles and a 
property registration system. According to De Soto, this lack of formal titling prevents the use of 
property as collateral, and hence prevents the capital embedded in these assets from being 
"unlocked." Thus while entrepreneurs in developed market economies are able to turn their 
houses into capital to start businesses; many potential entrepreneurs in the developing world are 
not able to obtain loans due to lack of collateral.  
 
Another study carried out by Besley’344 also shows the role of property rights for investment. 
Besley developed three theoretical models that imply the link between property rights and 
investment incentives.  Firstly, property rights ensure freedom from expropriation. This will affect 
the level of investment because individuals do not invest if their fruits of investments are seized by 
others. Secondly, property rights are linked to the credit market in that if better property rights 
make it easier to use land as collateral, then constraints on funding investments are diminished. 
Finally, better property rights in the form of superior transfer rights lead to expanded trading 
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opportunities and the ability to exploit gains from trade which eventually enhance investment 
incentives.345  
   
Johnson et al,346 also found an empirical link between property rights and reinvestment of earnings 
by firms. Johnson et al found that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their 
profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms 
reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from 
retained earnings. In the same vein, Claessens and Laeven347 have argued that the existence of an 
environment with poorly developed financial systems and weak property rights have two effects on 
firms: first, it reduces the access of firms to external financing; and second, it leads to firms 
allocating resources in a suboptimal way.  
 
The foregoing shows that countries with strong and secure property rights may be able to develop 
deep capital markets because investors will be attracted to put their wealth in the market. It should 
be noted here that these pre-conditions are cumulative and interrelated as strong and secure 
property rights depend on strong and predictable enforcement, which in turn depends on rule of 
law as well as independent and non-corrupt judges. According to North, it is all about the incentive 
structure such that if violence is believed to be more effective or efficient as a means to secure 
control of valuable resources then organisations will invest in violence. However if property law is 
seen as more effective or efficient then organisations will invest in property rights and support the 
legal system that they rely on. 
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vi. Market Access Rules  
 
The development of capital markets348 depends on the number of companies participating 
in the market. The number of corporate participants is determined by the level of access to 
the market granted to business entities within or outside a particular economy. Barriers to 
entry are therefore likely to affect the number of market players. According to North et al’s 
Limited Access Order (LAO) and Open Access Order (AOA) analysis, AOA’s are characterised 
by open access to economic activities to all and this allows for economic competition and 
the existence of perpetually lived public and private organisations, which are “door step” 
condition for transformation from LAO to OAO.349  
 
There are different levels of access to entry that needs to be properly regulated to allow 
more companies a chance of participating in the market. The first level is access to entry 
into the formal corporate world. This concerns the nature of the process and associated 
costs that apply in order for new businesses to register as companies or firms. These include 
legal requirements that need to be met before a business can officially open its doors, the 
official cost of meeting these requirements, and the minimum time it takes to meet them if 
the government does not delay the process. In their study, Regulation of Entry,350 Djankov 
et al, found that countries with cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive entry 
requirements are associated with sharply higher levels of corruption, and a greater relative 
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size of the unofficial economy. This is so because new businesses who cannot meet the 
entry requirements will either resort to bribe government officials to register them as 
companies or will decide to operate informally and therefore outside government control.  
 
The second level is access to entry into the capital market. This concerns the requirements 
that companies have to meet before being listed on the stock market. These may include 
legal requirements for a private company to become a public company, capitalisation 
requirements as well as corporate governance obligations. Stricter regulation of entry into 
the market is likely to result in fewer companies being listed on the official stock market. 
One way of easing access to the market is the establishment of  Alternative Capital Markets 
to allow smaller companies to float shares with a more flexible regulatory regime than is 
applicable to the main market.351  However as noted above, there is a reputational risk if 
corrupt companies manage to secure the reputational gains of listing on a stock market. 
Access in a system characterised by corruption needs corruption, although it is important to 
bear in mind that extreme restriction may create a new breeding ground for corrupt 
practices.352  It is therefore important to take a balanced approach.  
 
The final level of barriers to entry is regulation of foreign companies seeking to invest in the 
economy. Different countries have different restrictions for foreign companies to operate in 
their jurisdictions. This may be through company law rules or government policy. Another 
level of access for foreign companies would be access for foreign companies to trade their 
securities on the local stock exchange. The more foreign securities are allowed to trade on 
the local market, the more liquid the market will become.   
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vii. Share Ownership Structure  
In order to have an active secondary market, there is need for more shares to change hands 
in the market. However, in a market that is dominated by companies with concentrated 
ownership or family-controlled companies, shares may not change hands often. Family 
controlled companies will always be wary of diluting their control and therefore not willing 
to float more shares on the market. It has been observed that well-developed equity 
markets, such as those in the US and Britain, are dominated by listed companies with 
diffused ownership - majority ownership is rare and very few large companies are family-
controlled.353 Possible ways of restructuring share ownership rules are discussed in detail in 
chapter 9 below. 
 
viii. Taxation Rules 
 
Favourable taxation rules towards listed companies may attract more private companies to 
trade their securities on the market. In most developing economies, many companies fear 
that once they float their shares on the market, they will be put on the spot and be required 
to pay more tax.354 Consequently companies shun the market. Further, tax incentives to 
investors who buy and sell shares on the market will attract more investors to the market, 
thereby increasing market liquidity whereas excessive taxation of capital gains from the sale 
of shares, for instance, will encourage investors to retain their shares and take out their 
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profits in dividends.355  It has been noted that in countries with relatively developed 
financial markets, and in all countries that have high inflation rates, the supply of financial 
assets is highly responsive to tax changes.356 Chamley357 showed that the removal of 
onerous levels of taxation stimulates financial intermediation when such a measure is 
conceived to be a permanent policy change. The correlation between taxation and the 
supply of financial instruments has resulted in tax policies featuring prominently among 
policy instruments used to develop securities markets in some countries. In Korea, for 
example, tax policies have been used not only as incentives for the supply of, and the 
demand for, securities, but also as penalties for companies that were reluctant to go 
public.358 Similar measures used in Brazil include dividend tax exemptions or reductions, 
stock acquisition tax incentives, and provision of tax fund shares, among others.359  
 
Further, the tax environment plays a major role in determining the volume of inflow of 
foreign portfolio investment to emerging economies, such that the inflow of portfolio 
investments into any emerging capital market will largely be affected by the tax regime that 
affects the rates of return on financial assets.360  
 
ix. Corporate Insolvency Rules 
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Corporate insolvency rules may determine the attractiveness of a particular market to 
foreign companies. For instance multinational companies will be attracted to a pro-debtor 
insolvency regime and they will be wary to set up shop in a country where there are no 
terms for bargaining over creditor exit or refinancing of the distressed enterprise. There is 
therefore need for a balanced insolvency regime. 
 
 
x. Competition Rules 
 
According to North, the institutional framework that will give rise to economic change must 
promote competition among economic players because competition forces organisations to 
continually invest in skills and knowledge, hence the need for all well-functioning factor and 
product markets to provide incentives for the players to compete at the margins that induce 
growing productivity.361 Competition rules that govern market competition, open trade, and 
free entry and exit of market players promote impersonal exchange because they increase 
the opportunity costs of sticking to relational networks.362 The politics of open competition 
are particularly dangerous in Limited Access Orders, as competition that is open may 
threaten the economic basis of social and political stability.363 Therefore this is an aspect of 
macro-infrastructure that needs careful implementation.   
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xi. Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
A rule will only have value if it can be enforced. Mechanisms ought to be put in place to 
enable parties to an exchange to enforce compliance at a transaction cost that will make 
them that the exchange is worthwhile to them.364 It is observed that where there are high 
costs of measuring contract performance and no form of enforcement is possible, the gains 
from cheating and reneging exceed the gains from cooperative behaviour365. The process of 
perfect third-party enforcement involves a neutral party with the ability, at no or low cost, 
to be able to measure the attributes of a contract and, to enforce agreements, at low or no 
cost, such that the offending party always compensates the injured party so that violation of 
contract becomes costly.366 According to North, the inability of societies to develop 
effective, low cost systems for the enforcement of contracts is the most important source of 
both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third Word.367  
 
5.2.2 Micro Infrastructures 
 
As stated above, the role of micro institutions is to ensure market transparency and investor 
protection.368 According to Pardy369, these institutions aim to provide four things: 
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 Certainty as to property rights and contract. It is noted that clear rights to property 
and enforceable rights and obligations under contracts are crucial to the ability to 
trade and transfer title to securities, and enter into options and other agreements 
concerning securities. 
 
 Transparency of trading and other procedures, and public disclosure by companies 
of all information relevant to the value of their securities. These are necessary for 
efficient price setting, and for confidence in the fairness of the market.  
 
 Protection against unfair practices by intermediaries and insiders. This relies upon 
supervision by a supervisory authority and the imposition by it of penalties for 
wrong-doing rather than on scrutiny of transactions by investors themselves to 
protect their own interests.   
 
 Protection against the financial failure of intermediaries and market institutions such 
as clearing houses. This will give investors confidence that they will not suffer 
financial loss from the failure of an intermediary and also provides a degree of 
financial stability to the market as a whole by helping to reduce bankruptcies or 
delays in the performance of contracts by intermediaries both of which have 
detrimental flow-on effects which may be system-wide. 
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Micro institutions are the detailed rules that govern the efficient operation of the capital 
market. In this work we will use the recommendations of Black370 who provided a long list of 
what he called “the preconditions for capital market development” as a reference point to 
capital market micro institutions. We shall seek to show that Black correctly identifies the 
necessary institutions at micro level but that these institutions will only work effectively 
within a ‘Northian’ framework.  These shall be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
5.3 INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
As stated above, informal institutions are traditions, customs, conventions, routine, codes of 
practice, moral values, religious beliefs, and all the other norms of behaviour that have 
spontaneously, survived the test of time and served to bind the generations.371 Informal 
institutions are enforced by means of sanctions that include loss of reputation, ostracism by 
friends and neighbours, expulsion from community and sometimes more severe forms of 
punishment.372 Informal institutions are often self-enforcing because actors find it beneficial 
to adhere to them as long as others are adhering them as well.373 Adam Smith observed that 
economic development hinges on two important factors, namely (1) the secure existence 
and efficient operation of the basic institutions of production, exchange and accumulation: 
property, contractual relationships, markets, currencies and credit systems; and (2) the 
strength of social altitudes conducive to economic endeavour, especially the motivations of 
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the people to better their condition through labour, savings and productive investment374. 
The second factor is a proxy for informal institutions for economic development. 
 
Informal rules are usually the silent determinants of choices of economic entrepreneurs as 
they normally affect their mental processes in decision making. Skoog375 has succinctly put it 
as follows: 
 
“When confronted with a new problem and facing uncertainty about how to 
handle it, an actor is likely to rely on past experience and ‘thinking’ (subjective 
perceptions – ideas as well as values) to interpret the situation and experiment 
with behaviour to deal with the problem. The way she goes about this will thus be 
influenced by the legacy of her past and the present institutional and ideological 
context in which she finds herself. By making trials, eliminating errors and 
repeating successful behaviour as the problem recurs, the actor will gradually learn 
how to handle it. Over time she will develop a behavioural rule that offers a 
solution to the recurrent problem. When her behaviour has been repeated 
sufficiently often to display regularity, it becomes exactly what others will expect 
from her in similar situations. This is now a social rule for interaction – an 
institution”. 
 
The foregoing explains why informal institutions are crucial to the process of economic 
change.  It is thus said that since informal rules differ from one country to another, people’s 
reactions to the same set of formal institutions and policies lead to different and 
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unintended results.376  The following are some of the informal institutions, in the form of 
behavioural traits that are relevant to capital market development: 
 
i. Honesty, integrity and living up to a reputation pay off in strictly wealth maximising 
terms. 
 
The above behavioural traits are very crucial to market exchange. Corporate managers will 
need to have sufficient level of honesty and integrity and fear for their reputation in order 
to release true company information to investors and refrain from market abuse practices 
such as falsification of company records and other pieces of vital information as well as 
insider trading. Similarly, market regulators will need to personally internalise and 
encourage the internalisation a culture of honesty and integrity through codes of ethics in 
order to effectively root out market malpractices and other abuses.  North observes that the 
success story of the evolution of constitutional forms in England in the seventeenth century 
was a product of both respect for the law and the honesty and integrity of the judges.377 
 
ii. Norms of cooperative behaviour 
 
Corporative behaviour of economic agents facilitates complex exchanges and reduces cost 
of measurement and enforcement of exchange. It is observed that in the absence of such 
behaviour, asymmetric information and the consequent distribution of the gains will lead to 
devoting excessive resources to measurements or may lead to exchange not taking place at 
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all because the exchange is unenforceable.378 According to North, the growth of more 
complex forms of exchange in later medieval and early modern Europe was made possible 
by a variety of organisations and instruments that make norms of cooperative behaviour 
effective such as the early law of merchant’s published codes of merchant conduct.379 Thus 
self-enforcing codes of conduct for market players like accountants, auditors, lawyers and 
brokers may facilitate corporation as well act as a means to generate and enforce standards 
of honesty and service. 
 
iii. Democratic culture 
 
It is said that the level of decentralisation in rule making and the extent to which voluntary 
groups bargain with the powers that be will determine the effectiveness of formal rules.380 
The greater the level of decentralisation, the greater the probability that the formal rules 
that are aimed at improving the incentive structure to create wealth will encounter less 
friction in their interaction with informal rules.381 Further, where potentially affected parties 
are able to interact with the decision makers and wield some power to wring concessions, 
the probability that formal rules will last and realise their wealth creating potential will be 
greatly strengthened.382  This means that in economies where there is generally a culture of 
imposed or autocratic rule making, formal rules will not be as effective as they would be in 
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decentralised or democratic regimes. This entails that a “bottom-up” approach is more likely 
to succeed than a “top-bottom” approach when it comes to changing people’s behaviour. 
  
iv. Corruption level 
 
Corruption is an institutional phenomenon, informal in character and may be influenced by 
incentives shaped by other formal and informal political, economic and socio-cultural rules, 
as well as by such factors as resource availability383.  Corruption is sometimes said to be 
informal rules’ response to the perceived unfairness and/or ineffectiveness of formal rules 
and that ‘once it takes deeper roots, new formal rules tend to get weakened or distorted as 
transaction costs tend to increase or decrease by much less than expected from the original 
restructuring of the property rights enhancing the creation of wealth.’384    
 
As noted above, it is important to address the problem of corruption at the macro-
institutional level through effective anti-corruption rules. However, it is also important to 
deal with corruption, in its informal nature as a behavioural trait, at micro-institutional level. 
It is at the level of individual and group beliefs and values that corruption infests social and 
economic systems. It is therefore at the micro-institutional level that anti-corruption efforts 
should be effective. Thus addressing corruption as a belief system, that is, an informal 
institution is key to economic development. 
  
v. Belief system of the society 
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According to North,385 religious beliefs that people hold may be of the kind that gives 
preferences to solutions characterised by low adaptive efficiency, piling up one error upon 
another. It is also said that there are systematic differences between ethnic and other 
groups, in their ability and willingness to better their living conditions, and that these 
differences stem largely from divergent philosophies, world views, religious or ideological 
beliefs etc.386 The effect of belief system on economic development depends on where it 
can be placed on the Individualistic/collectivist continuum387. This will be explained as we 
look at the next proxy of informal institutions. 
 
 
 
 
vi. Culture of Individualism and Classical Liberalism 
 
It is said that the two cornerstones of capitalism are classical liberalism and methodological 
individualism.388 According to Perjovich, individualism means that human action is the result 
of emotions, desires, preferences and evaluations that only the individual can develop and 
appreciate.389 Perjovich goes on to posit that: 
 
“The culture of individualism rewards competitive performance, promotes risk taking and 
views income inequalities as desirable results of entrepreneurship and free trade. It sees 
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the community as a voluntary association of individuals who, in the pursuit of their private 
ends join and leave the community by free choice.” 
 
Classical liberalism on the other hand is about individual liberty, openness to new ideas, 
tolerance of all views, private property rights, rule of law and the freedom of contracts. 
Classical liberalism is said to create an environment in which individuals are free to pursue 
their private ends and a society where individuals are expected to tolerate one another’s 
preferences and not attempt to impose their own preferences upon others, while the state 
is expected to protect those preferences from any external interference including from the 
state itself.390  
 
 
 
 
vii. Informal political institutions and power relationships 
 
These present another set of informal institutions that affect the economic 
development trajectory in an economy. While many countries, especially in 
developing economies, have adopted the concept of democratic governance, the 
affairs of such countries are predominantly governed by different unwritten rules 
and power relationships that are not codified in their democratic constitutions. Thus 
most developing countries have a Limited Access Order governance structure391.  
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There are two interrelated ideologies upon which these informal political rules are 
founded and shaped. The first one is neo-patrimonialism, which refers to the vertical 
distribution of resources that gave rise to patron-client networks based around a 
powerful individual or party392. In a neo patrimonial state, “real power and real 
decision-making lie outside formal institutions. Instead, decisions about resources 
are made by ‘big men’ and their cronies, who are linked by ‘informal’ (private and 
personal, patronage and clientelist) networks that exist outside  the state structure, 
and who follow a logic of personal and particularist interest rather than national 
betterment”393. 
 
The second ideology is clientlism, which refers to the “forms of protective 
relationship of mutual benefit between a person or persons occupying a higher place 
in a social hierarchy (patron) and a following concerned with protection and the 
acquisition of certain advantages (clients).”394   
 
The informal networks that will result from the above may resist institutional 
changes that undermine their investment in the existing institutional arrangements. 
The challenge is therefore to incentivise such organisations and the elite interests 
they represent to allow or support changes from the inherently personal markets 
they control to impersonal markets. 
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viii. Impersonal exchange 
 
According to Adam Smith, two key components in the wealth creation process of 
human societies are, exchange and specialisation.395 There are however different 
forms of exchange that manifest in different societies depending on the level of 
development of a particular society. The first kind of exchange that has characterised 
most of economic history has been personalised exchange involving small-scale 
production and local trade.396 Personal exchange is characterised by repeat dealing, 
cultural homogeneity (common set of values) and a lack of third party enforcement. 
It is a form of corporation that depends on explicit trust397 and the kind of informal 
norms that tend to evolve from strong reciprocity relationship.398 In societies that 
rely on personal exchange, transaction costs are low but because there is little, if 
any, specialisation and division of labour, transformational costs are high.399   
 
The second pattern of exchange that has evolved due to the need for more complex 
transactions is the impersonal exchange. The shift from the known (personal) to the 
unknown (impersonal) generated difficult problems of trust. Historically, these trust 
problems were resolved by using available social resources “in which parties are 
constrained by kinship ties, bonding, exchanging hostages, or merchant codes of 
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conduct.”400 The establishment of impersonal exchange permits a widening of the 
market and the realisation of the gains from more complex production and 
exchange, extending beyond the bounds of a small geographic entity.401 
 
However, the most ideal form of exchange is impersonal exchange with third party 
enforcement. This is the form of exchange where cooperation by individuals does 
not depend on repeat dealings or past knowledge of the other part to the 
transaction. The cooperation and trust among individuals that initiates and sustains 
impersonal market exchange is implicit and not readily observable.402 Impersonal 
market exchange requires the development of economic and political institutions 
that alter the pay-offs in exchange to reward cooperative behaviour.403 Impersonal 
market exchange is said to be the critical underpinning of successful modern 
economies involved in the complex contracting necessary for modern economic 
growth.404  
 
5.4 FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONSTRAINTS LIKELY TO AFFECT CAPITAL 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN SADC COUNTRIES. 
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SADC countries seeking to establish and develop capital markets face a multiplicity of formal 
and informal constraints that make such a task daunting, and are likely to set the process of 
developing capital markets in these economies in a path dependent trajectory. These 
include the following. 
 
i. Political Instability 
 
Many SADC countries that are in the process of establishing capital markets share a history 
of civil wars and dictatorships. Further as discussed above, the governance of these 
countries is founded on informal political rules and power relationships that are usually 
contrary to democratic values and principles. It has been observed that a number of sub-
Saharan African countries display the outward signs of modern, democratic states and are 
often  treated as though power and decision-making reside within government institutions 
and that they function as designed when this is not usually the case.405  
 
Political stability is a crucial part of the process of economic development because investors 
will be less attracted to invest in a country where the state where governments change by 
the bullet and not by the ballot.”406   Political instability may result either in lack of clear 
state control or too much state control.407 In countries where there is no clear state control, 
markets will be unregulated and corruption is unchecked. On the other hand, in a country 
where the government exerts too much control of the market, inefficiency may result. It is 
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said that state attempts to control the direction of the market are counterproductive, since 
they distort information even further, creating artificial bubbles that will inevitably burst.408  
 
The problem is that most, if not all, SADC countries are Limited Access Orders (LAOs) and 
they have not yet made the transition to Open Access Orders (OAOs)409. The challenge is to 
develop institutions and organisations that can facilitate the transition, rather than facilitate 
regression to a more violence prone type of LAO.  
 
 
 
 
ii.  Lack of Initial Capital 
 
By definition a developing country has low GDP and as such the bulk of its population will 
not have the financial wherewithal to participate in the capital market. Most SADC countries 
are characterised by deep rural poverty and very limited sources of capital. As observed by 
De Soto410, most of the capital in developing countries is locked up in informal property that 
cannot be turned into capital or used as collateral to secure a loan from Banks. This scarcity 
of capital has significant implications to the development of capital markets as it would be 
extremely difficult to sustain a capitalist market where capital itself is not available or is 
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extremely in short supply411. Broadening market participation by economically empowering 
the population, therefore, should become a policy priority for authorities in SADC 
countries.412 
 
iii. Lack of Investment Opportunities 
 
Coupled with lack of initial capital is lack of opportunities for the population to invest. Many 
developing economies are characterised by narrow corporate base. The majority of 
businesses in developing countries are not formally registered and therefore have no 
potential of being listed on a stock exchange. With the exception of countries with natural 
resources, many developing countries have very few industries that would seek high 
volumes of capital injection. Consequently many developing capital markets have relied on 
privatised national companies413 as their initial candidates and many markets have been 
unable to attract privately-owned companies. The limited availability of companies to list on 
the capital market414 result in thin market capitalisation, which is an important metric of 
capital market growth.    
 
iv. Socio-Cultural Barriers 
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Another challenge facing policy makers in developing countries is culture-oriented altitudes 
of both entrepreneurs and investors towards the capitalist concept of stock markets. In 
most developing countries the idea of capitalism is alien and sometimes runs counter to the 
cultural values of society.415   One of the effects of strong cultural ties is lack of impersonal 
exchange as discussed above. According to North, the move from personal exchange416 to 
impersonal exchange is critical to achieving economic growth. 
 
Further, many traditional societies believe in family wealth and as such entrepreneurs are 
sceptical about the idea of giving away their stake in their family enterprises to the public 
through capital markets. Even those who are convinced of the positives of capital market 
trading will still be wary of giving away their majority stake to the market. Consequently, the 
few companies that will be prepared to trade their shares on the market will not have 
dispersed ownership thereby adversely affecting the liquidity of the market.  
 
Another facet of cultural barriers to capital market development in developing countries is 
the anti-colonialist sentiment that still manifests itself whenever a foreign concept is being 
introduced. This problem would be exacerbated with respect to capital markets given that, 
as discussed above, a large sector of society is usually shut out of the market, which leads to 
the perception that the capital market idea is a neo-colonial gimmick aimed at exploiting the 
national resources by foreigners.417  
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v. Lack of Specialised knowledge 
 
Given the exotic nature of the idea of capital markets in developing countries, the 
process  of installing the markets is likely to be affected by lack of specialised knowledge 
to operate the markets effectively and efficiently. Apart from understanding the role of 
capital markets to economic growth, operators of the markets need more education not 
only in stock exchange trading but also market based pricing418. Unfortunately, in most 
developing countries the capital markets have been installed without properly trained 
and skilled market practitioners. Gottlieb observes that: 
 
“Capitalism, and its attendant features that most investors in developed 
nations take for granted, is not a natural state of being - it seems entirely 
artificial that two friends cannot discuss business simply because one is a 
regulator and one is a businessman.”
419
 
 
Without specialised knowledge of the operation of the market, the pace of development 
of these markets will remain slow and the expected benefits of capital markets will not 
be realised. Effective and efficient operation of capital markets requires specifically 
trained practitioners including regulators, brokers, lawyers, judges, accountants as well 
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as auditors. However, such skilled professionals are still in short supply in developing 
countries420. 
 
vi. Poor Financial Reporting and Limited Access to Information 
 
It was observed by Barry Lockwood that: 
 
“In many developing nations, security markets are either lacking entirely or are poorly     
developed. Further, financial reporting may be unreliable and access to information highly 
limited.”
421 
 
Poor financial reporting may stem from absence of cultural traits associated with honesty 
and integrity. Ledeneva422 cites false reporting and document falsification as examples of 
practices that emanate from Russian unwritten rules that are practically observed within 
Russian economy.423  
 
As discussed above, symmetric information flow is one of the key preconditions for strong 
capital markets. In developing countries, the problem of information asymmetry is more 
acute and accentuated. There are a number of factors that contribute to this problem. 
Firstly, most developing countries lag significantly behind in terms of technological advances 
that are in use in developed countries. As such developing countries have no means or skill 
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to disseminate information to the members of the public most of whom are based in rural 
areas.  
 
Secondly, in some countries government controls information to be released by the market 
to investors such that the information disseminated will at best be selective and at worst 
doctored in order to mask the real state of the market.424 Thirdly, most companies in 
developing countries, especially those previously owned by the state, are still controlled by 
powerful political elites and often flout disclosure requirements with impunity. Finally, lack 
of information may be due to inadequate regulation of market participants. 
 
vii. Lack of Infrastructure 
 
 As stated above, most developing countries lack appropriate systems to effectively operate 
the capital market. Gottlieb explain this problem as follows: 
 
“Many developing countries suffer from a basic lack of infrastructure that makes more 
advanced trading options moot. This problem goes beyond simple poverty as an obstacle to 
investment. If a stock exchange has no way to communicate its prices, trading is rather 
difficult anywhere beyond the floor of the exchange. This situation disadvantages both 
foreigners and those living away from the market usually the poor rural population.”
425
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There is a whole range of basic infrastructure, lack of which may contribute to inefficient 
market operation including facilities for telecommunications, roads, sewage, water, and 
electricity.  
 
viii. Corruption 
 
Corruption is rampant in many developing countries426. As already discussed above, 
corruption adversely affects the development of capital markets because it scares off 
potential investors. Basically, corruption blurs transparency, hides information, and affects 
the dispute resolution process in a way that undermines investors’ trust.427 In other words 
corruption corrodes any system put in place to promote development of capital markets. 
 
ix. High rate of illiteracy 
 
The majority of the population in developing countries is illiterate or semi-illiterate. 
However, learning basic skills to trade on the capital market will require a certain level of 
literacy and as such it is likely that the majority of the population will be automatically 
excluded from market activities.  This will reduce the number of potential investors and in 
turn reduce liquidity of the market. 
 
x. Insufficient Enforcement of Rules 
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Developing economies usually lack credible mechanisms to enforce compliance of the rules 
with the consequence that most formal rules only exist on paper but not in practice. North 
describes the problem as follows: 
 
“In developed countries, effective judicial systems include well-specified bodies of law and agents 
such as lawyers, arbitrators, and mediators, and one has some confidence that the merits of a case 
rather than private payoffs will influence outcome. In contrast, enforcement in Third World 
economies is uncertain not only because of ambiguity of legal doctrine, but because of uncertainty 
with respect to behaviour of the agents
428
.” 
    
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 The discussion in this chapter shows that there are specific formal and informal institutions 
that need to be in place in order to establish efficient and effective capital markets. 
However, authorities and policy makers in developing economies face a challenge in their 
attempt to achieve rapid and sustained capital market growth due to a number of formal 
and informal institutions that are in conflict with existence of developed capital markets. 
 
The implication of the above is that simply adopting the formal rules for regulating capital 
markets in developed countries will not provide the required solutions. The specific 
challenges outlined above will need to be tackled in parallel with the process of reforming 
the regulatory framework for emerging capital markets.  
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6. CHAPTER SIX: NORTH'S MODEL AND BLACK'S PRECONDITIONS 
FOR STRONG CAPITAL MARKETS 
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6.1 BUILDING CAPITAL MARKETS: A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Using his practical experience in company and securities law reform in a number of 
developing economies, Professor Bernard Black429 provides a comprehensive analysis of 
legal and institutional preconditions for establishing strong capital markets. Black has 
posited that in order for a country to have strong public securities markets, its laws and 
related institutions must give minority shareholders good information about the value of a 
company’s business and confidence that the companies’ insiders430 will not “cheat investors 
out of most or all of the value of their investment through self-dealing transactions or even 
outright theft.”431 This calls for a complex web of market-supporting laws and institutions to 
deal with market information asymmetry, insider dealing and other forms of market abuse. 
It is important to mention at the outset that Black’s analysis is based on the neo-classical 
economic model of “rational choice”.  
 
Black is useful because his work is focussed on capital markets as a subject matter and at 
the establishment of capital markets at a National level. Thus, he is more particular than 
North in two distinct dimensions. He is interested in a single aspect of development rather 
than development overall. He is interested in specific jurisdictions rather than in factors 
common across all jurisdictions. 
 
In the context of the methodology of this research, Black provides a practical confirmation 
of North’s Propositions. His recommended institutional structures for capital market 
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development, by and large, do align, as we will show in this chapter, with North’s 
framework for development. In other words, Black reduces North’s high level and mostly 
abstract thesis into some palatable and practical framework which can be adopted by policy 
makers in designing and implementing capital market reforms within North’s framework. 
 
It is for this reason we set out in this chapter to explore the theoretical complementarities 
between Black’s pre-conditions for strong capital markets and North’s framework for 
economic development. 
 
6.2 THE STRUCTURAL CHALLENGE TO SUCCESSFUL CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
According to Black, the connection between strong investor protection along these two 
dimensions and strong securities markets creates the potential for two separating equilibria 
to exist, namely, the “lemons” equilibrium and the “strong markets" equilibrium.432 Under 
the “lemons” 433 equilibrium, that is, a market where some companies do not disclose full 
information and are involved in self-dealing, investors will discount the prices they offer for 
shares of all companies. This will adversely affect those issuers who are honest and are 
making full and frank disclosures as they do not receive fair value for their shares.434 
Discounted share prices will eventually result in companies resorting to other means of 
corporate finance or issuing shares in foreign capital markets.435 On the other hand, in 
“strong market” equilibrium, investor protection produces prices that make it attractive for 
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honest companies to issue shares, which increases the average quality of the shares that are 
issued, which further increases share prices and encourages more honest issuers.436 The aim 
of policy makers who wish to facilitate capital market growth therefore should be to achieve 
the "strong markets" equilibrium. 
 
The concept of information asymmetry in capital markets can be related to North’s concept 
of uncertainty, which he says is one of the key vices that societies aim to fight through 
learning and repetitive transacting. According to North, the level of uncertainty that exist in 
a particular society determines the level of that society’s development. The more economic 
actors invest in learning and engage in repetitive transaction, the less uncertainty exists and 
the more developed the society become. 
 
Thus the structure of the problems caused by asymmetries of information is understood by 
both neo-classic theorists like Black and NIE theorists like North in the same way. However, 
NIE theory tends to draw attention to the mediation of feedback through institutional or 
organisational or individual belief systems. If the market has “lemon” in it this may or may 
not be realised by participants. Once realised it may cause participants to form several 
beliefs, including that such markets are by their nature crooked. If reforms take place that 
limit or remove “lemons” then the effectiveness of the reforms will be determined both by 
whether the reforms do actually remove the lemons and by how the participants 
understand the effects of the reforms. For neo-classical theory the removal of lemons will 
be effective to alter market behaviour and learning effects can be ignored.437  
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Also while neo-classic theorists proceed on zero-transaction costs assumption, NIE theorists 
account for effects of transaction costs. As such for Black, the existence of his suggested 
preconditions should suffice to bring about strong capital markets. On the other hand, NIE 
theorists believe that mere existence of this precondition is not enough as in some instances 
high transaction cost may prevent some actors from, for instance, accessing the 
information.  
 
It is within this ‘NIE nuance’ that we intend to analyse Black’s preconditions for strong 
capital market. 
 
Black describes the information asymmetry problem as follows: 
 
“A critical barrier that stands between issuers of common shares and public investors is 
asymmetric information. The value of a company’s shares depends on the company’s 
future prospects. The company’s past performance is important as a (partial) guide to 
future prospects. The company’s insiders know about both past performance and future 
prospects, but investors don’t know this information and can’t easily find out. They need 
to deliver this information to investors so that investors can value the company’s 
shares”.
438
 
 
Black observes that it is not easy for issuers to deliver credible information as insiders have 
an incentive to exaggerate the issuer’s past performance and future prospects and investors 
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can’t directly verify the information that the issuer provides.439 Consequently, as investors 
are unable to know which companies are truthful and which aren’t, they discount the prices 
they will offer for the shares of all companies in order to receive a fair price, on average.440 
As discussed above however, discounted prices will discourage an honest issuer as they will 
not receive a fair price. 
 
With respect to self-dealing, Black singles out two categories of self-dealing as major 
obstacles to strong capital markets.441 These are: 
 
(i) “direct self-dealing, where a company engages in transactions, not on 
arms-length terms, that enrich the insiders themselves, their relatives 
or friends, or a second company that they own a larger percentage of; 
and 
 
(ii) indirect self-dealing or insider trading, where insiders use information 
about the company with less-informed investors.”442 
 
The prevalence of insider self-dealing, direct or indirect, like the problem of information 
asymmetry, gives rise to a “lemons market” in that investors don’t know which insiders are 
honest, and ‘which will appropriate most of the company’s value, so they discount the 
prices they will offer for the shares of all companies’.443  
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Black has observed that the problem of insider self-dealing is harder to solve than the 
problem of information asymmetry. First, honest disclosure of information during a public 
offering of shares can’t be undone once the offering is completed. In contrast, once a 
company has sold shares, the company’s insiders can always renege on a promise not to 
self-deal.444 Second, false or misleading disclosure in a public offering often occurs in a 
formal disclosure document, and thus leaves a paper trail. If subsequent events reveal the 
business problems that the company tried to conceal, the deficiencies in the original 
disclosure will often be obvious enough to make it straightforward for regulators or 
investors to seek sanctions or damages against the offending insiders and, if appropriate, 
their accountants, bankers, and lawyers. In contrast, insider self-dealing is often hidden. It 
must be uncovered before it can be policed.445 Third, a securities offering is a discrete event 
that lets investors insist on participation by reputational intermediaries446 while self-dealing 
lack a similar triggering event.447   
 
Fourth, once a company has issued shares at a discounted price, in a market characterized 
by information asymmetry, insider self-dealing, and resulting in a lemons problem, the 
insiders may feel entitled to appropriate most of the company’s value for themselves and 
they will fiercely resist any change in legal rules that limits this opportunity. They will 
therefore fight against any legal and institutional reforms that might prevent them from 
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taking what they see as their fair share of the company’s value.448 This possibility is of 
particular concern if the enforcement of the securities regulation might threaten the rents 
of elites that are vital for the stability of LAO. It is desirable to encourage elites into formal 
organisation and exploitation of their economic assets, but care must be taken in how 
protection of “minority” shareholder rights is extended. The value of their investment to the 
relevant elites must be seen by those elites to outweigh the restrictions on freedom of 
action by those elites. 
 
In his analysis, Professor Black has listed a number of core institutions that would counter 
information asymmetry and minimise insider self-dealing. These core institutions are 
classified into five broad themes as follows: 
 
i.  Local Enforcement (Effective Regulators, prosecutors and Courts) 
ii. Disclosure of Information 
iii. Reputational Intermediaries 
iv. Insider Trading liability 
v. Market Transparency 
The aim of this section is to examine Black’s recommended institutional preconditions for 
strong capital markets in light of North’s model for economic development. As stated in 
Chapter 4 above, North distinguishes institutions from organisations, institutions being 
considered as rules of the game and organisations regarded as players in the game 
manifesting in the form of groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve 
objectives. Institutions may be formal or informal rules that a particular society comply with 
                                                 
448
 Ibid, 806 
  
- 150 - 
 
in the running of its affairs. While formal rules can be changed by fiat and therefore at any 
time, informal rules can only change overtime. 
 
In the context of North’s framework therefore, Blacks preconditions for strong capital 
markets will fall into formal or informal institutions and organisations that are vital for the 
establishment of a strong capital market. It should be noted that it is possible for a single 
institution to have formal and informal institutional aspects as well as organisational 
aspects. For instance, a single organisation, say a Central Bank, will have both formal and 
informal aspects with regards to its governing rules and the prevailing custom and/or belief 
system of the individuals who operate the bank. At the same time, the Central Bank is an 
organisation being a group of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve its 
objectives. Specific identification of organisation is important as organisations, according to 
North, are key agents of change through competition and investment in knowledge and 
skills of its staff, which result in changes of both formal and informal rules449.  
 
Also the distinction between formal and informal institutions is vital to our understanding of 
Black’s preconditions of strong capital markets and such analysis would help to inform 
policy makers on which institutions on Black’s list can be achieved in the short term through 
statutory intervention and those institutions that can only be achieved over a long period of 
time and can therefore not be transplanted from outside.  
 
In light of the above, we will analyse Black’s preconditions for strong capital markets by 
identifying the formal and informal elements as well as organisational aspects of the 
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preconditions. The purpose for such classification is to identify those core institutions that 
can be easily changed by way of formal rules and those that are informal in nature and may 
only change over time. 
 
6.3  LOCAL ENFORCEMENT (EFFECTIVE REGULATORS, PROSECUTORS AND 
COURTS) 
The effectiveness of any rule is dependent on the strength of the existing enforcement 
mechanism. As such the first set of preconditions for strong capital markets are institutions 
and organisations that provide an enforcement mechanism for the rules. These include 
effective regulators, prosecutors and the judicial system. Examination of this set of 
preconditions through the lens of North’s framework reveals that these preconditions 
exhibit both formal and informal institutions as well as organisations. 
 
6.3.1 A Securities Regulator or Prosecutor 
The first enforcement agency is a securities regulator or prosecutor. A securities regulator is 
one of those preconditions that exist as an organisation and also has formal and informal 
institutional elements. It is an organisation in that most securities regulators will exist as 
government agencies established through statute and most market prosecutors are part of 
a Justice Department or equivalent and therefore part of the government establishment. 
The purpose of a securities regulator or prosecutor is to detect and deter breaches of 
market rules. The regulator is responsible for setting up standard practices for market 
players and this may include licensing market participants and enforcing compliance with 
market rules or practices. Prosecutors deal with cases involving criminal liability. 
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However, merely legislating a securities regulator or prosecutor into existence is not 
sufficient. According to Black, the securities regulator or prosecutor must be honest and 
must have the staff, the skill and budget to pursue complex securities cases involving false 
or misleading disclosure and to untangle complex self-dealing transactions.450 This is an 
informal element of this precondition. The effectiveness of a regulator or prosecutor will 
therefore depend on the formal rules that govern its operations as well as informal rules 
that impact on its institutional practice. The powers of investigation, negotiation discretion, 
prosecutorial discretion, and where relevant, discretion over sanctions, are both formal and 
informal in practice. The independence of the regulator or prosecutor is formal notionally, 
but will only be real if the political culture respects it. The effective working professional 
code is primarily informal, but can be supported through such formal devices as codes of 
practice.  
 
Further, an honest, well-staffed, skilled and decently funded regulator cannot be brought 
about through legislation. These virtues are a product of the deep seated belief systems of 
government officials and individual staff that work for the regulator and the prosecutor. 
They are therefore informal in nature. Further, corrupt government officials may also 
deliberately underfund the regulator so that their staffs is amenable to fraud and to 
frustrate skilled and honest staff away.451 This will create more incentives for officials to 
remain more corrupt as it will create a payoff of sorts.  
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Lack of skilled and motivated staff is one of the major problems for regulators and 
prosecutors in developing economies. For example, it is noted that “insiders often use 
transactional complexity and multiple intermediaries to hide their interest in a transaction, 
and anonymous offshore accounts to hide insider trading”.452 Therefore proving a self-
dealing case will require developing a chain of circumstantial evidence and digging through 
the company’s records to show how insiders have twisted the truth. This task will always 
befuddle ordinary prosecutors, or at least lead them to seek out easier cases.453 This also 
shows that lack of sufficient skill will create an incentive structure for prosecutors to pick 
and choose market abuse cases they would tackle. Building an honest and skilful team of 
regulators or prosecutors therefore cannot be done overnight. However with a robust and 
clear set of governance rules this can be achieved after a reasonable period of time. 
 
6.3.2 Judicial system 
 
The Judiciary, like the securities regulator, is an organisation in so far as it is part of the 
government establishment and a product of legislation but has also formal and informal 
rules which determine its institutional practice. Courts are crucial to resolving securities 
cases involving both civil and criminal liability. The judicial system of developing countries 
has often been the focus of “rule of law” reforms, and has proven no more tractable than 
other aspects of state institutions.454 According to Black, in order to build a strong securities 
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market, there is need for “a judicial system that is (a) honest; (b) sophisticated enough to 
handle complex securities cases and self-dealing transactions involving multiple 
intermediaries; (c) can intervene quickly when needed to prevent asset stripping; and (d) 
can produce decisions without intolerable time frame (and with appropriate adjustments 
for the time value of money)”.455  
 
Like securities regulators or prosecutors, the judicial system fits both sides of the 
formal/informal coin. While the rules that govern the operations of the judiciary are formal 
in nature, the existence of an honest, sophisticated and efficient judiciary will require a 
cultural transformation of the society in question. Every modern society has a judicial 
system of sorts but very few have honest and efficient judicial systems. Ineffective judicial 
systems come about due to a number of factors including corruption, political pressure, lack 
of funding and lack of skilled and/or trained personnel.456   As stated in Chapter 5 above, 
rule of law is one of the macro institutions that will sustain a strong capital market and the 
Judiciary is the custodian of the rule of law. 
 
Further, Black states that besides an effective and efficient judicial system, there must    be 
“procedural rules that provide reasonably broad civil discovery and permit class actions or 
another means to combine small claims of many investors”.457 This is a formal aspect of the 
judicial system. It is observed that meaningful liability risk will require not only formal 
liability rules, but also procedural rules that provide reasonably broad civil discovery as well 
as rules that allow for class action to enable investors combine their individual small claims 
                                                 
455
 Ibid, pp. 790 & 807 
456
 Ibid at p. 791 
457
 Ibid p. 791 
  
- 155 - 
 
into one big claim.458 These rules may also include contingency fee procedure.459 Black 
specifically notes that the need for broad discovery is more crucial for self-dealing than 
information asymmetry as misdisclosure in a public offering will always leave a paper trail 
which is normally not the case with instances of self-dealing.460 As such the judicial system 
will need to infer wrongdoing from circumstantial evidence.461 
 
6.3.3  Stock Exchange 
 
The formal institutions described above: regulators, court, procedural law and rules of 
court; are public sector formal institutions. A stock exchange can be publicly provided, but 
does not need to be, and usually is not. Therefore it is a private or civil society regulatory 
agency. Although Self Governing Organisations are dealt with below, we feel that a stock 
exchange is so integral to the structure of capital markets that it is noted here under the 
major public institutions of regulatory support and control of capital markets. 
 
According to Black strong capital markets will require “a stock exchange with meaningful 
listing standards, the willingness to enforce them by fining or delisting companies that 
violate the rules governing self-dealing transactions, and the financial resources and skill to 
run a surveillance operation that can catch at least some insider trading”462. Establishing a 
stock exchange with these qualities will require a shift in belief system of society. The nature 
of the listing standards and the level of their enforcement will depend on the ethical values 
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of stock exchange operators. Further if the stock exchange is largely funded by government, 
the levels of funding and therefore the extent of its advancement will depend on the 
incentives available to government officials to adequately fund the operation of the 
exchange.  
 
6.4  REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES 
As stated above, in a situation where a ‘lemons market’ exists, investors will tend to 
discount the share prices they will offer to companies and discounted share prices will 
discourage honest issuers and cause them to turn to other forms of financing.463 Discounted 
share prices however will incentivise dishonest issuers to issue shares which are even more 
worthless. Consequently, while high-quality issuers will be forced to leave the market, low-
quality issuers will remain and cause more damage to the market. 
 
Black suggests that one solution to the above conundrum would be the existence of laws 
and private as well as public institutions that will give investors reasonable assurance that 
the issuer is being truthful.464 One of such set of institutions is reputational intermediaries, 
which include, accounting firms, investment banking firms, law firms, credit rating agencies 
and stock exchanges. Reputational intermediaries are important because they can credibly 
vouch for the quality of information on the basis that they are ‘repeat players’ who will 
suffer reputational loss if they permit a company to exaggerate its prospects or gloss over 
any self-dealing transactions, which exceeds the intermediary's one-time gains from 
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permitting the exaggeration.465 This role of reputational intermediaries can be reinforced by 
civil liability to investors if they endorse faulty disclosure or self-dealing transactions 
coupled with possible criminal prosecution if they intentionally do so.  
 
Having one set of reputational intermediaries however, may not be enough as there is a 
danger that new entrants may seek to free ride on other intermediaries’ reputation and not 
bother to guard their own reputation. Consequently second tier reputational intermediaries 
are recommended.466 This may be in the form of self-regulatory organisations (SROs), which 
may be voluntary or mandatory. One example cited by Black is the requirement in United 
States for all investment bankers to belong to either the New York Stock Exchange or the 
National Association of Securities Dealers.467 With such arrangement in place, a member 
evicted by one organization is unlikely to be accepted by the other such that the 
organization's power to evict a member becomes the power to put the member out of 
business and not merely deprive it of the reputational enhancement that voluntary 
membership could bring. 
 
It is further realised that SROs themselves will need to be policed to avoid a situation where 
low-quality intermediaries form a lax SRO to vouch for their quality such that investors will 
have to figure out whether the SRO itself is bogus.468 The suggested solution to deal with 
this problem is to reinforce liability of the intermediaries and set up minimum quality 
standards for intermediaries. According to Black, a system in which different “multiple 
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reputational intermediaries vouch for different aspects of a company’s disclosure, while the 
government, private plaintiffs, and self-regulatory organisations police the reputational 
intermediaries can work well”.469    
 
The foregoing shows that there are three aspects to reputational intermediaries relevant to 
the effectiveness of the market. The first one is the existence of reputational intermediaries. 
The second aspect is liability risk in the event of a reputational intermediary giving 
misleading advice or being complicit of provision of misleading advice. Thirdly, it is how 
these reputational intermediaries are policed or regulated. Liability risk in itself would be 
meaningless unless sufficient monitoring and enforcement system is in place. As stated 
above it is recommended that there should be a multi-tier framework of regulating 
reputational intermediaries. The final aspect is whether the regulatory framework includes 
self-regulatory organisations (SROs).  SROs would be useful as they help to instil a culture of 
compliance by setting best practice standards to which all its members are supposed to sign 
up. 
 
Again, the proposed institutions and organisations under this category may also fall under 
both the formal and informal limbs of North’s model as shown below.  
 
 
6.4.1  Stock Exchange 
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As noted above the central reputational intermediary will be the stock exchange. The stock 
exchange is an organisation while its requirements are institutional. Stock exchange listing 
requirements play a crucial role in ensuring that companies that list their shares with the 
exchange have put in place necessary corporate governance structures to facilitate full 
disclosure of information and to provide sufficient checks and balances on company 
insiders. Further, exchange listing rules provide for continuous disclosure obligations.  
 
6.4.2 Accountants and the Accountancy Profession 
 
Accounting firms are in themselves organisations but the rules that regulate their services 
will take the form of formal rules. Also, viewed from the perspective of the client firm the 
accountant can serve as “gatekeeper” or more formally as the “mediators” of the regulatory 
rules. If the auditor refuses to sign off on an annual audit it operates as a very serious 
sanction upon the company and its directors. 
 
Since by selling their services in preparing and auditing financial statements, accounting 
firms ‘rent out’ their reputations for conducting a careful audit that can catch some fraud, 
discourage most attempts at fraud, and for painting a tolerably accurate picture of a 
company’s financial performance, some form of liability risk would be an important buttress 
for the accounting firm’s concern for reputation. As such Black sets out, as one of the 
preconditions for strong capital markets “Securities or other laws that impose on 
accountants enough risk of liability to investors if the accountants have endorsed false or 
misleading financial statements or if the accountants have endorsed nondisclosure, or false 
or misleading disclosure of self-dealing transactions, so that the accountants will resist their 
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client’s pressure for more favourable disclosure or to let them hide self-dealing 
transactions”.470 
Basically, liability risk can help to persuade the firm to establish strong internal procedures 
to ensure that the audits it conducts, and the financial statements that it prepares or 
reviews, meet minimum quality standards and also provide a compelling argument that the 
accounting firm can offer to a client that is pushing hard for more favourable treatment 
than the accounting firm wants to offer.471 
 
Also Black recommends “a sophisticated accounting profession with the skill and experience 
to catch at least some instances of false or misleading disclosure as well as some non 
disclosed self-dealing transactions, and insist on proper disclosure”.472 In so far as a 
sophisticated accounting profession cannot be legislated into existence, it is an informal 
institution. The conduct of accounting or investment firms, which are organisations, will be 
informed by formal and informal institutions. Professionalism is a virtue that is founded on 
one’s belief system which determines one’s ethical orientation. Black notes that ‘audit 
requirements and accounting rules are no better than the accountants who conduct the 
audits and apply and interpret the rules’.473 Accounting profession is therefore crucial to the 
process of information disclosure. Further, it is observed that for an insider who is 
determined to self-deal, having an accountant looking over his shoulder would be an 
obstacle but this could be overcome by suitably disguising the transaction, or his interest in 
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the transaction, by running one or both through multiple intermediaries.474 Therefore, in 
order for the accounting profession to be effective, accountants ‘must be sophisticated 
enough and auditing standards rigorous enough, to catch at least the less subtle 
subterfuges.’475 This would raise the transaction costs of self-dealing and thereby keep it in 
check. 
 
6.4.3 Investment bankers 
 
Similarly, investment banks are organisational while the rules governing investment banks 
are institutional. Just as in the case of accounting firms, liability risk can help to persuade an 
investment banker to establish strong internal procedures to ensure that the companies 
whose shares it underwrites meet minimum quality standards and provide a compelling 
argument that the investment banker can offer to a client that is pushing hard for more 
favourable disclosure, or a higher offering price, than the investment banker wants to offer. 
 
The formal rules required therefore are “securities or other laws that impose on investment 
bankers enough risk of liability to investors if investment bankers underwrite securities that 
are sold with false or misleading disclosure, so that the bankers will resist their client’s 
pressure for more favourable disclosure.”476 
 
Further, Black recommends the existence of a “sophisticated investment banking profession 
that will investigate the issuers of securities that the investment bank underwrites because 
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the investment banker’s reputation depends on not selling fraudulent or overpriced 
securities to investors.”477 An important part of investment bankers’ role involves 
conducting a "due diligence" investigation of the issuer, to satisfy themselves that the 
issuer's future prospects are reasonably stated in the offering documents and oral sales 
presentations, that the issuer's managers appear to be honest, and that investors 
understand the major risks of the investment. Investment bankers therefore should ensure 
that they conduct credible background checks on issuers and avoid underwriting offerings of 
shares by fraudulent companies, which may collapse in price when the fraud is discovered. 
Existence of credible investment bankers is an informal phenomenon. 
 
6.4.4  Lawyers and the Legal Profession  
 
Lawyers play a central role in drafting and interpreting legal rules when there is a dispute. 
This means lawyers and legal firms within whom they operate form a vital plank of the 
reputational intermediation structure. Also lawyers play a significant role in corporate 
governance. Involvement of lawyers in any transaction lends it some level of credibility. 
Therefore as with accountants and investment bankers, formal rules that apportion liability 
risk to lawyers and legal firms is a necessary precondition for strong capital markets. 
Lawyers need to be sufficiently regulated. This can be done by establishing a self-regulatory 
organisation responsible for the legal profession. 
 
Specifically Black recommends that there must be “sophisticated securities lawyers who can 
ensure that a company’s offering documents comply with disclosure requirements”. This 
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requires skilled and honest securities lawyers who can detect breaches of securities law and 
successfully prosecute perpetrators. Existence of skilled and honest lawyers is an informal 
constraint. Securities lawyers usually “walk a fine line between accepting the positive-
sounding statements that the issuer wants to make, and insisting on the need to disclose 
risks and problems”478  Like the other professions, effective securities lawyers will only exist 
within a milieu of ethical and honest culture. The role of effective lawyers will become more 
relevant with increasing liability risk for accountants and investment bankers and the 
lawyers themselves.479 The more the risk of liability for accountants and investment bankers 
the more they will be more careful and involve the services of lawyers. With their own 
liability hanging over their heads, the lawyers will ensure that they are honest with their 
advice.   
6.4.5 Regulation of Reputational Intermediaries  
 
As observed above, some form of regulation of reputational intermediaries is vital to ensure 
that they operate themselves in a credible fashion. This can be done in a number of ways 
including the following: 
 
(i) Licensing of reputational intermediaries.  
Subjecting reputational intermediaries to regulatory licensing scheme would be another 
way of ensuring that they adhere to set minimum standards although this is not regarded as 
a core institution because where there is sufficient liability to investors, private enforcement 
is likely to be more effective that public enforcement. 
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(ii) Existence of self-regulatory organisations.  
As stated above, self-regulation, through a voluntary or mandatory self-regulatory 
organisation that is itself subject to regulatory oversight, is a useful supplement to 
government regulation of reputational intermediaries.480 Again this is not a core institution 
as the quality of a particular SRO is dependent on the quality of intermediaries that 
comprise it. 
 
6.5 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
Disclosure requirements are an important tool for effective regulation of the market. In the 
context of North’s framework, disclosure would help reduce uncertainty and therefore help 
investors’ make informed investment decisions. Strict requirements for firms to effectively 
disclose any information that would affect their share prices including financial statements, 
corporate transactions, details of company directors as well as details of any shareholding or 
any transactions involving directors would effectively help reduce the ills of information 
asymmetry and self-dealing. It is argued that strict disclosure requirements lead to liquid 
and efficient markets in financial securities and reduce the cost of capital for firms.481 
Black lists the core institutions that would facilitate effective disclosure of information, 
some of which are formal in nature while others are informal as outlined below. 
6.5.1 Accounting and auditing rules that address investors’ need for reliable 
information. 
 
                                                 
480
 Ibid 800 
481
 Anat Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, ‘Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities’, 
(2000) 13 Rev. Fin. Stud. 479 at 480. 
  
- 165 - 
 
Accounting and auditing rules are formal institutions. It is said that good accounting rules 
should require companies to provide information in a form that is useful to investors and 
facilitate evaluating a company’s past performance, and comparing it with similar 
companies, in the same country and internationally, and limit managers' flexibility to pick 
and choose among alternate accounting practices in order to make their own firm appear 
more profitable482. Good accounting is important to the integrity of the markets as well as 
an important corporate governance tool as it provides “the brightest light and the most 
objective, detailed, and textured portrait of managerial performance.”483   
Generally, overly flexible rules can reduce comparability, increase opportunities for fraud, 
and increase overall information asymmetry between companies and investors. At the same 
time, the accounting rules must strike a sensible balance among investors’ desire for 
information, the cost of providing the information, and companies’ concern that giving 
detailed information to investors means giving the information to competitors as well484. 
 
As observed above, the effectiveness of the rules is determined by the level of its 
enforcement. As such, it is also important that the rules should be clear and specific to 
ensure that even the most corrupt of the regulators or prosecutors or judges has no room 
for manoeuvre to protect those who fall foul of the rules.     
 
6.5.2 A rule-writing institution with competence to write good accounting rules 
and an incentive to keep the rules up to date. 
 
                                                 
482
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In “Northean” terminology this is a rule-writing organisation. The nature of the rule-writing 
organisation matters in terms of the effectiveness of the rules it designs. Writing good 
accounting rules requires close knowledge of how companies operate, appreciation for 
changes in corporate practices, which are often intended to take advantage of loopholes in 
the existing rules so as to portray a firm’s performance as better than it really is, and the 
ability and incentive to write new rules and interpret old ones with reasonable dispatch485. It 
is therefore suggested that the best approach would be to vest rule writing responsibility in 
a quasi-public organization run by accountants,486 rather than a government agency like 
Finance Ministry, which tends to write the rules with a view to providing the information 
needed to collect taxes, rather than the information needed to attract investment or 
manage the business.487  
 
6.5.3  Securities or other laws that require extensive disclosure of self-dealing   
transactions. 
 
Disclosure of self-dealing transactions is very crucial because until such transactions are 
brought to light, other forms of protection like legal liability to investors will be rendered 
ineffective.488 As stated above, self dealing occurs in different forms and at different levels. 
It is therefore important that such rules should be textured and nuanced enough to capture 
each and every possible form of self-dealings. The rules should also be aligned with liability 
of intermediaries to avoid any instances of deliberate let-ups in accounting reports and 
auditing exercises. 
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6.5.4 Extensive financial disclosure, including independent audits of public 
companies’ financial statements. 
 
Given that a stock market cannot thrive if listed companies are unable to provide investors 
with audited financial statements, it is important to ensure that practices for auditing listed 
companies are widely adopted in the market to avoid fraudulent or misleading statements. 
This may call for a cultural change among all the players in a particular market. Such 
disclosure requirements may be imbedded in the rules regulating the operation and conduct 
of accountants and investment bankers as discussed above. 
 
6.5.5 Company law or securities law that establishes procedural protections for 
self-dealing transactions, such as approval after full disclosure by 
independent directors, non-interested shareholders, or both. 
 
It is observed that, while disclosure alone will deter some self-dealing, a lot of self-dealing 
may still take place if the underlying transactions are lawful. Consequently, sufficient 
protection may be achieved by making significant self-dealing transactions subject to a 
review by independent directors, non-interested shareholders or both.489 However, since 
often the nominally independent directors won't be all that independent in fact, especially 
for a company with a controlling shareholder, where the directors serve at the controlling 
shareholder's pleasure, it may be important to place approval power, especially for larger 
transactions, in the hands of non-interested shareholders.490 It should however be noted 
that Black’s analysis is based on neo-classic economics assumptions and as such the 
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effectiveness of these rules would be subject to North’s caveat with respect to transaction 
costs and belief system.  For instance, effectiveness of the rules will depend upon the 
interest and capacity of minority shareholders to investigate and police management or 
other insider activity. 
 
6.5.6  Ownership disclosure rules that ensure that outside investors know who 
the insiders are, and that interested shareholders in fact cannot vote to 
approve a self-dealing transaction that requires approval by non-
interested shareholders. 
 
If non interested shareholders are given decision making power over self-dealing 
transactions, insiders will have an incentive to disguise their share ownership, in order to 
pretend to be non-interested. Disclosure rules are needed to prevent this. More generally, 
as long as insider self-dealing is a significant risk, it will be important for outside investors to 
know who the insiders are. This will both help the outside investors to determine how much 
to trust the insiders this time, and give the insiders an incentive to develop reputations for 
not abusing their power.491 
 
 
6.5.7 A culture of disclosure that develops over time, among accountants, 
investment bankers, lawyers, and company managers, that concealing 
bad news is a recipe for trouble. 
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This is an informal institution within North’s framework. A culture of disclosure usually 
develops on the back of strong sanctions against misbehaviour.492 Such a culture will 
prevent managers from undertaking clearly illegal actions, because they grew up in a culture 
where disclosure is the norm, and where others are occasionally disgraced, or even sent to 
jail, for falsifying financial statements and the like.493 The interplay between laws requiring 
disclosure and a culture that supported disclosure is still subject to scholarly debate 
although it is considered that the two develops together over time, and are mutually 
reinforcing.494 
 
6.6 INSIDER DEALING LIABILITY 
As stated above, the prevalence of insider self-dealing gives rise to a “lemons market”, 
which results in investors discounting the prices they will offer for the shares of all issuers 
thereby driving honest issuers out of the market. It is therefore important for any capital 
market to put in place robust institutions to prevent insider dealing. Suggested formal and 
informal rules that would help control insider self-dealing include the following. 
 
 
6.6.1  Securities or other laws that impose severe sanctions on insiders for false 
or misleading disclosure or violation of self-dealing rules. 
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Direct sanctions against companies and insiders who attempt fraud is said to be the first line 
of defence against securities fraud.495 Thus formal rules that impose civil liabilities on 
directors and officers for using inside information to their benefit will provide a powerful 
regulatory weapon in this regard.  
 
6.6.2 Criminal liability for insiders who intentionally mislead investors and 
insiders who intentionally violate the self-dealing rules.  
 
It is recognised that most insiders have little wealth outside their company or usually hide 
their wealth out of investors’ reach.496 As such, criminal sanctions become a critical 
supplement to civil or financial liability. 
 
6.6.3 Securities or Other laws that prohibit inside trading, suitably defined, and 
government enforcement of those rules. 
 
According to Black, in order for a ban on insider trading to be effective, it must include a ban 
on tipping others, as well as on trading yourself.497 Further the rules must be enforced lest 
the insiders will learn that they can violate the rules with impunity.498 This is where a skilled 
and honest legal profession as well as an effective judicial system, as discussed above, 
becomes handy.  
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6.6.4 Company or other laws that (a) require public companies to have a 
minimum number of Independent directors; and (c) impose on 
independent directors enough risk of liability for approving self dealing 
transactions that are grossly unfair to the company, so that they will resist 
pressure from insiders to approve these transactions. 
 
Although approval by nominally independent directors is usually insufficient safeguard 
against self-dealing transactions, because the directors' independence will often be in 
doubt, it remains an important safeguard, especially when combined with directors' 
potential liability for not behaving independently.499 Also company liability can help to 
persuade the independent directors to reject transactions that are not on arms-length terms 
and may offer a powerful argument that the independent directors can use when insiders 
propose a dubious transaction.500  
 
6.7 MARKET TRANSPARENCY 
Investors will be attracted to a particular market if it is transparent. Again market 
transparency would be a useful tool to combat market uncertainty within the context of 
North’s framework. Market transparency entails that all transactions are accurately and 
promptly reported to ensure that all investors and potential investors are aware who is 
purchasing shares in the market and at what price. This is important because one of the key 
sources of information about value that investors rely upon is the prices paid by other 
investors for the same securities as this help investors know that others share their opinions 
                                                 
499
 Ibid 810 
500
 Ibid. 
  
- 172 - 
 
about the value they attach to the shares.501 The proposed formal and informal institutions 
that may help to promote market transparency include the following:  
 
6.7.1 Rules ensuring market “transparency”: the time, quantity and price of 
trades in public securities must be promptly disclosed to investors.  
 
Stock exchanges will need to have enough market power to force all trades to be reported 
to it and the government must mandate prompt reporting and require all trades to be 
reported in a single consolidated source, lest exchanges compete for business by offering 
delayed or no price reporting at all.502  
 
6.7.2 Rules banning manipulation of trading prices and enforcement of those 
rules. 
It is noted that in ‘thin markets’, insiders can manipulate trading prices to create the 
appearance that the shares are highly valued by outside investors, while dumping their own 
shares on the market and that the principal response to this risk is rules against 
manipulating trading prices. Of course the rules will need to be enforced, which calls for a 
specialized regulator, because manipulation is notoriously hard to prove.503 
 
 
6.7.3  An active financial press that can uncover and publicise instances of 
misleading disclosure, and criticise not only the company, but (when 
appropriate) the investment bankers, accountants and lawyers as well. 
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This is an example of an informal institution in Northean terms. An active financial press 
is an important source of reporting of disclosure failures as well as market malpractices 
by both companies and reputational intermediaries. It is observed that markets for 
reputation can work only if there is a mechanism for distributing information about the 
performance of both companies and intermediaries.504 This is so because while 
disclosure rules for companies and reputational intermediaries' incentive help to 
advertise their successes, most companies or intermediaries can hardly be expected to 
publicize their failures.505 Similarly, insiders will be more reluctant to engage in self-
dealing, and independent directors, accountants, and securities lawyers, will be more 
vigorous in policing it, if a country has a financial press that is ready and eager to 
publicize misdeeds.506 
 
One factor that would hamper the effectiveness of financial press especially in 
developing economies would be lack of specialised knowledge. As already noted above, 
fraudulent reporting or insider dealing transactions are usually complex in nature and 
unless members of the press are properly trained, most malpractices will go unnoticed. 
It is therefore imperative to ensure that the press is educated on the operation of the 
capital market. 
 
The role of the financial press can be propped up by a country's libel law. Carefully 
crafted libel laws would provide a shield to members of the press from unnecessary law 
suits. Otherwise the press can be chilled by libel laws that make it easy for deep-
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pocketed companies or intermediaries to sue anyone who is bold enough to criticize 
them.507  
 
6.8  THE CULTURE OF THE MARKET: INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS, INTERMEDIARIES 
AND REGULATORY BODIES (STATE AND SRO) 
 
Finally Black has emphasised on the importance of developing a culture of disclosure that 
develops over time, among accountants, investment bankers, lawyers, and company 
managers, that concealing bad news, self-dealing transaction, approving a seriously unfair 
transaction, or trading on inside information is improper and is a recipe for trouble.508  
 
According to North’s framework, such cultural shift shall emanate from individual 
experience which shapes belief systems and thereby inform the interpretation of new 
events. Essentially, culture and the internalisation of an ethical perspective is dependent 
upon the prior experience of the individual actor, the culture she grew up in, and the culture 
of the organisation. The culture of the organisation is dependent upon the experience of the 
organisation which has led to its developing a belief system and how it has adapted to 
incorporate that belief system in its investment in skills and training and job role.509  
 
Being an informal institution, such a culture will develop over time through learning and 
reduced incentive to non-compliance following robust enforcement of the formal rules in 
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place. This will result in the change of belief system of the players of relevant market as the 
cost of non-compliance will be more than the cost of complying with the rules. 
 
6.9 NECESSARY AND “MERELY NICE” INSTITUTIONS 
Black recognises that some of his suggested core institutions may be necessary for strong 
capital markets while others may be just “extra frosting on an already tasty cake”.510 He 
notes that both in America and Britain strong securities markets developed with some of 
the institutions but also predates some of them.   According to Black, the United States had 
active securities markets long before it had a strong central securities regulator and didn’t 
enforce insider trading rules until 1960.511  Similarly in Britain many stock promoters 
invested little in reputation until the middle of twentieth century, arguably after it had 
already developed strong stock market.512 
 
Black concludes that the fact that different types of interrelationships among the 
institutions, complimentary in some respects and substituting in others, means that there is 
no simple answer as to which of these institutions are necessary or merely nice. His advice is 
that one must evaluate how important each institution is, both by itself and as part of an 
overall system.513 
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Black’s observations and advice above, is in perfect alignment with North’s concept of path 
dependence. The evaluation and ultimately the choice of which institutions should be 
adopted first in a particular market will be dependent on the historic development of the 
economy in question. Institutions that may stimulate market growth in one economy may 
not have similar impact in another. This is crucial for policy makers to avoid the trap of 
merely copying institutions from economies that are historically and functionally different 
from their economy. 
 
6.10 BLACK’S ANALYSIS OF TRANSFERABILITY OF CORE INSTITUTIONS FROM 
ONE JURISDICTION TO ANOTHER 
Professor Black has conducted a very interesting analysis of the ease with which, and the 
extent to which a company, located in a country that lacks many or all of the institutions 
that control information asymmetry and self-dealing, can rely on other countries’ 
institutions or an entire country adapt other countries’ institutions for its own use, a process 
he calls piggybacking.514 This analysis is very relevant to the purpose of this section which is 
integrating Black’s core institutions into the North’s framework. Black has ranked his 
suggested core institutions on a scale of 1-5 translated as follows:515 
 
5:   easy to piggyback/adapt (as easy or nearly as easy for a company already 
located in the foreign country)  
4:  piggybacking is feasible, not too difficult, and likely to work reasonably well 
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3:  piggybacking is possible but difficult and/or will work only moderately well if 
achieved 
2:  piggybacking is very difficult and/or won't work very well if attempted 
1:  significant piggybacking is not feasible 
 
Black’s overall observation is that while reliance on foreign institutions is feasible, only a few 
institutions are easily transplantable.516 As between an individual company and a country, 
Black observes that it is easier for a single company on average to effectively rely on 
institutions of another country than a country to import institutions from outside. This can 
be easily done through a company’s promise to obey another country’s tougher rules by 
listing on a foreign stock exchange and hiring world-class accountants, investment bankers 
and lawyers.517 This is demonstrated in Table 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Rankings of Black’s Core Institutions in Thematic Order 
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               Core Institutions 
Needed for Piggybacking Ease 
Information 
Disclosure 
Self-
Dealing 
For a 
Company 
For a Country 
 
Local Enforcement and Culture 
 
1.An honest, sophisticated securities 
agency (and prosecutors for criminal 
cases) 
X X 1 1 
2. Honest, sophisticated, well-
functioning courts 
X X 1 1 
3. Good civil discovery rules and a 
class action or similar procedure 
X X 1 2 
4. A culture of compliance with the 
disclosure and self-dealing rules by 
managers, reputational 
intermediaries, and independent 
directors 
X X 2 1 
 
Disclosure Rules 
 
5.Rules requiring full disclosure of 
financial results and self-dealing 
transactions 
 
X 
X 4 3 
6. Good accounting and auditing 
rules 
X X 4 3 
7. Requirements of audited financial 
statements 
X X 4 3 
8.Ownership disclosure rules X X 4 3 
Table 2 Continued/... 
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               Core Institutions 
Needed for Piggybacking Ease 
Information 
Disclosure 
Self-
Dealing 
For a 
Company 
For a 
Country 
 
Reputational Intermediaries and Independent Directors 
 
9. A sophisticated accounting profession. X X 4 2 
10. A sophisticated investment banking 
profession. 
X X 4 2 
11. Sophisticated Lawyers. X X 4 2 
12. A stock exchange with meaningful listing 
standards and an active insider trading 
surveillance operation 
X X 5 3 
13. Inclusion of independent directors on 
company boards. 
 X 3 2 
 
Liability 
 
14. Civil liability risk for insiders  who violate 
the disclosure and self-dealing rules 
X X 2 1 
15. Criminal liability risk for insiders  who 
violate the disclosure and self-dealing rules 
X X 1 1 
16. Civil liability risk for 
Accountants 
X X 3 2 
17. Civil liability risk for investment 
Bankers 
X  3 2 
18. Civil liability risk for 
independent directors if they approve 
gross self-dealing 
 X 3 1 
 
Table 2 Continued/... 
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               Core Institutions 
Needed for Piggybacking Ease 
Information 
Disclosure 
Self-
Dealing 
For a 
Company 
For a 
Country 
 
Market Transparency 
 
19. Transparency of trading prices X X 4 3 
20. An enforced ban on market manipulation X X 3 2 
 
Self-Dealing Rules 
 
21. Procedural controls on self dealing 
transactions (review by independent 
directors, non interested shareholders, or 
both) 
 X 4 3 
22. Accountant review of the disclosure of 
self-dealing transactions 
 X 4 2 
23. Enforced securities or other rules banning 
insider trading 
 X 3 2 
 
Other Institutions 
 
24. An active financial press and security 
analysis profession 
X X 3 2 
25. A good organisation to write accounting 
rules 
X X 5 3 
 
Source: B.S. Black, Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, pp. 
817-819. 
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As stated before, the above analysis is very relevant to the overall thesis of this work. An 
examination of the above table reveals a general trend which shows that institutions that 
are informal in nature are, in general, not easily transplantable while formal institutions are 
generally easily adaptable. This neatly fits into the North’s framework which posits that 
formal rules can be changed within a short period of time whereas informal rules change 
over a longer period of time. A cross section of the Black’s core institutions and their 
rankings clearly depicts this trend as shown in Table 3 below, which lists a selection of 
formal and informal rules and their respective country ranking. 
 
Table 3: Rankings of Selected Formal and Informal Institutions 
 
Core Institutions 
Country 
Ranking 
 
Informal Institutions 
 
1.An honest, sophisticated securities agency (and prosecutors for criminal 
cases) 
1 
2. Honest, sophisticated, well-functioning courts 1 
3. A culture of compliance with the 
disclosure and self-dealing rules by managers, reputational 
intermediaries, and independent directors 
1 
4. A sophisticated accounting profession. 2 
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5. A sophisticated investment banking profession. 2 
6. Sophisticated Lawyers. 2 
7. An active financial press and security analysis profession 2 
 
Formal Institutions 
 
8.Rules requiring full disclosure of financial results and self-dealing 
transactions 
3 
9. Good accounting and auditing rules 3 
10. Requirements of audited financial statements 3 
11. Ownership disclosure rules 3 
12. A stock exchange with meaningful listing standards and an active 
insider trading surveillance operation 
3 
 
Source: Adopted from Table 2 above. 
 
The table above clearly shows that it is difficult if not impossible for a particular country to 
borrow informal rules from another country. This is depicted by low rankings for informal 
rules with a highest ranking of two. On the other hand, a country can adopt foreign formal 
rules with relative ease as the rankings above display a uniform higher ranking of 3. 
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Black observes that the most basic institutions like honest and competent courts, regulators, 
and prosecutors are the hardest to transplant.518 Consequently, one can’t transplant local 
enforcement.519 Therefore, the state of local enforcement as well as local professional 
culture determines the extent to which foreign formal rules can be effectively transplanted. 
Thus while it is not hard for a company to borrow audit requirements and accounting rules 
from abroad, weak local enforcement will still limit the credibility of its financial 
statements.520 Also, although a country can adopt foreign accounting rules and audit 
requirements, its local accountants must implement these rules.521 
 
Further, it is possible for a single company to take some steps to import a culture of 
disclosure and compliance by hiring foreigners to sit on its board of directors, and in its 
financial department. However this will be limited by the fact that the bulk of the staff will 
still be local, and can often hide local “skeletons” from the foreigners and that their thought 
processes, as they think about disclosing something they would rather hide, will be 
influenced primarily by national culture and expectations, not the perhaps different norms 
their company has tried to instil.522  
 
Black also observes that it is much harder for a country to borrow disclosure rules. He 
states: 
 “...American securities laws can't be simply copied and transplanted wholesale to 
another country. They won't mesh with other local institutions, will likely conflict 
with other local laws, will be far more complex than needed, and will in some 
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respects be weaker than needed, because official rules can be less strict when 
informal enforcement is strong”.
523
   
 
Finally, although, a country can attempt to introduce rules attaching liability to 
accountants, investment bankers and lawyers, such rules will only be as strong as 
the country’s local enforcement regime. Hence Table 1 shows low country 
rankings for liability institutions. For Instance, with respect to civil liability risk for 
independent directors, Black explain the low ranking as follows: 
 
“Independent directors will generally be locals and hold their assets locally. 
In practice, they will be liable (if at all) only under local law. That brings us 
back to local courts, which aren't transplantable, and local rules, which are 
only moderately transplantable. Hence the country ranking of 1.”
524
 
 
6.11 CONCLUSION 
As stated above, despite some quite important methodological differences, Black’s analysis 
reinforces North’s thesis that economic change can only be achieved by changing both 
formal and informal rules. The foregoing conclusively confirms that the effectiveness of 
formal rules is dependent on the culture and belief system of the receiving country. Proper 
understanding of this dynamic is very crucial when formulating a national reform strategy 
with respect to capital market development.  
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Taking North’s approach as a Meta theory, Black’s work stands as a mid-tier theory of 
capital market development translating the abstract propositions expounded by North into 
the practice of capital market reform. As stated above however, Black and North have 
different theoretical underpinnings. Black’s assumptions are based on the neo-classical 
rational actor whereas North is coming from a much richer and more nuanced brand of 
institutional economics. However, the fact that Blacks practical observations confirm 
North’s propositions is an endorsement of the methodology adopted in this work as set out 
in chapter 1 above. 
 
Further, Black’s thematic list of core formal and informal institutions as well as organisations 
for strong capital markets provides a ready tool kit for policy makers seeking to design a 
capital market reform agenda. For purposes of this work, Black’s regulatory themes 
nevertheless provide a very helpful methodological tool of analysis of the state of capital 
markets in our selected case studies discussed in the next section.   
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: REGULATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS IN DEVELOPED 
ECONOMIES AND SADC COUNTRIES - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and compare the capital market regulatory regimes both 
in developed market economies and developing economies in general and SADC countries, in 
particular. For developed economies we will use United Kingdom, it being one of the recognised 
developed capital markets. It is important to emphasise that the United Kingdom capital market 
rules are only considered as examples of rules, both formal and informal, that may be adopted and 
adapted to the regulatory frameworks of capital markets in developing countries as they have 
proved effective in attracting investors to and preventing capital flight from the market. Sight is 
however not lost to the fact that the UK capital market operates within a different economic  and 
institutional milieu to that existing in most developing economies, its current regulatory framework 
having been heavily influenced by UK membership of the European Union. As such these rules may 
not be fully compatible with the conditions in developing countries.  
 
With respect to SADC countries, we will examine capital markets in South Africa and Malawi. SADC 
like many other economic regions has seen a number of capital markets being established in its 
member states in the recent past. Most of the capital markets in the region, with the exception of 
South Africa, are embryonic and authorities in these countries are still grappling with the task of 
developing their markets with the aim of realising the full economic benefits of capital markets. 
The SADC region therefore presents itself as a classic case study of unique problems facing capital 
markets in developing countries and how these markets can be developed. 
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Our selection of the two countries is based on the fact that South Africa has the most developed 
capital market in the region while Malawi’s capital market is one of the least developed in the 
region. It is hoped that a comparison of the two capital markets, which operate in the same 
economic region but sit on the opposite side of the spectrum will enable us better understand the 
dynamics of capital market growth.  
 
In examining the three case studies, we will use the six themes developed by Professor Black as 
tools of analysis. These will provide us with a standard set of parameters as we look at each of the 
three case studies. The six themes include the following: 
vi. Local Enforcement (Effective Regulators, prosecutors and Courts) 
vii. Reputational Intermediaries 
viii. Disclosure Regime 
ix. Liability for Insider dealing 
x. Market Transparency 
xi. Liability of issuers, directors etc for Market Misconduct 
 It is hoped that this comparative analysis will help identify effective policy prescriptions that may 
be considered by authorities in the SADC region and other developing countries as they seek to 
develop their capital markets.    
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7.2   UNITED KINGDOM CAPITAL MARKET REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
The main securities market in the United Kingdom is the London Stock Exchange (LSE). LSE is 
one of the world’s oldest stock exchanges and can trace its history back more than 300 
years525 when organised trading in marketable securities in London is believed to have 
started.526 The first regulated exchange came into existence in London on 03 March 1801 
when the exchange started operating under a formal membership subscription basis.527 In 
1836 the first regional exchanges opened in Manchester and Liverpool. 
 
A major revolution of the exchange took place in 1986 following deregulation of the market, 
which is commonly known as “Big Bang”. The main changes were as follows528: 
 
(i) Ownership of member firms by an outside corporation was allowed. 
(ii) All firms became brokers/dealers and were able to operate in a dual capacity. 
(iii) Minimum scales of commission were abolished. 
(iv) Individual members ceased to have voting rights. 
(v) Trading moved from being conducted face-to-face on a market floor to being 
performed via computer and telephone from separate dealing rooms. 
(vi) The Exchange became a private limited company under the Companies Act 1985. 
 
                                                 
525
 This was around 1898. 
526
 See, London Stock Exchange Website at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-
exchange/company-overview/our-history/our-history.htm. Last visited on 15/08/2014. 
527
 Ibid. 
528
 Ibid. 
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In 1991, the governing Council of the Exchange was replaced with a Board of Directors 
drawn from the Exchange's executive, customer and user base and the trading name 
became “The London Stock Exchange”.  In 1995, the exchange launched its alternative 
international market for growing companies, AIM.  In order to bring greater speed and 
efficiency to the market, the Exchange launched SETS (Stock Exchange Electronic Trading 
Service) and the CREST, its settlement service in 1997. The Exchange listed on its own Main 
Market as a public limited company, London Stock Exchange plc, in July 2001. Another 
notable technological development took place in 2003 when EDX London, a new 
international equity derivatives business, in partnership with OM Group was created. In the 
same year the exchange acquired Pro quote Limited, a new generation supplier of real-time 
market data and trading systems. The London Stock Exchange merged with Borsa Italiana, 
creating London Stock Exchange Group in 2007. 
 
In terms of market structure, the LSE has 4 different markets. The Main Market is its flagship 
market for larger, more established companies, and is home to some of the world’s largest 
and most well-known companies. On the other hand, AIM is the London Stock Exchange’s 
international market for smaller growing companies. A wide range of businesses 
including early stage, venture capital backed as well as more established companies join 
AIM seeking access to growth capital. Professional investors seeking to raise capital through 
the listing of specialist securities, including debt and depositary receipts trade through the 
Professional Securities Market.529  Finally, the Specialist Fund Market serves as the 
                                                 
529
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/psm/home/psm.htm. Last visited on 
15/08/2014. 
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Exchange's regulated market for specialist investment funds, targeting institutional, 
professional and highly knowledgeable investors.530  
 
7.2.1 Legislation  
United Kingdom (UK) capital markets regulatory framework is derived from European Union 
(EU) directives and local statutes including the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 
2000 and the Companies Act (CA), 2006. As stated above, following the harmonisation 
program of company law within the Member States of the European Union, the UK 
securities law has been, to a large extent, influenced by the EU directives.531 The relevant EU 
directives that affect the UK securities law include, the Prospectus Directive,532 and 
the Market Abuse Directive533 which replaced the previous Insider Dealing Directive,534 with 
combined rules to combat both insider dealing and market manipulation. 
 
The FSMA has recently been extensively amended by the Financial Services Act 2012 which 
came into force on 1st April 2013. 
 
7.2.2 Local Enforcement 
Prior to the Financial Services Act 2012 (FS Act 2012), financial services in the UK were 
regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) which was initially established as the 
Securities and investment Board (SIB) under the Financial Services Act of 1986 and it was 
                                                 
530
 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/sfm/home/sfm.htm. Last visited on 
15/08/2014.  
531
 Article 94 of the European Community Treaty. 
532
 2003/71/EC 
533
 2003/6/EC 
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 89/592/EEC 
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retained and endorsed by the FSMA 2000. However, FS Act 2012 abolished FSA and 
replaced it with two main bodies, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA).535 As a result, the majority of the functions of the FSA have 
been transferred to the FCA and the PRA. The FCA inherited the majority of the FSA's roles 
and functions and also adopted the legal corporate identity of the FSA. The FCA is 
responsible for the conduct of business regulation of all firms, including those regulated for 
prudential matters by the PRA. It is also responsible for the prudential regulation of firms 
not regulated by the PRA.536 Further, the FCA inherited the FSA's market conduct regulatory 
functions, with the exception of responsibility for systemically important infrastructure 
which was transferred to the Bank of England (BoE). The strategic objective of the FCA is to 
ensure that the "relevant markets" function well while its operational objectives include (i) 
securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers (ii) protecting and enhancing 
the integrity of the UK financial system; and (iii) promoting effective competition in the 
interests of consumers.537 The FCA is the competent authority for purposes of listed 
securities and it is responsible for the maintenance of the UK Official List and creation of 
Listing Rules.538 
 
On the other hand, the PRA is a subsidiary of the BoE and is responsible for micro-prudential 
regulation539 of systemically important firms, including banks, insurers and certain 
investment firms.540 The PRA’s general objective is to promote the safety and soundness of 
                                                 
535
 Parts 1A and 2A of the FS Act 2012. 
536
 These firms are sometimes referred to as FCA-only firms or FCA-authorised firms. 
537
 Part 1B  of  FS Act 2012 
538
 Section 16 of FS Act 2012 
539
 Micro-prudential regulation seeks to enhance the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, 
as opposed to the systemic regulation which focuses on welfare of the financial system as a whole. 
540
 These firms are referred to as PRA-authorised firms and also as dual-regulated firms because, while the PRA 
regulates prudential issues, the FCA acts as these firms' conduct regulator.   
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regulated firms by minimising any adverse effects of firm failure on the UK financial system 
and ensuring that firms carry on their business in a way that avoids adverse effects on the 
system.  
 
The general macro-prudential regulation of the UK financial system is assigned to the 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), which is a committee of the Court of Directors of the BoE. 
The FPC's objective is to contribute to the BoE's achievement of its financial stability 
objective541 by identifying, monitoring and taking action to remove or reduce systemic 
risks.542 
  
 The FSMA 2000 gives the relevant regulator (FCA or PRA), a range of investigation543 and 
enforcement powers.544 The regulators’ enforcement powers include disciplinary action, 
varying or cancelling offender’s permission, requiring the offender to pay restitution to 
those who have suffered loss or to disgorge profits it made, disciplining any approved 
persons who were involved, removing their approval or imposing a prohibition order 
preventing a particular individual from being involved in the industry and bringing criminal 
prosecutions where necessary.545    
 
There are also a number of provisions aimed at assisting the regulators in the investigation 
and enforcement process including the ability to bring contempt of court proceedings for 
those who fail to comply with the provisions,546 ability to obtain a warrant to search 
                                                 
541
 This is provided under section 2A of the BoE Act 1998. 
542Section 9C (1) and (2), BoE Act 1998. 
543
 Part XI of the FSMA 2000. 
544
 Part XIV of the FSMA 2000. 
545
 Andrew Haynes, Financial Services Law Guide, (3
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 edition, Tottel Publishing, West Sussex 2006) p. 361. 
546
 Section 177 (1) FSMA. 
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premises and seize documents547 as well as the criminal offences of knowingly or recklessly 
providing false or misleading information.548  
 
FSMA 2000 also appoints the relevant regulator as the prosecuting authority for a large 
number of criminal offences. The powers to prosecute criminal offences are set out in 
section 401 of FSMA, which empowers the relevant regulator to prosecute any offence that 
is an offence under FSMA or its subordinate legislation and section 402 of FSMA, which 
gives it power to institute proceedings for insider dealing offences under Part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA). In the case of R v Rollins549, which was decided in July 2010, 
the Supreme Court held that the prosecution powers conferred on the then FSA are not 
restricted to the prosecution of the offences set out in sections 401 and 402 of FSMA. Its 
view was that section 401(2) operates to limit the power to prosecute for offences under 
FSMA itself to certain authorities, including the FSA, but not to limit which offences can be 
prosecuted by the FSA more generally, and that section 402 should not be interpreted as an 
exhaustive list of the offences that the FSA (now either the FCA or PRA) can prosecute.  
 
Further, with regard to market conduct offences the relevant regulator has power to work 
in coordination with other prosecution bodies like the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Police in accordance with the Prosecution Guidelines 
which help to determine which prosecuting agency is responsible for pursuing a particular 
incident of market misconduct.550  
                                                 
547
 Section 176 FSMA. 
548
 Section 177 (4) FSMA. 
549
  [2010] UKSC 39, 
550
 For instance in order to determine whether the SFO should take action in a particular fraud case, it should 
take into account factors such as the financial value of any crime, the national interest, specialist knowledge 
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As a safeguard for those subjected to the enforcement process, the FSMA 2000 also 
provides for a right of appeal to the Tax and Chancery Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, 
formerly, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal,551 which is an independent body 
entirely different from the regulators. In order to ensure the transparency of its decision 
making process, the Tribunal proceedings are normally held in public and its judgements are 
pronounced publicly.552 Further, either party to a reference to the Tribunal may appeal to 
the Court of Appeal, on a point of law.553 A decision of the Court of Appeal may also be 
appealed against but such appeal may only be made with the leave of the Court of Appeal 
or the Supreme Court. 
 
Part 14 of FSMA sets out the sanctions that are available to the FCA and the PRA in respect 
of authorised firms that are in breach of the FSMA regulatory regime. These include public 
censures, financial penalties and suspending permissions to perform regulated activities. 
 
The United Kingdom enforcement regime therefore offers an example of how regulators, 
prosecutors and the courts of law can effectively work together to regulate capital markets. 
The existence of the specialised Tribunal is one of the unique features of UK regulatory 
system, which make it possible to have cases of market misconduct dealt with by judges 
with specialised knowledge of capital markets. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
required for the investigation, and any international dimension of the case. See Prosecution Guidelines, 
Appendix 1, para. 3.3. 
551
 The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal was abolished on 6 April 2010 and its functions has since been 
transferred to the Tax and Chancery Chamber of the Upper Tribunal. 
552
 See, Eurolife v FSA (2002) Unreported, for the Tribunal’s stance on public hearings. 
553
 Section 137 of FSMA 2000. 
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The foregoing shows that the United Kingdom regulatory framework ticks most of the boxes 
on Black’s preconditions with regard to local enforcement by having a well-established 
securities regulator and prosecutor in the form of the FCA and PRA which has honest and 
skilled staff. The regulators’ role is complemented by a robust judicial system with well-
developed procedural rules which have proved effective over the years.  
 
7.2.3 Reputational Intermediaries 
The United Kingdom has a robust system of reputational intermediaries, which consists of 
accountants, investment bankers, stock brokers, lawyers and other professional advisors. 
These professional groups play important roles in different ways both in the primary and 
secondary securities markets.  
 
In terms of regulation of reputational intermediaries, the UK capital market regulatory 
framework exhibits characteristics of self-regulation although, it is argued, not in its purest 
form.554 Cheffins, observes that organisations of self-regulatory nature which currently 
supervise company affairs, equity markets and financial services each has some level of 
involvement with the government, ranging from simply receiving assistance with resources 
to being entities established with the primary objective of carrying out tasks designated by 
legislation.555   
 
                                                 
554
 Brian Cheffins, Company Law; Theory, Structure, and Operation, Supra note 487 at p. 365  
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In general, the United Kingdom capital market regulation, with regard to conduct of 
business, would be described as having a two-tier regulatory structure.556 The first and top 
tier is provided by the FCA, which, acts as a senior regulator and administers and enforces 
the provisions of the FSMA 2000. As a statutory regulator, the FCA, authorises the 
establishment and supervises the operations of the bodies that make up the second tier of 
regulation. These include (i) institutions designated as Recognised Investment Exchanges 
(RIEs) - organisations that provide a market within which transactions in investments can be 
affected557, (ii) Designated Professional Bodies (DPBs) – covering professionals such as 
lawyers and accountants carrying on investment business and other self-regulatory 
organisations encompassing financial intermediaries such as stock brokers, unit trusts 
investment trusts and life insurance companies who deliver front-line supervision of 
markets and investment business.558     
 
FCA’s oversight of market professionals is effected through designated professional body 
(DPB) regime.  Section 19 of FSMA (the general prohibition) prohibits persons who are not 
authorised or exempt from carrying on any regulated activity in the UK. Breach of section 19 
is a criminal offence.559 This means that professional firms have the choice either to: 
 
                                                 
556
 A. Large, Financial Services Regulation: making the two Tier System Work (London: Securities and 
Investment Board, 1993) at 22. 
557
 There are currently six RIEs in the UK listed by FCA:  
(i) EDX London Limited  
(ii)  London Stock Exchange plc  
(iii) LIFFE Administration and Management   
(iv) the London Metal Exchange  
(v) ICE Futures Europe ; and 
(vi)  PLUS Markets plc 
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  Brian Cheffins, (1997) supra note 487 at 366  
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 Section 23 of FSMA. 
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(i) Seek authorisation directly from the FCA so that they may carry on mainstream 
regulated activities or 
(ii) Carry on exempt regulated activities under the designated professional bodies (DPB) 
regime. 
 
The DPB regime broadly allows firms, who comply with the necessary rules for exemption, 
to undertake a certain amount of investment work that is incidental to the work that they 
carry out. 
 
A regulated activity is an activity of a kind specified by the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (SI 2001/544) (as amended) (RAO), which is 
carried on by way of business in relation to an investment of a kind also specified by the 
RAO.  An exempt regulated activity is a regulated activity which may, as a result of Part XX of 
FSMA (Provision of Financial Services by Members of the Professions), be carried on by 
members of a profession supervised and regulated by a DPB, without breaching the general 
prohibition.  
 
An exempt professional firm is a person, under section 327 of Part XX of FSMA, to whom 
the general prohibition does not apply. Exempt professional firms can carry on exempt 
regulated activities and obtain the benefit of the exemption from the general 
prohibition.560 These firms are therefore not directly regulated by the FCA, but by the 
                                                 
560
There are a number of conditions set out by the FSA, which must be met for a member of a DPB to be 
treated as an exempt professional firm, and for its regulated activities to be treated as exempt regulated 
activities, one of which is that the person must be a member of a profession or be controlled or managed by 
one or more such members. Section 327 (1) – (7) of FSMA.  
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relevant DPB which is accountable to the FCA in relation to the activities carried out by the 
firms they regulate. 
 
Section 326 of FSMA sets out the conditions a body must satisfy before it can be designated. 
The basic condition is that the body has rules applicable to the carrying on by members of 
the profession, in relation to which it is established, of regulated activities which, if the body 
were to be designated, would be exempt regulated activities.561  
 
In the UK, the Treasury has named ten bodies as DPBs under The Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Designated Professional Bodies) Order 2001)562 and these include: 
(i) The Law Society of England and Wales. 
(ii) The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
(iii) The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants. 
(iv) The Institute of Actuaries. 
In this way the FCA regulates the professional bodies that in turn regulate the individual 
firms that are within their respective remit. Solicitors and solicitor practices in England and 
Wales are regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), which is an independent 
regulatory body of the Law Society in England and Wales.  The FCA has entered into a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU)563 with the SRA which provides a framework for the 
working relationship between the FCA and the SRA in discharge of their duties under FSMA, 
relating to exempt regulated activities and authorised professional firms. 
                                                 
561
 Section 326 (4) of FSMA 
562
 (SI 2001/1226) (as amended) 
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 See:  www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsa_sra.pdf. Last visited on 16/08/2014. 
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Again the United Kingdom framework fares well on Black’s core institutions with respect to 
reputational intermediaries. With regards to formal institutions there is a robust legal 
framework that imposes liability to investors if accountants and investment bankers are 
involved in market misconduct. Also the London Stock Exchange has sufficient listing rules 
which ensure that issuers are complying with their disclosure obligations. The accountancy 
and investment professions are also arguably well regulated564 and most reputational 
intermediaries are required to have a licence in order to transact on the market.  As set out 
above, there are also a number of SROs that exist in United Kingdom. Finally, the accounting 
and investment profession are sufficiently regulated as are the securities lawyers.  
 
Of course despite this somewhat robust regulatory framework, regulatory lapses still occur 
in United Kingdom as evidenced by the recent matter involving the Russian firm, Eurasian 
Resources Corporation, (ENRC) as discussed in Chapter 5 above.565 
 
7.2.4 Disclosure of Information 
There are a number of provisions that need to be complied with regarding listing of 
securities, market conduct and reporting of issuers’ financial affairs. Section 79 of the FSMA 
2000 provides that no securities (other than new securities) may be admitted to the official 
list unless listing particulars have been submitted to, and approved by, the competent 
authority, currently the FCA and the PRA, and published. The listing particulars must contain 
                                                 
564
 There is still public clamour for more and tight regulation of investment banking in the United Kingdom. 
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all such information as investors and their professional advisers would reasonably require, 
and reasonably expect to find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment of 
(a) the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer 
of the securities; and (b) the rights attaching to the securities.566 
 
In terms of new issues of securities, all issuers of securities admitted to trading on regulated 
markets must provide a prospectus that will be approved by the FCA before the securities 
are listed.567 The prospectus must contain all information which is necessary to enable 
investors to make an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, 
profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of the securities and the rights attaching to 
them.568 It is an offence to contravene the requirement for a prospectus and offenders are 
liable to be sued for breach of statutory duty by anyone who suffers loss as a result of the 
contravention.569 Further the FCA have power to suspend or prevent a public offer of 
securities or impose a financial penalty or issue a statement of censure if there is suspicion 
of or there has been a contravention of prospectus rules.570 There is also civil liability for 
misleading statements and omissions in the prospectus.571 
 
The UK Listing Rules contain a number of provisions requiring issuers or prospective issuers 
to provide information to the FCA. When a prospective issuer has made an application for 
admission to listing, the FCA may request any information which the FCA may “reasonably 
                                                 
566
 Section 80 of FSMA 2000 
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 Sections 84 and 85, FSMA, 2000, Article 13 of the EU Prospectus Directive, 2003/71/EC 
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require to decide whether to grant an application for admission.”572 Further, the issuer is 
under a duty to “take reasonable care to ensure any information it makes available through 
the FCA is not misleading false or deceptive and does not omit anything likely to affect the 
import of the information”.573 The FCA may also require that the issuer provide any 
information which the FCA considers “appropriate to protect investors or ensure the 
smooth operation of the market.”574 The FCA is also empowered to request any further 
information which it requires to verify whether or not the listing rules are being complied 
with or whether the listing rules have been complied with at some point in the past.575 
Disclosure rules also contain some disclosure requirements. DTR 2 contains the key general 
obligation of disclosure. It provides that issuers must notify a Regulatory information 
Service576  (RIS) as soon as possible of any inside information which directly concerns the 
issuer.577 
The accounting rule writing institution in United Kingdom is the Financial Reporting Council 
(The FRC) and is independent from government. The FRC has two boards, namely, the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) which drafts accounting standards and the Auditing 
Practices Board (APB), which drafts auditing standards.  
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575
 Listing Rules, Chap. 1, para. 1.3.1(3) R 
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The foregoing shows that the United Kingdom regulatory regime satisfies most of the core 
institutions for information disclosure as recommended by Black. These are supported by a 
culture of disclosure that has developed over a long period of time among market players. 
 
7.2.5 Liability for Insider Dealing 
The United Kingdom has both civil and criminal liability regimes for insider dealing. Insider 
dealing occurs where an individual or organisation buys or sells securities while knowingly in 
possession of some piece of confidential information which is not generally available and 
which is likely, if made available to the general public, to materially affect the price of these 
securities.578 
 
The civil liability is based both at common law and statute. Imposing civil liability for insider 
dealing has proved problematic under English common law. For example, in the case of 
Percival v Wright,579 directors had purchased a member’s shares in the full knowledge that 
there was a ready buyer for all the shares of the company at a higher price than they paid 
him. It was held that the transaction could not be set aside for the director’s failure to 
disclose the negotiations which were already taking place at a higher price because there 
was no fiduciary relationship between the directors and individual shareholders and 
therefore no duty of disclosure to the shareholder as the duty was owed to the company 
alone. In Allen v Hyatt,580 the court held that in some special and very limited circumstances 
a duty to disclose might be owed by directors to individual shareholders.  In that case it was 
                                                 
578
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found that a duty existed where the directors had profited through share purchases from 
members because they had purported to act as agents for the members by inducing the 
later to give them purchase options over each member’s shares supposedly to facilitate a 
proposed amalgamation.581  
 
The civil liability regime has now been bolstered by the market abuse provisions under 
section 118 of FSMA 2000. This particular provision was slightly amended in 2005 following 
the UK implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD).582 Section 118 (2) states that 
market abuse shall be established   where there is market behaviour “based on information 
which is not generally available to those using the market but which, if available to a regular 
user of the market, would or would be likely to be regarded by him as relevant when 
deciding the terms on which transactions in investments of the kind in question should be 
effected.” Where the FCA is satisfied that a person is engaged in market abuse behaviour it 
may impose on him a penalty of such amount as it considers appropriate.583 
 
In the case of Parker v FSA,584 the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal (FSMT) (whose 
functions were transferred to the Upper Tribunal on 6 April 2010) confirmed that the 
standard of proof to be applied in market abuse cases is high and could be similar to the 
criminal burden of proof. It upheld the decision of the RDC that the applicant, James Parker, 
                                                 
581
 The need for special relationship in order to impose the duty was also confirmed in the case of Munro v 
Bogie [1994] 1 BCLC 415. 
582 The UK however did not fully align its civil market abuse regime with MAD as it retained two 
subparagraphs of its original section 118 of the FSMA, namely s. 118 (4) on misuse of information and s. 118 
(8) about misleading behaviour and market distortion. These provisions (known as super-equivalent elements 
of the FSMA), were made subject to sunset clauses under which they would expire after a three year period, 
pending the outcome of a review by HM Treasury. The provisions have subsequently been extended, on three 
occasions, most recently in December 2011. They will now expire on 31 December 2014. 
583
 Section 123 of FSMA 2000. 
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 See: http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/FSMTribunal/037_JamesParker.pdf 
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a senior accountant at Pace Micro Technology plc (Pace) (a listed company), had engaged in 
behaviour which constituted market abuse (misuse of information) under section 118 of 
FSMA by selling, and placing spread bets on, shares in Pace when he knew that a profit 
warning was imminent. However, it reduced the financial penalty imposed by the RDC. The 
FSMT held that market abuse, even when punished in accordance with section 123 of FSMA 
and therefore by a route which is classed as civil for domestic law purposes, has to be 
treated, for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights, as a criminal 
charge. However, it determined that this does not lead to the conclusion that the standard 
of proof must be the domestic criminal standard and it referred to a "sliding scale" of proof, 
depending on the severity and complexity of the case. The FSMT took the view that, in the 
particular case at issue, it was difficult in a practical sense to draw a meaningful distinction 
between the civil standard of proof which must be applied and the criminal standard. 
 
Criminal liability for insider dealing is provided under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 
1993.585 Section 52 of CJA 1993 creates three separate offences which may be committed by 
an individual within the United Kingdom. The offences are: 
 
i. Dealing offence – where an insider deals in securities to which inside 
information relates.586  
 
                                                 
585
 This Act, which incorporates the requirement to implement the EU directive on insider dealing (Directive 
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ii. Encouraging offence – where an insider encourages another person to deal in 
such securities knowing of having reasonable cause to believe that the other 
would have cause to do so.587  
 
iii. Disclosure offence – where an individual who has information as an insider 
discloses that information to another person otherwise than in the proper 
performance of his functions of his employment, office, or profession.588  
 
The dealing and encouraging offences may be committed either when the dealing in 
securities takes place on a regulated market589 or where the person dealing in the price-
affected securities relies on a professional intermediary590 or is himself acting as a 
professional intermediary.  
 
The offences must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. On conviction of 
any of the three offences an individual can be sentenced to a maximum of seven years’ 
imprisonment on indictment or six months on a summary conviction together with a fine591. 
The criminal nature of this liability has been confirmed by the courts. It is therefore “malun 
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in se”, not merely regulatory “mala prohibitum”. In R. V McQuoid592  Lord Judge C.J. stated 
that: 
“Those who involve themselves in insider trading are criminals: no more and no less. 
The principles of confidentiality and trust which are essential to the operations of the 
commercial world are betrayed by insider dealing and public confidence in the 
integrity of the system which is essential to its function is undermined by market 
abuse...”
593
 
 
In this case the court provided guidelines for sentencing a convicted perpetrator of insider 
dealing offence.594  
 
Section 53 of the CJA 1993 provide for a number of defences to the three offences which 
must be proved on the balance of probabilities.595 There is a defence for the dealing and/or 
encouraging offences if an individual is able to prove any of the following:  
 
(i) No advantage was gained.596 This is known as the "no profit/no loss" defence. 
A person will have a defence if he can show that, at the time, he did not 
expect the dealing or encouraging to result in a profit (or the avoidance of a 
loss) attributable to the fact that the information he possessed was price-
sensitive information in relation to the securities.  
                                                 
592
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593
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595
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defences under the disclosure offence. 
596
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(ii) Adequate disclosure was made.597 This is known as the "equality of 
information" defence. The defendant must prove that he believed on 
reasonable grounds: 
 
 (in relation to the dealing and encouraging offences) that the 
information had been sufficiently widely disclosed to ensure that no-
one taking part in the dealing would be prejudiced by not having the 
information; or 
 (in relation to the encouraging offence only) that sufficiently wide 
disclosure would be made and prejudice avoided.  
 
(iii) He would have traded anyway.598 In order to rely on this defence, the 
defendant must prove that he would have done what he did even if he had 
not had the inside information.  
 
With respect to the disclosing offence, an individual has defence if he is able to prove that:  
 
(iv) He did not expect dealing to occur.599 This is where the defendant did not at 
the time expect any person to deal in securities on a regulated market or by 
or through a professional intermediary as a result of his disclosure. 
 
                                                 
597
 section 53(1)(b), CJA 
598
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599
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(v) He did not expect a profit to result or a loss to be avoided.600 This defence 
will apply where, although the defendant had such an expectation at the 
time, he did not expect the dealing to result in a profit made or loss avoided 
attributable to the fact that the information was price sensitive.  
Schedule 1 of the CJA provides three further special "market" defences to the dealing and 
encouraging offences (Schedule 1, CJA). These relate to activities carried on by market 
makers, the dissemination of market information and permitted price stabilisation activities.  
 
The United Kingdom framework therefore exhibits a very robust set of liability risks for 
those contemplating insider dealing transactions. The framework provides for both civil and 
criminal liability for breach of insider dealing rules.  There are clearly severe sanctions for 
violation of these rules. Under the current UK corporate governance regime, companies are 
public companies obliged to have a specific number of independent directors who are 
equally liable as other directors. These provisions are capped by a culture of compliance 
among accountants, lawyers, independent directors and company managers.601   
 
7.2.6 Market Transparency 
Ensuring market transparency requires prompt and accurate reporting of all trades and 
trading prices and also avoiding practices that manipulate share prices to create a false 
market.  In the United Kingdom market transparency is regulated under provision against 
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market abuse. The FSMA 2000 provides for a primary market abuse offence602 and a 
secondary offence.603 
 
Under section 118(1)(a) of FSMA, market abuse is behaviour (that is, action or inaction) 
which both: 
(i) “occurs in relation to: 
 
•  qualifying investments admitted (or in respect of which a request has been 
made for admission) to trading on a prescribed market; or 
 
•  in the case of the insider dealing (section 118(2), FSMA) and improper disclosure 
(section 118(3), FSMA) market abuse behaviours only, investments which are 
relate to such qualifying investments, (that is, an investment whose price or 
value depends on the price or value of the qualifying investment); 
 
(ii) falls within any one or more of the seven types of behaviour set out in sections 
118(2)- (8) of FSMA”.604 
 
The secondary offence is provided under section 123(1)(b), FSMA and involves taking, or 
refraining from taking, action which requires or encourages another person to engage in 
behaviour which would be market abuse if the encourager had carried out the behaviour. 
                                                 
602
 Section 118, FSMA. 
603
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604
 These include, (i) insider dealing, (ii) improper disclosure of inside information (or "tipping off"), (iii) misuse 
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manipulating transactions, (v) manipulating devices, (vi) dissemination and (vii) misleading 
behaviour and market distortion. 
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The person required or encouraged does not need to have actually engaged in market abuse 
and there is no requirement that he should have benefited from it. 
 
Further requirements to disclose inside information are provided by the Disclosure Rules 
and Transparency Rules sourcebook (DTR). Thus under DTR 2.2.2R, an issuer of shares must 
notify a regulatory information service (RIS) as soon as possible of any inside information 
which concerns the issuer.605 Also, persons discharging managerial responsibilities (PDMRs) 
of the issuer company must notify all transactions conducted on their own account in the 
company’s shares or derivatives relating to those shares.606  
 
In terms of accounting records, s. 386 of the Companies Act 2006, requires every company 
to keep accounting records which are sufficient to show and explain the company’s 
transactions and also to disclose, with reasonable accuracy, the financial position of the 
company at any time. A company’s accounting records must be open, at all times, for 
inspection by the company’s officers.607 There is a criminal sanction for failure to comply 
with this provision.608 Section 441 of CA, 2006 requires the directors of a company to deliver 
a copy of the company’s annual account and reports to the Companies House. Failure to do 
so is a criminal offence on the part of every person who was director of the company 
immediately before the period ended.609 
 
                                                 
605
 Under DTR 1.4.1R, the FSA may require trading to be suspended if there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
a failure to comply with disclosure rules and may impose a financial penalty in the event of breach-DTR 1.5.3G. 
606
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607
 Section 388 (1) CA, 2006. 
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Finally, the United Kingdom capital market is always under the spotlight through a very 
active and specialised financial press. This helps to ensure prompt and accurate reporting by 
companies who fears being named and shamed in the press. Also exclusive financial papers 
like The Financial Times (FT) and television channels like Bloomberg, serves as constant 
feeds for up to date market information including daily share prices. This also helps the 
disclosure of information.  
 
The United Kingdom’s regulatory framework sufficiently promotes market transparency. 
There are specific rules coupled with effective technology which ensures that time, quantity 
and price of trades in public securities are promptly disclosed to investors. Further, there 
are clear rules banning manipulation of trading prices and enforcement of the same. This is 
supported by active press that is ready to uncover and publicise any instances of market 
misconduct.  
 
7.2.7 Liability of Issuers, Directors and Reputational Intermediaries for Market 
Misconduct 
The United Kingdom regulatory regime provides for liability of the issuer companies as well 
as reputational intermediaries through statutory provisions and common law. The relevant 
provision under the FSMA 2000 is section 90, which provides for a general civil liability to 
any person who has acquired securities on the basis of information contained in the listing 
particulars and has as a result suffered a loss due to incorrect or misleading statements. 
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Also the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995610, sets out who are responsible for, 
and thus who are competent defendants in any proceedings in respect of, the prospectus or 
supplementary prospectus or listing particulars611 and these include the issuer of the 
securities and (where the issuer is a body corporate) the directors of the issuer at the time 
when the document was published and where the issuer is not the offeror (e.g. under an 
offer for sale by a merchant bank) then the offeror is also a responsible person in addition to 
the issuer.612 Further, any person who accepts and is stated as accepting responsibility for 
any part of the prospectus or listing particulars is also a responsible person and therefore a 
potential defendant.613 This is the provision that attaches investor liability to any 
professional who assisted the issuer during the offering process. 
 
At common law, the general approach is that those preparing a prospectus relating to the 
issue of securities must do so with complete honesty.614 Those who issue a prospectus 
inviting the public to acquire shares of the issuer are bound to state everything with “strict 
and scrupulous accuracy.”615 There have, however, been two different judicial approaches 
for attributing liability to investors for professional negligence. In the landmark case of 
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman616 the House of Lords advocated a narrow view of proximity 
when determining liability to third parties. In this case it was argued that auditors owed 
both shareholders and potential investors a duty of care in their certification of accounts. 
The court however held that liability for economic loss due to negligent misstatement would 
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be confined to those cases where the statement or advice was given to a known recipient 
for a specific purpose of which the maker was aware and upon which the recipient had 
relied to his detriment.617 The court therefore restricted defendant’s liability to those it 
knew would receive the statement and rely upon it for the purposes of a particular 
transaction.618  
 
A more relaxed approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal a year later in the case of 
Morgan Crucible Co Plc v Hill Samuel Bank Ltd,619 where the directors and financial advisors 
of the target company had made express representations in the course of a contested 
takeover forecasting a 38 percent increase in pre-tax profits at a time when an identified 
bidder of the company had emerged in order to induce the bidder to make a higher bid. The 
Court of Appeal held that there was a relationship of sufficient proximity between the 
bidder and those who had been responsible for the statements to found a duty of care in 
negligence.  In another case of Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd v Diamond620  the prospectus 
prepared in relation to initial placement of shares on the Unlisted Securities Market greatly 
understated the issuer’s liabilities to pay extra premiums to syndicates at the Lloyds of 
London insurance market, and the company subsequently went into receivership due to the 
burden of paying those extra premiums. It was argued, inter alia, that those responsible for 
the prospectus had breached a duty of care owed to the purchasers of the shares. The court 
held that investors had been justified in relying on the statement made in the prospectus 
when making their investment decisions and that a duty of care would exist if subsequent 
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purchaser could show the following things (1) that he relied reasonably on the prospectus, 
(2) that he reasonably believed that the defendant intended him to act on them and that 
there was a sufficiently direct connection between the parties to make such a duty fair, just 
and reasonable.  
 
It has been suggested that the effect of the FCA Prospectus Rules, is that the entire investing 
public is necessarily within the cognisance of any person involved in the preparation of a 
prospectus for an offer of securities to the public and as such any loss caused by a negligent 
misstatement in such a prospectus must now be actionable in tort.621    
 
Finally, promoters, directors, experts or the persons making an offer for sale are liable for 
fraud if it can be shown that they signed, or authorised the issue of, a prospectus containing 
a false statement which they did not honestly believe to be true with the intention that 
another person should act upon it, and that he acted on it to his detriment.622 
 
There is also specific liability for contravention of specific provisions of legislation. Thus, 
there are a number of sanctions that may be imposed by the FCA for non-disclosure of 
information.  The FCA may impose the following sanctions for breach of the Disclosure Rules 
and Transparency Rules: 
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(i) Censure the issuer and/or any person who was at the material time a director of the 
issuer and was knowingly concerned in the contravention.623 This includes an ex-
director if he was a director at the material time.624 
(ii) Fine the issuer and/or a director knowingly concerned in the breach.625 
Additionally, in the case of breach of the Disclosure Rules: 
(iii) censure or fine persons discharging managerial responsibility (PDMRs) within an 
issuer or any connected person ;626 
(iv) suspend the issuer's securities from trading.627 Examples of when the FCA may 
impose suspension for breach of the Disclosure Rules include where an issuer fails to 
make an announcement to a Regulatory Information Service (RIS) as required by the 
Disclosure Rules within the time limit or where there is a leak of inside information 
and the issuer is unable to issue an appropriate RIS announcement within a 
reasonable time.628 
Further, for breach of the Transparency Rules: 
(v)    censure an issuer where the FCA finds that it failed to comply with an applicable        
transparency obligation.629 
(vi)  suspend the issuer's securities from listing.630 
(vii) fine a person who has contravened a provision of the Transparency Rules.631 
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Also, in the case of breach of the Listing Rules: 
(viii) censure a sponsor where the FCA considers that the sponsor has contravened any 
requirement imposed on him by the Listing Rules.632  
(ix) suspend the issuer's securities from listing.633  
(x) cancel the issuer's listing of securities where the FCA is satisfied that there are 
special circumstances that preclude normal regular dealings in them.634 
And finally, in the case of breach of the Prospectus Rules: 
(xi) suspend or prohibit the offer to the public of transferable securities.635  
(xii) suspend or prohibit admission of transferable securities to trading on a regulated   
market.636 
Section 91 of FSMA contains the FCA's power to fine issuers and others for breach of the 
Listing, Prospectus, Disclosure or Transparency Rules. The FCA may impose a penalty of such 
amount as it considers appropriate. 
 
 Under s. 123 (1) (a), FSMA, if the FCA is satisfied that a person is, or has, engaged in market 
abuse, it may impose a financial penalty, or publish a statement to the effect that the 
person has engaged in market abuse. Also under sections 89 and 90 of Financial Services 
Act, 2012, it is a criminal offence for any person to do any act, or engage in any course of 
conduct, which creates a false or misleading impression as to the market in, or price or value 
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of, any relevant investments. Finally as stated above, insider dealing is also a criminal 
offence under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 which carries a penalty of imprisonment for up 
to seven years and/or a fine for which there is no limit.637 We therefore argue that the UK 
regulatory regime is sufficiently robust for the efficient, fair and transparent operation of its 
capital market. 
  
7.3  CAPITAL MARKETS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Like many other African countries, South Africa has one Stock Exchange, the Johannesburg   Stock 
Exchange (JSE). However unlike many African countries, the South African capital market is far 
more advanced and developed. The JSE is Africa’s largest and most vibrant stock market 
accounting for over 90 per cent of the total market capitalization of sub-Saharan Africa and over 76 
per cent of the entire continent.638 In this respect, South Africa forms a very good case study of 
development of capital markets as it stands out as a success story among failing and 
underdeveloped markets on the African continent.  
 
In 2003 the JSE had 472 listed companies and a market capitalisation of US$182.6 billion (€158 
billion) as well as an average monthly traded value of US$ 6,399 million (€5.5 billion). As of 30 
September 2006, the market capitalisation of the JSE was at US$579.1 billion. The JSE is presently 
the 16th largest stock exchange worldwide.639  
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The need for a stock exchange arose following the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 
which had led to many mining and financial companies opening. This resulted in the establishment 
of the Johannesburg Exchange & Chambers Company by a London businessman, Benjamin Minors 
Woollan.640 The JSE was born out of this company on November 8, 1887. The Exchange expanded 
at a rapid pace resulting in its moving from one building to another as buildings were being 
outgrown within short periods of time. By 1963, the JSE became a member of the Federation 
International Bourses de Valeurs (FIBV) and in 1993 the JSE became an active member of the 
African Stock Exchanges Association.641 A landmark development of the JSE took place on June 7, 
1996 when the open outcry system of trading was changed to a new era of computer trading. The 
JSE adopted a fully automatic electronic trading system named the JET System (Johannesburg 
Equities Trading), which is an order-driven automated trading system acquired from the Chicago 
Stock Exchange.642  
 
On 2 May 1996 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the banks (represented by 
BankServ) and the JSE, to establish an electronic settlement system for the South African equities 
market known as STRATE (Share Transactions Totally Electronic), in order to facilitate settlement 
and the transfer of ownership by electronic book entry.643 The electronic system was vital to 
enhance the security of settlement in the market and brought South Africa in line with 
international practice.  In August 1997, the JSE launched the real-time Stock Exchange News 
Service (SENS) to enhance the market transparency and investor confidence.644  
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Another important milestone for the JSE was the strategic alliance that was formed with the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 2002. As part of the JSE’s alliance with the LSE, its trading system 
was replaced with the SETS system hosted by the LSE.645 This proved to be more than just a change 
in technology platforms as this change also improved the international visibility and acceptability of 
the JSE. In addition, the JSE modernised its operations with the launch of a new indexing system in 
conjunction with the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) index, the FTSE/JSE African Index Series 
and free-float adjusted series. This system provided international investors with an indexing system 
with which they are familiar.646 
 
The JSE enrols shares on two separate markets, the Main Board and Alternative Exchange (Alt-X). A 
company applying for listing on the Main Board may qualify for one of the three possible listings, 
the Main Board, the Development Capital Market (DCM), or the Venture Capital Market (VCM).647 
The DCM exist to encourage the growth of small to medium size businesses and companies which 
are not able to list on the Main Board by offering less onerous listing criteria while the VCM aims at 
assisting companies specializing in venture companies by offering even less onerous listing 
criteria.648 Further, the JSE has introduced to the Main Board the Financial-Redevelopment 
sector649 to promote the socioeconomic development of South Africa and the Industrial-
development stage sector650 to promote industrial development in South Africa.  
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The Alt-X on the other hand is the JSE’s market established to accommodate small and medium 
sized high growth companies. The Alt-X was therefore designed to appeal to the investor who 
understands the nature of such a market and who is prepared to accept the potential risks and 
rewards in investing in growing companies.651Alternative markets like the Alt-X help reduce market 
uncertainty as well as the free-rider problem as allowing growth companies on the main market 
would increase uncertainty as to which companies are risky and if any such small companies gets 
into trouble, the reputation of the entire market would be called into question. Having a special 
market for small and usually risky companies, alerts investors to the potential risks in those 
companies and this help investors to make an informed decision to invest in such companies. 
 
7.3.1 Legislation 
The main piece of legislation governing the securities markets in South Africa is the 
Securities Services Act of 2004 (SSA 2004).652 Section 2 of the Act set out its objectives as 
follows:   
 (a) to increase confidence in the South African financial markets by – 
(i) requiring that securities services be provided in a fair, efficient and transparent  
manner; and 
(ii) contributing to the maintenance of a stable financial market environment; 
(b) to promote the protection of regulated persons and clients; 
(c) to reduce systemic risk; and 
                                                 
651
 Alt-X has implemented best practice principles in order to mitigate the potential risks associated with small 
to medium companies, including good corporate governance and rigorous market surveillance. See: 
www.psgonline.co.za  
652
 The Securities Services Act, No. 36 of 2004, (SSA) came into operation on 1 February 2005, replacing the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985, the Financial Markets Control Act, 1989, the Custody and Administration of 
Securities Act, 1992 and the Insider Trading Act, 1998. 
  
- 221 - 
 
(d) to promote the international competitiveness of securities services in the Republic. 
 
7.3.2 Local Enforcement 
The regulatory mandate of capital markets in South Africa is in the hands of the Financial 
Services Board (FSB), which is an independent institution established by statute653 to 
oversee the South African Non-Banking Financial Services Industry in the public interest.  
The FSB is committed to promoting and maintaining a sound financial investment 
environment in South Africa.654 There is also a Financial Markets Advisory Board (FMAB)655 
which may on its own initiative, and must, at the request of the Minister of Finance or the 
Registrar of Securities Services, investigate and report or advise on, administrative and 
technical matters concerning regulated persons or the provision of securities services.656  
The SSA 2004 also established the Directorate of Market Abuse (DMA) which has statutory 
mandate to investigate cases of market abuse and to enforce the prohibitions against 
market abuse in the Act. The DMA has wide powers of interrogation, search and seizure of 
records and documentation, and the ability to obtain details of the beneficial owners of 
securities held by nominees, to deal with market abuse investigations. 
 If the DMA is of the opinion that the SSA 2004 has been contravened, it can take 
enforcement action against the offender. Such cases could be referred to the Enforcement 
Committee of the FSB, or handed over to the prosecuting Authorities if there is a criminal 
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element. The DMA makes a media release after every meeting to update the public on its 
current investigations and every enforcement action is published once it is completed. 
The frontline detection and prevention of market abuse is undertaken by the JSE 
Surveillance Division, which has in place a number of proprietary systems that have been 
specifically designed to detect unusual trading volumes and price movements, which could 
be indicative of insider dealing or market manipulation. When there is an alert of a possible 
market insider dealing or manipulation, the Surveillance Division undertakes an initial 
investigation and the results are brought to the attention of the DMA. Staff in the Market 
Practices Department of the Surveillance Division are responsible for detecting any signs of 
market abuse using this proprietary technology, which refreshes the trading information 
every half hour. When unusual activity is detected, and there appears to be no obvious 
cause, the surveillance officers may contact the sponsors of a listed company and request 
that they ask the directors if they know of any price-sensitive information that is due to be 
released. Should this be the case, the company is requested to make the relevant 
announcement as soon as possible through SENS. If there is a delay in making an 
announcement, the JSE may halt trading in the company’s shares until the announcement 
has been made. 
 
Responsibility for prosecutions lies solely with the Directorate of Public Prosecutions. A person 
aggrieved by a decision of   the registrar of the FSB or an exchange under a power conferred or a 
duty imposed upon the registrar or the exchange by or under the SSA 2004, has a right of appeal to 
the board of appeal established under section 26 of the Financial Services Board Act, 1990.657 
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There is however no right of appeal to a court of law, although it is possible that an aggrieved party 
may institute judicial review proceedings in the event of an unsatisfactory decision of the board of 
appeal. The High Court or regional courts have statutory jurisdiction to try criminal offences under 
the SSA 2004.658 Also in order to enforce civil remedies, the FSB may apply to a Court for an order 
of attachment of assets or disclosure of evidence to prevent their concealment, removal, 
dissipation or destruction.659 The board may also institute any interdict or interlocutory 
proceedings against a person who made a profit or avoided a loss or whom the board reasonably 
believes may have made a profit or avoided a loss through insider dealing.660  
 
South Africa demonstrates a high level of local enforcement and it fares very well with Black’s 
preconditions in this respect. It has a well-established securities regulator, the FSB, which is well 
resourced with sufficient and skilled staff. Investigations and prosecution of market misconduct are 
done by the DMA and the Director of Public Prosecutions respectively. The judicial system in South 
Africa is also well established. Although South Africa has decent regulators, prosecutors and 
Judges. However this may not be comparable to the level of competence and honest exhibited by 
law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom. 
 
7.3.3 Reputational Intermediaries 
A number of reputational intermediaries operate in the South African capital market including 
financial advisors and intermediaries (which are usually accountants and auditors), investment 
bankers and stock brokers and other licensed members of the Stock Exchange.     
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In terms of regulation of these intermediaries, the South African regulatory framework 
exhibits a number of layers of regulation which seek to ensure that every agency that 
advises investors is properly kept in check. The FSB has broad regulatory authority over the 
JSE Exchange and the Bond Exchange of South Africa Ltd (BESA), financial advisors and 
intermediaries (FAIS), collective investment scheme operators (CIS), pension funds, and 
insurance companies.661 The FSB has authority to perform on-site examinations, to require 
reports, and to investigate misconduct and to impose penalties for violations of applicable 
laws.662 The FSB itself is subject to the general authority of the Ministry of Finance who 
appoints the members of the Board and selects the senior officers, after consultation with 
the Board.663  
 
SROs are said to be critical components of the regulatory system. Both the JSE and the BESA, 
which is the principal bond exchange, operate as SROs and have primary regulatory 
responsibility for licensing members (authorized users) and employees and to enforce the 
exchange’s listings requirements. STRATE (Share Transactions Totally Electronic) Ltd664 is an 
SRO that functions as the central securities depository for both listed equity securities and 
debt (government and corporate).665 The South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the nation’s 
central bank, has regulatory responsibilities over investment bankers.  
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While the foregoing shows some level of interaction between multiple government 
agencies, oversight committees and SROs, the IMF has described the system as complex and 
recommended clearly delineating responsibilities to minimise gaps and overlaps.666  
 
As demonstrated above, the South African regime shows some level of existence of 
reputational intermediaries. One problem however would be lack of clear provisions 
imposing liability on accountants and investment bankers in the event of non disclosure or 
disclosure of misleading information667.  The JSE however has sufficient listing rules that 
ensure market transparency. There are also a number of SROs with their own licensed 
members. The long trading history of the South African market has resulted in existence of 
skilled and experienced accounting and investment professions as well as sophisticated 
securities lawyers. Overall, therefore, South African regulatory framework compares 
positively to Black’s recommendations on reputational intermediaries. There are a number 
of reputational intermediaries in existence in South Africa with sufficient capability to 
provide checks and balances on companies trading stock. 
 
7.3.4 Disclosure of Information  
There are a number of provisions both under the listing rules and the SSA 2004 that aim at 
promoting market transparency in South Africa. 
 
The JSE Listing requirements (LRs) obliges applicant companies seeking to list their securities on the 
market to disclose various forms of information that will help investors make informed investment 
                                                 
666
 Ibid, p. 32 
667
 The only provision that may be used by investors would be section 104 of the new CA, 2008 and section 76 
of the Securities Act 2004.   
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decisions. There are also various continuing obligations that are imposed on existing issuers to 
disclose information. LR 1.25 provides the JSE with general mandate to require an applicant issuer 
to disclose to it, such information at the applicant issuer’s disposal as the JSE may determine, save 
to the extent that the issuer has obtained a court order excusing it from such disclosure. If the JSE 
is satisfied  that the disclosure of that information to the registered holders of the securities in 
question will be in the public interest, it may by notice in writing require such applicant issuer to 
publicly disclose that information within the period specified in the notice.  
 
Further, a new applicant or an issuer who applies for a listing of securities that requires the 
publication of a pre-listing statement must provide a pre-listing statement/prospectus containing: 
  
i. “the information pertaining to the nature and circumstances of the applicant 
and the type of securities   concerned as specified in this section; and 
ii. such additional information as the JSE may consider investors reasonably 
require for the purpose of making an informed assessment of the prospects 
and status of the applicant.”668  
 
A new issuer is also required to submit  to the JSE a report of historical financial information 
when the new issuer makes an application for listing and issuing a prospectus/pre-listing 
statement providing the following669; 
i. statements of comprehensive income; 
ii. statements of financial position; 
iii. statements of changes in equity; 
                                                 
668
 LR 6.1 and 6.6 
669
 LR 8.1, 8.3 and 8.11 
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iv. statements of cash flows; 
v. accounting policies; 
vi. notes thereto; 
vii. segmental information; and 
viii. any major change in the nature of property, plant and equipment and 
any change in policy regarding the use thereof as well as details of any material loan 
receivable. 
 
LR 3.4 stipulates a general continuing obligation of disclosure of any material price sensitive 
information. Thus with the exception of trading statements, an issuer must, without delay,  
release an announcement providing details of any development in such issuer’s sphere of 
activity that is not public knowledge and which may, by virtue of its effect, lead to material 
movements of the reference price of such issuer’s listed securities670. Further all issuers 
must disclose periodic financial information including dividends and interests and interim 
and yearly reports must be sufficiently published.671 Also an issuer must publish audited 
annual financial statements for its financial year, as specified in the prospectus/pre-listing 
statement, irrespective of the fact that the company may have subsequently changed its 
year-end.672 
 
According to LR 3.9 when an issuer acquires knowledge of any material price sensitive 
information and the necessary degree of confidentiality of such information cannot be 
                                                 
670
 LR 3.4 (a). However under LR 3.10, if the directors of an issuer consider that disclosure to the public of 
information in accordance with paragraph 3.4 will or probably will prejudice the issuer’s legitimate interests, 
the JSE may grant a dispensation from the requirement to make such information public. 
671
 LR 3.11 and 3.15 
672
 LR 4.13 (b) 
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maintained or if the issuer suspects that confidentiality has or may have been breached an 
issuer must immediately submit a copy of a cautionary announcement673 to the JSE for 
approval, and once such approval has been obtained, must publish such cautionary 
announcement and must  provide updates thereon in the required manner and within the 
time limits.674  
 
There is also a disclosure requirement targeting trading activities of directors. LR 3.63 states 
that an issuer, via its sponsor, must announce the following information:  
 
(a) details of all transactions (including off market transactions) in securities relating to 
the issuer by or on behalf of:  
 
(i)  a director and company secretary (held directly, indirectly, beneficially or 
non-beneficially) of the issuer;  
(ii)  a director and company secretary (held directly indirectly, beneficially or 
non-beneficially) of a major subsidiary company (as defined in 3.35) of 
the issuer;  
(iii)  any associate of 3.63 (a) (i) or (ii) above (collectively referred to for the 
purposes of this section as “directors”); or  
(iv)  any independent entity, and, in terms of which, any party in paragraph 
3.63 (a) (i)-(iii) may derive any beneficial interest now or in the future;”  
                                                 
673
 The purpose of the cautionary announcement is to alert existing and potential future shareholders to 
exercise care in trading before the company is in a position to make a detailed announcement. One reason for 
making a cautionary announcement would be to signal to the market that the company posting the 
announcement is in a price-sensitive situation, such as merger, acquisition or disposal discussions with another 
party or where it is in a legal dispute with another company. 
674
 See LRs 11.40 and 11.41 
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Price-sensitive information may only be disseminated to a broad audience once it has been 
published by SENS. Hence, an issuer that has its own website address on the internet may 
make an announcement on its website or release information to the media only after the 
announcement has been released through SENS.  
 
Under Section 15 of the SSA 2004, an exchange may require an issuer of listed securities to 
disclose to it or to the registered holders of the securities any information at the issuer’s 
disposal about those securities, or about the affairs of that issuer, if such disclosure is 
necessary to achieve one or more of the objects of the Act within a period specified by the 
exchange.675 Where the issuer refuses to disclose the information to the exchange or the 
registered holders of the securities the exchange may, unless the issuer obtains a court 
order excusing it from such disclosure, suspend trading in those securities until such time as 
the required disclosure has been made to the satisfaction of the exchange.676 Further, when 
an issuer discloses information in terms of this section to the registered holders of securities 
that may influence the price of those securities, the issuer must at the same time make the 
information available to the public.677 
 
Financial institutions, whether in the business of buying or selling listed securities or not, 
must report any transaction in listed securities resulting in a change of beneficial ownership 
of those securities and concluded by it outside of an exchange to the registrar who must in 
turn disclose the information to the exchange on which the securities are listed and the 
                                                 
675
 See, section 15 (1)(a) of the SSA 2004. 
676
 Section 15 (1) (c) of SSA 2004. 
677
 Section 15 (2) of SSA 2004 
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public, unless the registrar is satisfied on reasonable grounds that such disclosure will be 
contrary to the objects of the Act.678 
 
Finally section 63 of the SSA 2004 requires a self-regulatory organisation to disclose 
information relating to or arising from its functions to any other self-regulatory organisation 
or supervisory authority, whether domestic or foreign, if such disclosure will further one or 
more of the objects of the Act. 
 
It is clear that both the JSE listing rules and the SSA 2004 provide for extensive disclosure of 
information to investors as recommended by Black. However, the regulatory framework 
does not clearly provide for ownership disclosure rules so that outsiders know who the 
insiders are. Also there is no specific rule writing organisation with respect to accounting 
rules.  
 
7.3.5 Insider Dealing Liability 
South Africa has made significant strides in its efforts to prevent insider dealing. Initially the 
prohibition of insider dealing was contained in the Companies Act of 1973,679 which made 
insider dealing a criminal offence but no provision was made for civil liability. The provisions 
under the Companies Act were replaced by the Insider Trading Act (1998) which provided 
for both criminal prosecution and civil action. The 1998 Act has now been repealed by the 
SSA 2004 which has maintained the criminal and civil liability regimes. 
 
                                                 
678
 Section 21 (1) and (3) of the SSA 2004 
679
 This was provided under section 440 of the 1973 Companies Act. 
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The criminal liability is provided under section 73 of the SSA 2004, which sets out four 
different forms of insider trading offences as follows:680 
 
i. An insider dealing in the securities for his own account.681  
ii. An insider dealing in the securities on behalf another person.682  
iii. An insider disclosing inside information.683  
iv. An insider encouraging or discouraging others to trade.684  
 
Jurisdiction to try any of the above offences is reserved for a High Court or a regional 
court.685 A person convicted of these offences is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
R50 million or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment.686 
 
Civil liability is provided for under section 77 of the SA 2004 which provides that where an 
insider commits any of the offences set out in section 73 above and makes a profit or would 
have made a profit if he or she had sold the securities at any stage or avoids a loss, through 
such dealing is liable, at the suit of the board in any court of competent jurisdiction, to pay 
to the board: 
i) the equivalent of the profit or loss  
                                                 
680
 There are statutory defences to all insider trading offences. 
681
 Section 73(1)(a) of the SSA 2004 
682
 Section 73 (2) (a) of the SSA 2004 
683
 Section 73(3)(a) of the SSA 2004 
684
 Section 73(4) of the SSA 2004 
685
 Section 79 of the SSA 2004 
686
 Section 115 of the SSA 2004 
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ii) a penalty, for compensatory and punitive purposes, in a sum determined in the 
discretion of the court but not exceeding three times the amount referred to in 
paragraph (i); 
iii) interest; 
iv) the commission or consideration received for such dealing, if any; and 
v) cost of suit on such scale as may be determined by the court. 
 
The foregoing shows that the criminal and civil liabilities run concurrently and in parallel to 
each other with the later instigated wherever a profit has been realised from the dealing or 
loss avoided due to the dealing. This is clearly a robust way of combating insider dealing and 
measures well against Black’s recommendations. Also, the corporate governance provisions 
under the King Report on Corporate Governance687 require public companies to have 
independent directors.  
 
7.3.6 Market Transparency 
The SSA 2004 prohibits a number of market practices that would amount to market abuse in 
order to promote market transparency. 
Section 75 (1) of the SSA 2004 contain a general prohibition of any practice that will have 
the effect of manipulating the market. This include directly or indirectly using or knowingly 
participating in the use of any manipulative, improper, false or deceptive practice of trading 
                                                 
687
 The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa refers to the South African Codes of corporate 
governance issues by the King Committee on Corporate governance. These were issued in 1994 (King I), 2002 
(King II), and 2009 (King III).  
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in a security listed on a regulated market, which brings about a false or deceptive 
appearance of the trading activity or creates  an artificial price for the security.  
The Act also sets out a number of specific practices that will be deemed to be manipulative, 
improper, false or deceptive trading practices.688 Issuing of false statements is prohibited 
because it can harm the integrity of and undermine public confidence in markets. Incorrect 
published information regarding the financial state of a listed company may encourage 
investors to trade in the company’s shares at prices that would not be sustainable were the 
true facts known.689  
Consequently the SSA 2004 prohibits false statements under section 76 which states as 
follows: 
  
“(1) No person may, directly or indirectly, make or publish in respect of listed securities, or in 
respect of the past or future performance of a public company-  
(a) any statement, promise or forecast which is, at the time and in the light of the 
circumstances in which it is made, false or misleading or deceptive in respect of any material 
fact and which the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, is false, misleading or 
deceptive; or  
(b) any statement, promise or forecast which is, by reason of the omission of a material fact, 
rendered false, misleading or deceptive and which the person knows, or ought reasonably to 
know, is rendered false, misleading or deceptive by reason of the omission of that fact.  
(2) A person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence.” 
                                                 
688
 Employment of price stabilising mechanisms that are regulated in terms of the 
rules or listing requirements of an exchange, however, does not constitute a manipulative, improper, false or 
deceptive trading practice for the purposes of this section or insider trading. Section 75 (3). 
689
 See, JSE Booklet on Insider Trading and other market abuses found at 
www.jse.co.za/.../JSE...Insider_Trading/Insider_Trading.sflb.ashx at page 24 
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This prohibition also applies to cases where negligence causes the misleading statement to 
be made and also relates to any other person who is responsible for a false or misleading 
statement including stockbrokers and market analysts. 
South Africa has an active and well informed financial press that help to report any 
undisclosed market information as well as insider dealing attempts by company insiders.  
 
South Africa, like the United Kingdom, has sufficient rules, which ensure that time, quantity 
and price of trades in public securities are promptly disclosed to investors. This is also 
propped up by advanced technology, SENS information system. Further, there are specific 
rules banning manipulation of trading prices and enforcement of the same. As stated above, 
there is an active press in South Africa that help to uncover and publicise any instances of 
market misconduct. This checks most of the recommendations by Black regarding market 
transparency.  
 
7.3.7 Liability for issuers, directors etc, for market misconduct 
Liability for contravention of obligations under the SSA 2004 is provided for under section 
115 of the Act which states that a person who commits an offence referred to in sections 
73, 75 or 76 is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R50 million or to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both such fine and imprisonment.690 Further, a 
person who commits an offence referred to in section 92(2) is liable on conviction to a fine 
or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years, or to both a fine and such 
imprisonment. Finally, a person who contravenes or fails to comply with section 4(1) or (2), 
                                                 
690
 Section 115 of SSA 2004. 
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19, 20, 21, 22 or 29 is liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 5 years, or to both a fine and such imprisonment. 
 
In addition to the criminal liability, the DMA may refer cases of market abuse to the 
Enforcement Committee established in terms of section 97 of the Act, who may impose 
unlimited penalties.  
 
Further, the registrar may impose a fine in the case of any failure by a regulated person to 
submit to the registrar within any period specified by or under the Act any statement, 
report, return or other document or information required by or under this Act to be so 
submitted, not exceeding R1 000 or such other amount prescribed by the registrar for every 
day during which the failure continues.691 
 
Also the court has power, in addition to any sentence it may impose under the Act, to 
declare the person concerned disqualified, for an indefinite period or for a period specified 
by the court, from carrying on business or being employed in a capacity of trust.692 
 
The new South African Companies Act of 2008 (CA 2008) provides liabilities of company 
directors relating to securities trading. Section 77(3) of the CA 2008 stipulates that a director 
of a company is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or 
indirect consequence of the director having signed, consented to, or authorised, the 
                                                 
691
 Section 95 (1) of SSA 2004. 
692
 Section 96 (1) of SSA 2004. 
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publication of any financial statements that were false or misleading in a material respect or 
a prospectus, or a written statement containing false, misleading or untrue information.693 
 
Further section 104 of CA 2008 provides that directors, company promoters and issuers of 
prospectus of a company are liable to compensate any person who bought securities of the 
company relying on the information contained in the prospectus and has incurred a loss 
following acquisition of the said security. 
  
Finally, section 165 of the CA 2008 provides for a statutory derivative action to shareholders 
allowing them to institute proceedings on behalf of the company against directors, 
management or majority shareholders in the event of an unratifiable wrong against the 
interest of the company. This will provide a powerful tool to investors in the South African 
market. 
 
In summary, the foregoing shows that the South African regulatory regime for capital 
markets is relatively robust and compares well to Black’s list of core institutions for strong 
capital markets. South Africa has a number of law enforcement agencies which are fairly 
robust. Also reputational intermediaries do exist to some level and are functional. There is 
also a satisfactory set of insider dealing and market manipulation rules.   Finally liability for 
reputational intermediaries as well as insiders in also well catered in both the Companies 
Act 2008 and the Securities Act 2004. 
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7.4  CAPITAL MARKET IN MALAWI 
Malawi has a single stock market, the Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE). The MSE is still 
embryonic having been in existence since 1994 and only started equity trading in November 
1996 when the first company was listed on the exchange.694  Prior to the listing of the first 
company, the major activities that were being undertaken were the provision of a facility for 
secondary market trading in Government of Malawi bonds namely, Treasury Bills and Local 
Registered Stocks.  
Unlike the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), which 
were created by traders, the MSE is a creature of Government having been established 
through an Act of Parliament.695  The MSE is said to have been set up to serve a critical need 
in the Malawi economy of offering an alternative avenue of raising capital for companies to 
grow and provide a link between capital raisers and investors seeking profitable investment 
and also to serve as a vessel through which Government would successfully privatize 
companies into the hands of many Malawians.696 The specific objectives of the MSE are 
outlined as follows:697  
 Promoting development of the capital markets in Malawi by, inter alia, mobilization 
of savings and related funds for investment in long-term assets and other productive 
enterprises.  
 Promoting just and equitable principles of securities trading.  
                                                 
694
 The first listed company in Malawi was the National Insurance Company Limited (NICO). 
695
 Capital Market Development Act of 1990. 
696
 See: MSE website http://www.mse.co.mw/  Last visited on 16/08/2014. 
697
 Ibid. 
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 Preventing fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices by securities issuers, 
brokers, dealers, market markers, underwriters, and all participants in the market.  
 Preventing and/or removing impediments to, and promote a free and open market.  
 Protecting both investor and public interest in the market.  
7.4.1 Legislation 
The current legislation for securities trading in Malawi is the Securities Act, 2010 (SA 2010) 
which repealed the Capital Market Development Act, 1990.698 The SA 2010 applies in 
tandem with the Financial Services Act 2010 (FSA 2010), which is umbrella legislation for 
financial services699 in Malawi.  
 
7.4.2 Local Enforcement 
The SA 2010, like the repealed Capital Market Development Act, has not provided for an 
independent market regulator. The regulator of the capital market, therefore, remains the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi. The function of supervising the capital market has been vested in 
the office of Registrar of financial institutions who is the governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi.700 The registrar is required to establish departments to supervise the operations of 
                                                 
698
 Since the inception of the MSE, the only source for capital market regulation in Malawi was the Capital 
Market Development Act 1990 and the Companies Act, 1984
698
(CA 1984). The MSE listing rules also added 
some flavour to the regulatory frame work. This regulatory regime however fell far too short of the regulatory 
standards required to develop a successful capital market, hence the introduction of new legislation. 
699
 Section 2 of the Financial Services Act, 2010 defines financial services as services related to financial 
matters. 
700
 Section 8 of the Financial Service Act of 2010. In an informal interview with one of the officers of the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi involved is capital market supervision, I was told that the policy consideration that 
was taken into account in considering whether to have an independent regulator or not was problems of 
funding a separate office to regulate capital markets. He said it was felt that the capital market in Malawi had 
not developed to a level where an independent regulator, which is usually funded by commissions and market 
fees, could be sustained. 
  
- 239 - 
 
banking, insurance, retirement benefits schemes and securities markets701 and has the 
power to delegate his supervisory functions to, inter alia, a director or employee of the 
Reserve Bank.702 In practice, the supervisory functions of the registrar, with respect to 
securities market, are more or less permanently delegated to the Director of Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions who is an employee of the Reserve Bank. There is no separate 
prosecutor of criminal offences under the SA 2010. It is assumed that the power to 
prosecute is assigned to the Director of Public Prosecution.  
 
Enforcement powers of capital market rules are vested with the registrar in the first 
instance.703 A party dissatisfied with a decision of the registrar has a right of appeal to the 
Financial Services Appeals Committee.704 Appeals against decision of the Financial Services 
Appeals Committee lie to the High Court of Malawi.705   
 
The Malawi framework fails to meet Black’s benchmark for local enforcement institutions. 
There is a lack of an independent securities regulator as well as a specialist prosecutor. The 
mandate to regulate capital markets is vested in the Reserve Bank of Malawi and there is no 
known prosecutor of market abuse cases. The fact that the location of the power and duty 
to prosecute is obscure suggests a lack of prosecutorial zeal. It is assumed that this 
responsibility would be with the Attorney General’s office or the Director of Public 
Prosecution where there is a criminal element. These offices are likely to have neither the 
capacity nor the expertise to deal with such cases. Further, the judicial system in Malawi 
                                                 
701
 Section 8 (4) of the Financial Services Act of 2010. 
702
 Section 20 (1) (a) of the Financial Services Act of 2010. 
703
 Section 4 of the SA 2010. 
704
 Section 82 of the Financial Services Act 2010. 
705
 Ibid, section 92. 
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lacks sophistication and expertise especially with respect to commercial cases. These 
weaknesses are exacerbated by a lack of honest staff due to a predominant culture of 
corruption, which will be discussed below. 
 
7.4.3 Reputational Intermediaries 
The regulatory framework in Malawi does recognise the role of professional advisors such as 
accountants, investment bankers, stock brokers etc. For instance, section 1 of the MSE 
listing rules states that an issuer seeking to apply for listing on the Malawi Stock Exchange 
must appoint a sponsoring broker. Further, the prospectus must contain an auditor’s report 
and other financial information prepared by the accountants.  
 
With regards to regulation of reputational intermediaries, the registrar of financial services 
sits on top of the pyramid. Under section 45 of the FSA 2010, the Registrar is mandated to 
declare a person or body that has functions in relation to a class of financial institutions as a 
self-regulatory organization and enter into arrangements with such person or body so that 
the person or body performs regulatory or supervisory functions in relation to a class of 
financial institutions it is associated with. So far the only registered SRO in Malawi is the 
Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE). In turn the MSE supervises its members, which are mainly 
stockbrokers. While accountants and lawyers are internally regulated by the Society of 
Accountants in Malawi (SOCAM) and the Malawi Law Society, respectively, there is no 
regulatory link between these bodies and the registrar of financial services. 
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While there are some reputational intermediaries in Malawi as observed above, the 
framework does not fare very well against Black’s recommendations. Malawi does not have 
a sophisticated accounting profession, and the investment profession is still in its infancy.  
While there are a number of banks that provide investment advice, these banks are not fully 
regulated in that there is no specific regulatory framework for the banks’ investment 
business. Skilled and experienced securities lawyers are also a rare commodity. While there 
are some provisions in the CA, 2013 and SA 2010 that would be regarded as imposing 
liability to investors such rules are not effective in the absence of an independent regulator 
and sophisticated securities lawyers. Also as stated above only one SRO exists and very few 
reputational intermediaries are licensed.  
 
7.4.4 Disclosure of information 
Disclosure requirements are contained in the SA 2010, the CA 2013 and the Malawi Stock 
Exchange (MSE) listing rules.  
 
The SA 2010 requires a registration statement and/or a prospectus containing information 
about a security to be published before an issuer or underwriter of the security directly or 
indirectly sell, offer to sell or enter into a contract to sell that security to any person.706 This 
requirement is supplemented by Section 3.1 of the Listing Rules, which requires new issuers 
to advertise a statement or a summary prospectus in the leading daily newspapers in 
Malawi. The pre-listing statement must contain sufficient information to allow investors to 
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 Section 28 of the SA 2010. Section 260 of the CA, 2013 stipulates specific information to be contained in a 
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make informed decisions whether to invest in the securities or not.707 This information 
should include, inter alia, details about the business of the issuer, its directors and 
management, its capital, loan capital and borrowings and financial information.708   
 
Continuous disclosure obligation on the part of an issuer of any security registered under 
the Act is provided under section 31 (1) of the SA, 2010, which states that: 
 
“An issuer of any security registered under section 27 shall inform and keep 
the public informed of all matters which affect the value of the security 
immediately upon their becoming known to the directors of the issuer, by 
placing an advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation and by 
reporting to the Registrar and to any licensed stock exchange on which the 
securities are listed.” 
 
The MSE listing rules also provide for various continuing obligations which a listed company 
is required to comply with once any of its securities have been admitted to listing, in order 
to maintain an orderly market in securities and to ensure that all users of the market have 
simultaneous access to the same information.709 
 
Further, any person who is the beneficial owner of more than five per cent of any class of 
publicly-traded security, or who is a director or officer of the issuer of such security is 
required to file a statement, with the Registrar, and any securities exchange of which such 
security is traded either at the time such security becomes publicly-traded or within five 
                                                 
707
 Section 3.11 of the Listing Requirements  
708
 Section 4 of the Listing Requirements. 
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days after that person acquires beneficial ownership of such security.710 The statement 
should specify the name, address, citizenship, and position of the person making the 
statement; and the amount of all publicly-traded securities of which such person is the 
beneficial owner.711 
 
In addition, the CA 2013 has comprehensive rules concerning keeping and publishing 
company accounting records and preparing auditor’s reports.712 
 
The above exhibits a fair amount of rules ensuring that investors are kept informed of the 
affairs of the issuer at all times. However, as with the South African regulatory framework, 
there are no specific ownership disclosure rules and also there is no clearly identifiable rule 
writing organisation for accounting rules.  
 
7.4.5 Liability for Insider Dealing 
The SA 2010 proscribes insider dealing and other market abuse practices with the aim of 
ensuring sufficient protection of investors. 
 
Under section 49 (1) of the SA 2010, “no person shall, directly or indirectly, purchase or sell, 
or counsel or procure another person to purchase or sell, securities of an issuer concerning 
which he has knowledge that - (a) is  not  publicly  available; and (b) would, if it were 
                                                 
710
 Section 32 of the SA 2010. 
711
 Section 32 (1) (a) and (b) of the SA 2010. 
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publicly available, materially affect the price of the security.”713  There is criminal liability for 
insider dealing.714  
 
Under section 194 of the CA 2013, where a director of a company acquires any special 
information which may substantially affect the value of companies securities and buys or 
sells, he will only be allowed to buy or sell such securities where he pays or receives fair 
value of the securities and where he pays less than the fair value to acquire the shares or 
receives more than the fair value on disposition of the securities, the director shall be liable 
for the difference between the price paid or received and the fair value of the securities. 
This provision however does not go far enough in proscribing insider dealing as a director 
with such privileged information would be happy to pay or receive what would be regarded 
as a fair value of the shares at the material time well knowing that the value of the 
securities would go down or up sharply few months down the line. 
 
Again the Insider dealing provisions in Malawi fail to meet most of Black’s recommended 
institutions. Firstly, the SA 2010 does not define what inside information is. Secondly the Act 
does not provide for civil liability of the issuer. Although criminal liability is provided for 
under the Act, no sanctions are stipulated.  There are also no specific provisions for public 
companies to have independent directors. And as with South Africa, the culture of 
compliance among accountants, lawyers, company directors and investment bankers is not 
well developed.  
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7.4.6 Market Abuse 
The SA 2010 sets out a number of prohibited market practices as follows: 
 
(i) False trading and manipulations. This include bringing about a “false or misleading 
appearance of the volume of trading in any securities on any licensed stock 
exchange; or a false or misleading appearance of the market for, or the price of, 
any securities”715. False trading and manipulation may also occur where a person 
seeks to maintain, inflate, depress or cause fluctuations in the market price of 
any securities through fictitious transaction or device.716 
 
(ii) Use of deceptive statements as inducements.717 This include where a person induces 
or attempts to induce another person to deal in securities by publishing 
statements, promises or forecasts he knows to be false or misleading or by 
dishonest concealment of material facts.  
 
(iii) Fraudulent Transactions. These include, where a person, in connection with any 
transaction with any other person involving the purchase or sale of securities, 
uses any device or scheme to defraud the other person or “engages in any act, 
practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or deception or is likely 
to operate as a fraud or deception on that other person”.718  
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 Section 45 (1) of SA 2010. 
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(iv) False or misleading statements in connection with sale of securities. This is where a 
person makes false or misleading with respect to any material fact or conceals 
material facts for the purpose of inducing the sale or purchase of securities of 
any issuer.719 
Market transparency is also underpinned by the provisions of the CA 2013 which requires 
every company to prepare and file with the registrar of companies, within six months of its 
balance sheet date, financial statements and annual accounts presenting a true and fair 
view of the companies state of affairs at the balance sheet date and of its profit or loss as 
well as cash flows for the accounting period.720 Further, any prospectus prepared by a 
company offering securities to the public should contain all such necessary information as 
investors and their professional advisers would reasonably require or reasonably expect to 
find in there for the purpose of making an informed assessment of the company’s affairs.721  
  
The foregoing shows that Malawi has sufficient rules banning manipulation of trading prices. 
As stated above, however, the enforcement regime is not sufficient. Also, Malawi lacks 
specific rules and the technology to ensure prompt disclosure of the time, quantity and 
price of trades in public securities to investors. Perhaps the major limitation to effective 
market transparency in Malawi is a lack of active financial press that can uncover and 
publicise as well as criticise, issuers, accountants, lawyers and investment bankers. Again, 
therefore, Malawi does not fare very well on Black’s core institutions for market 
transparency.  
 
                                                 
719
 Section 48 (1) SA 2010 
720
 See, sections 245-252 of the CA, 2013. 
721
 Section 260 of the CA, 2013. 
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7.4.7 Liability of issuers, directors etc for market misconduct. 
The SA 2010 has provided for criminal liability on the part of any person who contravenes its 
provisions on disclosure,722 false trading and manipulation,723 use of deceptive statements 
as inducements,724 fraudulent transactions,725 False or misleading statements726 and insider 
dealing.727 However, as observed above, the Act does not specify any sanctions for the 
offences. Also, the Act is completely silent on civil liability of issuers and their officers. 
 
In addition, the CA 2013 provides for general penalties for the insider dealing and market 
manipulation offences.728 All offences are punishable with imprisonment and/or a fine to be 
determined by the court dependent on the gravity of the offence. 
 
7.5 ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES  
The foregoing examination shows that the UK capital market regulatory regime is 
sufficiently robust in line with Black’s recommended core institutions. The UK regulatory 
framework ticks most of the boxes of the formal and informal institutions dealing with 
information asymmetry and insider dealing. However, as stated above sight is not lost of the 
fact that due to a long history of securities trading in UK, the market has built a formidable 
foundation of investor trust and therefore it cannot be concluded that the success of the UK 
capital markets is solely and squarely due to its regulatory institutional framework. 
                                                 
722
 Section 31 (3) of SA 2010 
723
 Section 45 (4) of SA 2010 
724
 Section 46 (2) of SA 2010 
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 Section 47 (2) of SA 2010 
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The capital market in Malawi has until recently operated with a skeleton regulatory 
framework under the Capital Market Development Act 1990. The SA 2010 only came into 
force in 2010. The new legislation has bolstered the regulatory framework significantly. The 
SA 2010 brought in internationally compatible rules for capital market regulation in Malawi. 
 
There are, however, still some gaps in the new legislation that may need attention. Firstly, 
the Act requires issuers of securities to inform and keep the public informed of all matters 
which affect the value of the security immediately upon their becoming known to the 
directors of the issuer.729 The Act however does not specify what such information may be. 
While it is appreciated that it is difficult to come up with an exhaustive list of such matters, 
it would be argued that an indicative list would be helpful so that issuers have an idea of 
what such matters may be. Further, the Act does not explain what is meant by ‘immediately 
upon their becoming known’ and when it could be deemed that matters became known to 
the directors. This lack of detail could generate unnecessary litigation that may result in 
offenders getting off scot free. 
 
With regard to inside trading offences, the Act does not indicate what information will be 
regarded as ‘material’ for purposes of proving the offence. Also, the Act does not provide 
statutory defences to insider dealing. This may be a disincentive to potential issuers and 
investors who would find the regulatory regime unduly harsh in this regard.  
     
                                                 
729
 Section 32 (1) of the 2010 Act 
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Another weakness of the Malawi regulatory framework is its glaring lack of an independent 
regulator. The new legislation, like the repealed Capital Market Development Act, has not 
provided for an independent market regulator and therefore the regulator remains the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi.  
 
Further, the new legislation does not provide for any civil liability for non-disclosure of 
information, insider dealing and other market abuse practices. Criminal liability is always 
difficult to prove as it requires a high standard of proof and as such it is always ideal to 
provide for civil liability which may be used in parallel to a criminal action or as a fall back 
where a party is unable to meet the evidential high threshold of a criminal offence.   
 
Also self-regulation is underdeveloped in Malawi. So far, the Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE) 
is the only recognised Self-Regulatory Organisation (SRO) with respect to securities trading.    
 
Finally, as is the case with South Africa, the main weakness is likely to be the existing 
informal rules. Although the new legislation has introduced formal rules comparable to 
those in developed markets, the presence of adverse informal rules are likely to slow the 
growth of capital market in Malawi.  
 
The South African capital market is in a very unique position, as we will discuss below, and 
would therefore offer some helpful insights to the thesis of this research. As discussed 
above, South Africa, like other developing economies, has put in place formal rules that 
incorporate international best practices for capital market regulation. South African 
regulatory framework has a very good mechanism for market surveillance and monitoring 
  
- 250 - 
 
for purposes of detecting market misconduct. The transaction reporting system is also very 
robust and strict. The only Achilles heel for the South African regulatory framework, with 
respect to formal rules, would be lack of a specialised court of the first instance as is the 
case in the UK. This is helpful because it allows for market misconduct cases to be dealt with 
by specialist judges in the first instance before they move to the higher courts as well as 
expeditious disposal of the cases. Also the regulation of reputational intermediaries and 
SROs, as observed, is a bit complex and may need proper delineation of regulatory powers.  
 
However, despite its robust formal rules, the South African capital markets operate in a 
similar cultural environment to other SADC countries and, as such, the market should be 
expected to be subject to similar informal rules that exist in other countries. However, as 
stated above, South Africa is the most developed market in the region. It is in fact so 
developed that it is sometimes comparable to capital markets in developed economies. The 
uniqueness of South Africa and its relevance to this work is discussed in section 7.8 below.  
 
7.6  COMPARISON OF INFORMAL RULES IN UNITED KINGDOM, SOUTH AFRICA 
AND MALAWI. 
As observed above, most developing economies, including Malawi and South Africa, have 
adopted formal rules that are comparable to those that exist in developed economies in the 
hope that this would speed up growth of their capital markets. However, as North 
hypothesised, and as was confirmed by Black, changing formal rules only is not sufficient. 
Also, according to Black, informal rules are the most difficult to borrow from other 
countries. This entails that any reform agenda should be mindful of specific informal rules 
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that can scupper its chances of success. Discussed below are some of the informal rules that 
are considered relevant to capital market development in developing economies in general 
and SADC region in particular and may account for the significant disparities of development 
with regard to the three case studies discussed above. 
 
7.6.1 A Culture of Compliance and Honesty 
One of the basic differences between developing economies and developed economies is 
that self-enforcing attitudes like honesty, integrity and cooperative norms are not common 
place in the former. This means it is difficult to have honest regulators, prosecutors or 
judges. Also a lack of the culture of compliance entails that professionals who are expected 
to guide issuers through the regulatory requirements are themselves not willing to comply 
with the rules and therefore amenable to the persuasion of issuers to ride roughshod over 
disclosure or insider dealing rules. United Kingdom has the highest level of compliance 
culture compared to South Africa and Malawi. 
 
7.6.2 Political stability 
It is clear that the United Kingdom is a true democratic society with stable political systems. 
It is a mature Open Access Order (OAO).730 It is therefore safe to say that developed 
countries like the United Kingdom are less affected by effects of informal political rules or 
power relationships which rarely determine economic issues in these countries. However, as 
                                                 
730
 North et al, (2013) supra note 317. 
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stated above, in most developing economies including our case studies, South Africa and 
Malawi, informal political rules are prevalent. Richard Sandrook731 observed as follows: 
 
“African states are not, in any real sense, capitalist states. The peculiar conditions of 
postcolonial Africa impel an adaptation of colonial-inspired political structures and 
processes in a patrimonial, or rather neopatrimonial, direction. The omnipresent 
danger in this adaptation is a degeneration of neopatrimoialism into an economically 
irrational form of ‘personal rule’. This decay manifests in political instability, systemic 
corruption and maladministration...”  
 
It will be noted that South Africa and Malawi, although officially democratic countries, are 
both dogged with an undercurrent of neo-patrimonial practices of their ruling elites and 
their henchmen.732  
 
Collier in his recent book, The Bottom Billion,733 identifies four development traps that 
causes economic stagnation in poor countries and these include (i) conflict trap, which 
manifests itself in the form of civil wars and coup d’ etat; and (ii) the trap of bad 
governance. This is echoed by North et al, in their analysis of Limited Access Orders and 
Open Access Orders. The problem of violence or restriction of entry into economic markets 
and rent-seeking, are linked in this analysis.  
 
                                                 
731
 Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation (Cambridge university Press, 1985) p. 12 
732
 See, Tom Lodge, ‘Neo-Patrimonial Politics in the ANC’ African Affairs, Vol. 113, Issue 450,  pp 1-23. Also at: 
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/113/450/1.full.pdf+html?sid=7d6524a0-015f-4a25-8e19-
0b2eb1f03ce5 Last visited on 16/08/2014. 
733
 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) 5 
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7.6.3 Corruption 
As stated above, corruption is one of the obstructive informal institutions in most emerging 
economies including countries in the SADC region. In “Northean” terms, this is so because 
the current institutional structures in these countries create incentives for corrupt practices. 
According to North, “the structure that humans create to order their political/economic 
environment provides the incentives which shape the choices humans make” and these will 
usually take the form of activities with highest pay-offs.734 In most emerging economies, 
corruption, in the form of bribery, extortion, and rent-seeking, presents highest pay-offs 
amongst political and government officials, as well as private sector players.  
 
Corruption is rampant both in Malawi and South Africa.  For instance, there have been high 
profile corruption scandals in South Africa, notably, the arms procurement scandal in which 
the current president, Jacob Zuma, was implicated while he was serving as a vice 
president.735 Also during his presidency, Zuma was embroiled in massive corruption scandal 
relating to abuse of public resources to build his personal compound.736 Malawi has had its 
fair share of high profile corruption incidents. The former president, Dr Bakili Muluzi and a 
number of his cabinet members are currently under investigations and some have already 
been convicted of corruption offences. Also recently the politicians, including cabinet 
ministers and civil servants have been in a heinous scandal involving looting of government 
resources amounting to millions of US Dollars, which has been dubbed the “Capital Hill 
                                                 
734
 North, (2005) supra note 8 at pp 48 and 61. 
735
 Global Corruption Report, Transparency International (2004) p. 259. 
736
 Andrew Endland ‘Damming Report Finds Zuma Used Tax Millions on Private Estate’ Financial Times, 19 
March 2014. Also at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b2d5630-af60-11e3-bea5-
00144feab7de.html#axzz34EMJ1KP6.  Last visited on 16/08/2014. 
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Cashgate” scandal737.  These high profile cases are clearly a microcosm of the culture of 
corruption that is prevalent in emerging economies, generally and in SADC region, in 
particular. 
 
The literature on the effect of corruption on investment is growing. Corruption increases 
transaction costs and creates uncertainty with regards to future returns on investment.738 In 
order for a foreign company to invest in a host country, they will need licences, permits, 
passports, visas etc in order to comply with the host country’s laws and regulations.739 In 
developing countries, including African countries, government officials demands bribes 
before issuing such requirements.740 Consequently potential investors are put off from 
taking the risk of investing in an environment where they will have to pay more and above 
the normal capital investment. It is observed that concerns about corruption, most of the 
times, shape companies' decisions to invest in Africa as navigating red tape and corrupt 
administrations in Africa may prove to be costly.741    
 
In terms of development of capital markets, unchecked corruption by government officials 
strains the growth of local firms and prevents foreign firms from investing in the local 
economy. This would result in few companies floating on the local stock exchange resulting 
in low market capitalisation levels. It is observed that in emerging and developing 
                                                 
737
 Javier Blas, Financial Times, “Malawi ‘Cash-Gate’ Corruption Scandal Unfolds Like A Thriller” Financial Times 
(FT), 19 November 2013. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c17480e0-50fb-11e3-b499-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mo10TrX5. Last visited on 16/08/2014. 
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 A.S. Dixit, and R.S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton  
University Press, 1994).  
739 Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. Vishny ‘Corruption’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3. (Aug., 
1993), pp. 599-617. 
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economies, corruption practices threaten to undermine both the growth and the stability of 
global trade and financial system and that as these economies open their doors to foreign 
investment and trade, corruption tends to thrive.742  
 
According to the South African Country Corruption Assessment Report of 2003 a survey of 
South African businesses revealed that 62% of businesses agreed that bribery is becoming 
an accepted business practice and 90% of respondents agreed that once employed, bribery 
opened a company to further demands.743  
 
Thus although countries such as South Africa have strong regulatory structure for capital 
markets, the culture of corruption still affects the level of growth of its capital markets in 
comparison to capital markets in developed countries. 
 
While cases of corporate fraud have been reported in developed economies such as UK and 
US,744 the difference is that these were exclusively perpetrated by greedy corporate 
executives and one would safely say they do not represent a social-cultural problem as is 
the case in African economies. Further, each wave of corporate scandals in developed 
economies has always been followed by tough legislative reforms to keep such practices in 
check.745 In emerging economies however, corruption remain rampant. The difference in 
                                                 
742
 See: Soma Pillay, ‘Corruption – The Challenge to Good Governance: A South African Perspective’  The 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 17 No. 7, 2004. 
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 Country Corruption Assessment Report, South Africa, April 2003 at: 
http://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2004/4/sacorruptionassessmentreport2003.pdf  
744
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corruption levels in the case studies we have used is confirmed by the Corruption 
Perception Index of 2013, which ranks them as follows: 
 
Table 4 : Extract of the Corruption Index of 2013 
 
Rank  Country/Territory  CPI 2013 Score  Surveys Used  Confidence Range  
14 United Kingdom  76  8 74 - 78  
72  South Africa  42  9  37 - 47  
91  Malawi  37  8  34 - 40  
 
Source: Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2013. (The countries are ranked on a score of 
0-100, 0 being most corrupt and 100 being corruption free.) 
 
7.6.4  Culture of Capitalism 
It may be said that in UK the culture of individualism and classical liberalism as described 
above are well entrenched. In contrast, in most African economies, including our two case 
studies, the dominant cultural and religious beliefs lean towards the collectivist side of the 
individualist/collectivist continuum and this promotes collective decision making. Also the 
tenets of classical liberalism, including individual liberty, openness to new ideas, tolerance 
of all views, private property rights, rule of law and the freedom of contracts are in short 
supply in Africa and this affects the level of innovation and adoption of new ideas, like the 
capitalist idea. 
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7.6.5 Impersonal Exchange 
Decades of economic experience in UK has given rise to a fully-fledged pattern of 
impersonal exchange. Coupled with technological development the UK market is 
predominantly contract-based and not based on relational ties. This is however not the case 
in most developing economies. Tan and Meyer746 describe this distinction as follows: 
 
“In developed economies, institutional frameworks foster market-based competition 
based on impersonal exchange. Firms’ primary strategic challenge is to develop 
competitive resources and capabilities to outperform competitors in the market 
place (Peng, 2003). In contrast, emerging economies often lack institutions that 
support arm’s length impersonal exchange, such as reliable intermediaries and a 
transparent and effective legal framework (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001). The weak institutional frameworks have two major implications for 
businesses in emerging economies. First, firms often respond to this institutional 
challenge by developing ‘institutionally embedded resources,’ defined as ‘the 
informal linkages with dominant institutions that confer resources and legitimacy’ 
(Peng, et al., 2005:622). These institutional resources include for instance informal 
linkages with governmental institutions, which may take the form of managers’ 
personal networks”. 
 
In their empirical study, Zhou et al,747 have found that while impersonal exchanges are being 
adopted by Chinese businesses, when business transactions are becoming more complex, 
                                                 
746
 Danchi Tan and Klaus E. Meyer, ‘Business Groups’ Outward FDI: A Managerial Resources Perspective’, 2009. 
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managers, due to increasing uncertainty, revert back to personal exchange. This suggests 
that the concept of impersonal exchange has not yet grown roots in developing economies. 
 
7.6.6 Lack of Specialised Knowledge 
Most developing economies as stated above lack specialised knowledge in the operations of 
capital markets. Consequently, most of the market players including, accountants, lawyers 
and judges lack the necessary skills to operate and regulate the market. This is aptly 
depicted by Professor Stuart Cohn experience when he was teaching securities regulation to 
Ugandan market professionals which he described as follows: 
 
“Nothing exited except the laws, a Capital Markets Authority that had no capital markets to 
regulate, and a stock exchange devoid of stock. Broker-dealers existed in creating public 
issues. There were no private companies that had engaged in a public offering, and 
privatisation offerings were still in the planning stages. There were few if any, trained and 
knowledgeable lawyers and accountants prepared for the demands of a securities 
markets...I had assumed that the statutes, regulations, and organisational structure 
reflected market realities and developments-an assumption based on US experience, where 
securities laws came well after the development of primary and secondary securities 
markets. I had never seen a different model and did not appreciate that sophisticated rules 
and institutions could be – and indeed had been – promulgated in an experiential 
vacuum.”
748
   
 
South Africa may be an exception as it has a well developed accounting and legal profession 
probability due to the fact that the South African capital market has existed for a 
considerably long period of time. However such specialist knowledge is clearly lacking 
Malawi. 
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 Stuart R. Cohn, ‘Teaching in a Developing Country: Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in Uganda, 48 J. 
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7.7 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMAL RULES TO THE REFORM PROCESS 
Having asserted that there are a number of informal constraints in developing economies 
that do not exist in developed economies, it is important to consider how this would affect 
the reform agenda for capital market regulation in these countries.  
 
Firstly, as stated above, this would entail that any formal rules that are being introduced in 
these economies are supposed to be adjusted to the existing informal rules. For instance, 
the fact that self-enforcing altitudes like honesty, integrity and cooperative norms are not 
common place in developing economies would necessitate stricter rules for promoting 
market transparency and preventing market abuse. Further, the prevalence of relational 
transacting and lack of impersonal exchange would require strengthening of effective 
contract laws that would help to take away reliance on relational ties. Similarly, any reform 
agenda should take into account the fact that corruption is the norm in these economies. 
The possibility that officials throughout the entire market infrastructure would be corrupt, 
needs to be fully factored into the process and necessary safeguards need to be embedded 
in the regulatory framework. 
 
According to North, the process of changing informal rules is slow and takes time. This 
means that reformers should not expect overnight change of behaviour and should consider 
ways of getting round the constraints that the informal institutions would give rise to the 
capital market development process while any obstructive informal rules are being 
transformed. 
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Also, the consequences of “non-ergodicity” should be fully considered. It is obvious that the 
introduction of new formal rules will bring about a level of uncertainty to market players in 
these economies, which would encourage them to find new ways of evading the intended 
consequences of the new rules. For instance introduction of stringent rules may encourage 
market participants to resort to bribes in order to get their way round the rules. Promotion 
of whistle blowing culture by introducing rules rewarding whistleblowers or exonerating 
informants from liability for conspiracy would be one of the ways of shifting incentives to let 
people comply with the rules. 
 
One institutional aspect that needs to be considered when dealing with the consequences 
of informal rules and the accompanying consequences of non-ergodicity that result from 
changes in formal rules is the enforcement regime to be adopted. In their study, Garoupa 
and Klerman749 considered the effect of corruption under monopolistic enforcement by a 
single private enforcement agency and under competitive enforcement by many private 
enforcers. Their observation was that: 
“Under monopolistic enforcement, corruption is used to generate additional rents 
to the enforcement agency. Under competitive enforcement, the analysis is 
complicated by the possibility that bribing one enforcer may not prevent 
prosecution by another”.
750
 
The South African regulatory framework offers an example of competitive enforcement. As 
discussed above, the SSA 2004 established the Directorate of Market Abuse (DMA) which 
has statutory mandate to investigate cases of Market abuse and to enforce the prohibitions 
                                                 
749
 N. Garoupa and D. Klerman, ‘Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History’, Illinois Law and 
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against market abuse in the Act. However, the frontline detection and prevention of market 
abuse is undertaken by the JSE Surveillance Division, which has in place a number of 
proprietary systems that have been specifically designed to detect unusual trading volumes 
and price movements, which could be indicative of insider trading or market manipulation. 
This arrangement would make it difficult for a wrongdoer to bribe his way through the 
system with impunity. 
Further, self-regulation may also be one way of dealing with the consequences of negative 
informal institutions. Self-regulation through common codes of conduct within groups of 
market players is considered an effective informal institution for regulating the market. 
North has expressed the importance of self-enforcing codes of behaviour as follows: 
 
“The importance of self-imposed codes of behaviour in constraining maximising behaviour in 
many contexts also is evident. Our understanding of the source of such behaviour is deficient, 
but we can frequently measure its significance in choices by empirically examining marginal 
changes in the cost of expressing conviction” 
751
 
 
The importance of using market self-regulation has been recently echoed by Carson (2010) 
who stated that: 
 
“Arguably, the main reason to consider using self-regulation is that it enables additional 
resources and expertise to be applied to regulation. In large and complex securities 
markets, even large and well-resourced regulatory authorities find it a challenge to set all 
the rules and standards and to deploy thorough supervision programs that will monitor 
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compliance in all activities. This challenge applies to both developed and emerging 
markets.”752 
 
7.8  THE UNIQUENESS OF CAPITAL MARKET IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 As observed above, although South Africa operates in an environment facing many of the same 
problems of obstructive informal rules as Malawi and other SADC countries, South African capital 
markets are far more developed than most markets in the region. As stated above, the JSE is 
Africa’s largest and most vibrant stock market accounting for over 90 per cent of the total market 
capitalization of sub-Saharan Africa and over 76 per cent of the entire continent. This makes the 
South African case special and fascinating.  
 
There are a number of factors that may help to explain the uniqueness of South Africa. Such factors 
may include the following: 
 
i. The South African capital market has a long history of trading with the first stock 
exchange established in 1887. On the other hand stock exchanges in Malawi and 
most countries in the region, were only established recently mostly in the 1990s. 
This long trading history may suggest that the South African informal rules that used 
to affect the market in its initial stage have now changed over a period of time. The 
informal rules likely to have developed would be the following: 
a) Culture of compliance with disclosure and insider dealing rules 
                                                 
752
 J. Carson, ‘Self‐Regulation in Securities Markets’, (2010), Working Paper for World Bank Financial Sector 
Policy Group. 
  
- 263 - 
 
b) Specialised knowledge in capital markets resulting in skilled capital 
market professionals 
c) Impersonal exchange 
 
ii. The South African capital market was established independently of state forces and 
was supported by strong mining industry that provided demand for capital while 
capital markets in Malawi and other countries were established as a state machinery 
to help in the process of divesting state-owned companies. 
 
iii. The South African capital market is supported by modern technological advances, 
which have not yet been adopted in most SADC countries. This is of course arguable 
as a causative factor considering that most of the technological advances have only 
been realised in the recent past. 
 
iv.  The South African capital market is also supported by a strong surveillance and 
monitoring system for purposes of detecting market malpractices. 
 
The South African case may therefore serve to confirm North’s Model in the following ways: 
 
i. With proper alignment of formal and informal rules currently underdeveloped 
markets can grow to the levels approximating capital markets in developed 
economies 
ii. Since informal rules change over time such growth will only be realised after years 
of operation of the capital market.   
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7.9 CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this section shows that developed economies like UK have put in place 
formal institutions to support their capital markets which, together with favourable informal 
institutions that exists in these economies, have supported the operation of strong capital 
markets. The formal rules in these economies are propped up by robust enforcement 
regimes that have been established. 
 
On the other hand, while developing countries such as those examined from the SADC 
region have introduced similar formal rules for regulating their capital markets most of 
which are quite nascent, the formal rules are of doubtful efficacy due to the informal 
institutions that are prevalent in these economies.  
 
The above analysis therefore clearly shows that there is a real need to reform not only the 
formal rules but the informal rules as well. However, as posited by North, the process of 
changing informal rules is slow and therefore takes a long time. The South African capital 
market offers an example of how underdeveloped markets are able to develop with proper 
alignment of formal and formal rules over a period of time.  
 
The foregoing calls for a unique reform agenda that will take into account the unique 
informal institutions that have capability to render standard formal rules adopted from 
developed economies ineffective.  There is therefore need for a dynamic model of 
development that will have present informal institutions and structures as its starting point 
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and that will quickly respond to any consequences of interaction between existing informal 
rules and any adopted formal rules.  Some possible ingredients of such reform agenda are 
suggested in Chapter 9 below. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT:  THE MECHANICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
AND CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT REFORM. 
 
8.1   INTRODUCTION 
Having looked at the current state of development and regulation of capital markets in the 
SADC region which may be regarded as representative of the state of capital market 
development and regulation in many developing countries, this chapter seeks to explore the 
mechanics of institutional change, which is very crucial to the effective design and 
implementation of capital market reforms in developing countries. We shall therefore start 
by looking at the process of institutional change according to North’s framework. We shall 
then explore practical ways through which formal and informal rules may be changed and 
the practical problems that result from interaction of formal and informal rules and their 
effect on institutional reform. We shall also examine some suggested theories for achieving 
efficiency-friendly institutional change. Finally we shall look at some practical examples of 
institutional development within North’s framework. 
 
8.2   THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE – NORTH’S FRAMEWORK. 
North describes institutional change as the process through which existing formal and 
informal rules change through the agency of organisations.753 North asserts that 
institutional change is induced by organisations and their entrepreneurs.754  Organisations 
are understood to be purposive entities that are designed by their creators to achieve 
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specific objectives like profit or income maximisation, winning elections, regulating 
businesses, or educating students as defined by the opportunities afforded by the 
institutional structure of the society.755 This entails that entrepreneurs or decision makers in 
organisations are agents of institutional change while the opportunities as perceived by 
their mental models are the sources of institutional change.756  North therefore introduces 
the concept of belief system in the process of change. The extent, speed and direction of 
institutional change is thus contingent on the ability of social actors of a particular society to 
perceive opportunities or incentives in a particular institutional structure. 
 
North notes that more often than not, human improvement has been a ‘trial and error 
process of change with lots of errors, endless losers and no guarantee of continued 
progress.’757 According to North, in order to get institutional change right through time 
there is need to ‘perceive correctly changes in the human environment, incorporate those 
perceptions in our belief system, and alter the institutions accordingly.’758 North provides a 
step by step process of change as follows759: 
 
 i. Understand the implications of novel changes with respect to their effects on three 
fundamental sources of change – demography, the stock of knowledge, and 
institutions – and the resultant new interaction among them; 
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ii. Incorporate this new knowledge in the belief systems of those in position to modify 
the institutional matrix; 
iii. Alter the formal rules, the informal constraints, and the enforcement characteristics 
accordingly and the result will be the desired changes. 
 
According to North, two key issues that need to be the focus of any development strategy 
are (i) how humans make decisions in the face of strong uncertainty and (ii) how humans 
learn. 
 
8.2.1 Decision making, Uncertainty and Institutional Change. 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, North has identified uncertainty over time as one of 
the key issues that economic agents have problems with in the process of economic 
exchange.  North observes that the world is ‘non-ergodic’ in its character in that it is 
constantly changing such that it is always impossible to predict with certainty the outcome 
of one’s action. This is so because actions that are intended to deal with a perceived 
uncertainty may themselves generate novel situations that give rise to more 
uncertainties.760 Therefore human beings usually find themselves in situations where they 
are supposed to make decisions without being certain of the outcome. It is this process of 
decision making in the face of uncertainty that is crucial to institutional change. 
 
The influence of decision making by social actors on institutional change occurs both at 
macro and micro levels. At macro-level, institutional change will occur when accumulated 
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experiences and beliefs from the past provide a correct guide to future decision making. In 
practice however accumulated knowledge or past beliefs are not usually integrated into 
future decision making process resulting in humans getting institutional change wrong.761 
North observes that this happens either because the ‘set of mental models, categories and 
classifications of the neural networks that have evolved in our belief system through which 
the new evidence gets filtered have no existing patterns that can correctly assess the new 
evidence’762 or because the dominant organisations and their entrepreneurs may see the 
necessary changes as a threat to their survival and therefore resist the change.763 The 
starting point of effective institutional change is to correctly comprehend what is happening 
to us and design institutional adjustments accordingly.764 A relevant example in this regard 
is the shift from personal to impersonal exchange which gave birth to modern global 
economy. Impersonal exchange came about after noting the restraints and restriction on 
trade that were imposed by personal exchange that largely relies on reciprocity and repeat 
dealings. However impersonal exchange requires the ‘development of economic and 
political institutions that alter the pay-offs in exchange to reward cooperative behaviour.’765 
North notes that the successful evolution from personal to impersonal exchange in the 
Western world required radical alteration in economic institutions in order to make such 
long distance and impersonal trade viable. Further, growth of long distance trade exerted 
pressure on the economic system and necessitated the state to intervene and provide for 
legal enforcement of contracts.766 
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Further, institutional change occurs at macro level through integration of dispersed 
knowledge at low cost of transacting. Acquisition of new knowledge shall give birth to 
different institutions aimed at pulling together the dispersed knowledge in order to use it 
effectively in the growth of productivity of the modern economy.767 Specialisation has 
resulted in increased specialised knowledge and less general knowledge. In turn, the 
decrease of general knowledge has increased the risk of uncertainty and such uncertainty 
can only be reduced by exchanging specialised knowledge at low cost of transacting.768 
Some of the institutions and organisations that have arisen to facilitate low cost exchange of 
specialised knowledge include warranties, guarantees and trademarks. Finally there is need 
for a lot more complex institutional structures to integrate specialised knowledge into 
productive knowledge. North observes that although Germany was the pioneer in the 
application of scientific principles to technology in the chemical industry, it is the United 
States that combined chemical knowledge a nd engineering principles by developing a 
curriculum in chemical engineering in universities and that this resulted in revolutionary 
developments.769 In this case the university was a necessary organisation/institution to help 
integrate dispersed knowledge at low cost of transacting.   
 
On the other hand, micro-level institutional change, involves adjustments to factor and 
product markets. North says that factor and product markets must not only be structured at 
a moment of time to get the players to compete via price and quality but also the conditions 
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for maintaining market efficiency must vary over time with changes in technology, human 
capital, market conditions, and information costs.770  This therefore calls for constant 
adjustments to the institutional framework within which markets operate. Given that each 
factor and product market is characterised by an institutional structure that defines the 
margins at which the players can operate to affect the profitability of their operation, what 
is needed is the maintenance of an institutional structure that will provide players with 
incentives to compete at these margins. The margins are usually defined by rules, 
regulations, norms and enforcement regimes in place.  
 
Institutional change, therefore, will be effected through marginal adjustments to the 
complex set of rules, norms and enforcement that constitute the market institutional 
framework.771 The incremental process of change is facilitated by the overall stability of an 
institutional framework which allows for complex exchanges to take place across time and 
space.772 Institutional stability results from a complex set of formal  rules ‘nested in a 
hierarchy, where each level is more costly to change than the previous one’773 as well as 
informal rules which are extensions, elaborations and qualifications of the rules and ‘have 
tenacious survival ability’774 as they become part of habitual behaviour.    
 
Institutional stability will only be disturbed when there are changes in relative prices as 
relative price changes alter incentives of individuals in human interaction.775 Changes in 
relative prices will result from the process by which organisations and their entrepreneurs 
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acquire skills and knowledge as the acquired skills and knowledge will change perceived 
costs of measurement and enforcement as well as alter perceived costs and benefits of new 
bargains and contracts.776 However changing relative prices will still have to be filtered 
through pre-existing mental constructs or belief system of entrepreneurs and this will shape 
their understanding of price changes.777   
 
In light of the above, an institutional framework would be stable resulting in institutional 
equilibrium778 where given the bargaining strength of the parties and the set of contractual 
bargains that make up total economic exchange, none of the parties would find it 
advantageous to devote resources into restructuring the agreements regardless of whether 
everyone is happy with the existing rules and contracts.779 However, a change in relative 
prices will lead to one or both parties to an exchange to perceive that either or both could 
do better with an altered agreement or contract. Because contracts780 are nested in a 
hierarchy of rules any attempt to renegotiate the contract will not be possible without 
changing a higher set of rules.781 This will result in the party who stands to improve his or 
her bargaining position devoting resources to restructuring the rules at a higher level. A 
change in formal rules will give rise to disequilibrium in the institutional framework and 
alter transaction costs.782 This will spark efforts on the part of entrepreneurs to evolve new 
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conventions or norms and a new informal equilibrium will evolve gradually following a 
change in informal rules.783  
 
Thus deliberate institutional change will come about as a result of the demands of 
institutional entrepreneurs in the context of the perceived costs of altering the institutional 
framework at various margins.784 Entrepreneurs who perceive themselves and their 
organizations as relative (or absolute)losers in economic exchange as a consequence of the 
existing structure of relative prices can turn to the political process to right their perceived 
wrongs by altering that relative price structure.785 Again whether a party perceives itself as a 
loser or winner depends on their belief system at the time.  
 
Further, changes in enforcement rules will provide entrepreneurs with new avenues of 
profitable exploitation that will also result in changes of both formal and informal 
constraints. 
 
It is, however, observed that creating efficient markets both at the moment of time and 
over time is associated with a number of problems. The following are identified as problems 
associated with creating efficient markets at the moment of time: 
 
i. Although it can be assumed that the choices of market players will be guided by 
income and wealth maximisation – subject to the usual caveats about making 
choices in the world of uncertainty and the constraints imposed by the state of 
                                                 
783
 Ibid 88 
784
 Douglass North (1999) supra note 756 at p. 5 
785
 Ibid at 5. 
  
- 274 - 
 
technology and competitive conditions, a combination of these two variables 
produces an immense variety of margins at which the players can and will act. 
This makes the task of knowing what set of incentives and disincentives will 
provide players in each factor and product market with the correct inducements 
not an easy one.786    
 
ii.       The performance characteristics of each market will be a consequence of both 
the formal rules and the informal norms of behaviour that modify, qualify, or 
even negate the formal rules and therefore the transaction costs in each market 
will reflect the combination of formal and informal constraints. Consequently, 
although it is easy to provide for specific rules, say for example property rights, 
both measurement and enforcement of the rules will usually be imperfect since 
the rules will only provide general rules rather than "cater" to the specific 
characteristics of each market.787  
 
iii.      Additional specific rules for each market will be made by a government that is 
hardly a disinterested party and at times with its own political agenda. As a 
result, the structure of political market will determine whose voices are "heard" 
in shaping additional rules governing each market.788 
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iv.       Even when the ostensible objective of government policy is economic efficiency, 
it is not obvious that the government players will possess sufficient economic 
sophistication to achieve that objective.789  
 
v.       Finally in most cases enforcement will be made by agents-whether regulatory 
bodies or courts-with their own agenda.790  
 
With regard to problems with creating efficient markets over time, North observes that not 
only does each factor and product market require different specific constraints so that it will 
provide the right incentive structure for the players, but economic change requires 
continual alteration in the institutional structure in order to maintain efficiency.791 This is so 
because incentives of the players in a particular market, say capital market, will be 
determined by the structure of the market and with changes in market conditions the 
incentives that at time t would induce the players to make an efficient capital market may in 
time t + 1 induce the players to engage in activities that undermine, weaken, or indeed 
destroy the capital market with consequent adverse effects on the economy as a whole.792  
 
Development of efficient markets over time is complex because successful adaptation to 
changing conditions entails altering economic institutions, which frequently entails the 
enactment through the polity of new rules. This is less of a problem where market players 
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(entrepreneurs of economic organizations) are able to perceive the need for adaptation and 
are in a position to make the necessary alterations themselves.793 However, where change 
involves the political enactment of new rules, the adaptation is much less likely to be 
forthcoming as the polity becomes the battleground for those who believe they would be 
adversely affected by the rule changes. North observes that while Neo-classical economists 
have generally come to perceive that institutions are important and that an underpinning of 
property rights and the rule of law are necessary conditions for a successful economy, there 
is little evidence that neo-classic economic advisors and international organizations they 
advise, properly perceive the need for ongoing institutional change as the fundamental 
characteristics of a particular efficient market are altered.794 The result of prolonged failure 
to improve individual factor and product market is declining overall rates of growth and 
economic stagnation.795  
 
Specific issues involved with maintaining efficient markets over time are summarised as 
follows:  
i. ‘Alterations in the performance characteristics of a market require an initial 
understanding of the source(s) of such change. 
 
ii. ‘Successful’ alterations designed to improve market performance require the correct 
theory of the overall process of change. 
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iii.     Implementing that correct theory entails that the key players (that is the 
entrepreneurs in a position to alter that market structure) possess such theory, 
through their belief system and are willing and able to act upon it.  
 
iv.    Where the alterations entail changes that must be enacted by the polity, there is 
an additional hurdle in enacting such political policies in that the existing 
institutional structure will have spawned organizations with a stake in that 
existing institutional structure and such organizations will attempt to thwart the 
changes.’796  
 
8.2.2 Learning and Institutional Change 
As stated above, institutional change will also result from the process of human learning. As 
organisations pursue wealth-maximising activities, they incrementally alter the institutional 
structure. Members of the organisation acquire productive knowledge, skills and learning 
necessary to maximise profit of the organisation and to enhance their survival possibilities in 
the context of ubiquitous scarcity.797 Incentives that are built into the institutional 
framework determine the kinds of skills and knowledge that pay off.798 Further, the process 
of learning by doing and development of tacit knowledge will lead individuals in decision 
making processes both within (e.g. company directors) and outside (e.g. regulators) the 
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organisation to gradually evolve new systems different from old ones.799 This will in the long 
run result in institutional change. 
 
The firm’s maximising behaviour can take one of the two forms; (i) making choices within 
the existing set of constraints through learning and investing in skills and knowledge with 
highest payoff, and (ii) devoting resources to alter the existing constraints.800 The 
entrepreneur will assess the gains to be derived from re-contracting within the existing 
institutional framework compared to the gains from devoting resources to altering that 
framework801. Organisations with sufficient bargaining strength will use the political process 
to change political rules in order to increase their profitability when the payoff from 
maximising in that direction exceeds the payoff from investing within the existing 
constraints.802 Further, organisations will also encourage the society to invest in the kinds of 
skills and knowledge that indirectly contribute to their profitability and that this investment 
ultimately shapes the long-run growth of skills and knowledge803.  An ideal interaction 
between the market for knowledge i.e. overall stock of knowledge and the subjective 
knowledge of the players will coincide to produce a private and public investment in 
knowledge that will approximate the social rate of return.804 
 
The systemic investment in skills and knowledge and their application to an economy over 
time will result in a dynamic evolution of the economy through adaptively efficient 
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organisations.805 North draws a distinction between allocative efficiency, which is premised 
on neoclassical pareto conditions and adaptive efficiency which is concerned with rules that 
shape the way an economy evolves through time and the willingness of a society to acquire 
knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk and creative activity as well 
as to resolve problems and bottlenecks of society through time.806  North explains that since 
in a world of uncertainty no one knows the correct solution to the problems confronted, it is 
the society that permits maximum generation of trials that will be most likely to solve the 
problems through time.807 For this reason adaptive efficiency will provide the incentives to 
encourage the development of decentralized decision-making processes that will allow 
societies to maximize the efforts required to explore alternative ways of solving 
problems.808  
 
Adaptive efficiency will help societies to learn from failures and will result in organisational 
trials and elimination of organisational errors.809 Consequently, an institutional structure 
that provides for competition, decentralised decision making, well specified contracts of 
property rights and bankruptcy laws will promote adaptive efficient organisation.810 North 
therefore counsels that it is important to have a structure of rules that not only rewards 
success but also vetoes the survival of maladapted parts of the organisational structure.811  
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8.2.3 Institutional Change and Path Dependency  
The final and perhaps the most important aspect of the process of institutional change is the 
path of economic change. North has argued that there are basically two forces that shape 
the path of institutional change, namely (i) increasing returns and imperfect markets 
characterised by significant transaction costs.812  
 
Increasing returns is an economics concept, which basically holds that the probability of 
further steps along the same path increases with each move down the path because the 
relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increases over 
time,813  According to W. Brian Arthur,814 increasing returns processes come into being as a 
consequence of the following self-enforcing mechanisms:  
 
(i)       Large set-up or fixed costs. When set-up or fixed costs are high, individuals and 
organisation have a strong incentive to identify and stick with a single option. 
 
(ii)        Learning effects. Knowledge gained in the operation of complex systems leads to 
higher returns from continuing use because with repetition individuals learn how 
to use products more effectively and their experiences are likely to spur further 
innovations in the product or related activities. 
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(iii)       Coordination effects. The benefits of an organisation using a particular institution 
will increase as others adopt the same institution. 
 
(iv)       Adaptive expectations. Projections about future aggregate use patterns lead 
individuals to adapt their actions in ways that help make those expectations 
come true.  
North asserts that all these four mechanisms apply to institutions in that institution creation 
is usually associated with large initial set up costs and also that there are significant learning 
effects for organisations that arise in consequence of the opportunity set provided by the 
institutional framework.815 Also coordination effects exist directly via contracts with other 
organisations and indirectly by induced investment through the polity in complementary 
activities as well as by way of creation of informal rules in response to formal rules. Finally 
adaptive expectations occur because increased prevalence of contracting based on a 
specific institution will reduce uncertainties about the permanence of that rule.816 This 
shows that the interdependent web of the institutional matrix produces huge increasing 
returns which shape the long run path of economies. 
 
The path of institutional change is further shaped by incomplete markets, fragmentary 
information feedback and significant transaction costs. Divergent paths and persistently 
poor performance then prevail due to subjective models of actors that are modified both by 
very imperfect feedback and ideology.817 Increasing returns and imperfect markets 
therefore make institutional change path-dependent and once a development path is set on 
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a particular course, network externalities, the learning process of organisations, and the 
historically derived subjective modelling of the issues reinforce the course.818 Thus 
increasing returns characteristic of an initial set of institutions that provide disincentives to 
productive activity will create organisations and interest groups with a stake in the existing 
constraints and will therefore resist change.819  
 
North observes that the artifactual structure including institutions, beliefs as well as various 
problem solving tools and techniques are inherited from the past as part of our ‘cultural 
heritage.’820 Usually cultural heritage will impose severe constraints on the ability to change 
institutional structure either ‘because the proposed changes run counter to the inherited 
belief system or because the proposed alteration threatens the leaders and entrepreneurs 
of existing organisations.’821 
 
The foregoing therefore explains why fundamental change in relative prices affect two 
societies differently as in each society the change will result in adaptations at the margins 
and the margins affected will be those where the immediate issues require solution and the 
solution will be determined by the relative bargaining power of the participants which are 
the organisations that have evolved in the specific overall institutional context.822 
Consequently a common set of fundamental changes in relative prices or the common 
                                                 
818
 Ibid at 99 
819
 Ibid. 
820
 North (2005), supra note 8 at 156 
821
 Ibid at 157 
822
 Ibid at 101 
  
- 283 - 
 
imposition of a set of rules will lead to widely divergent outcomes in societies with different 
institutional arrangements.823  
 
Path dependency is thus very crucial to the process of institutional change like legal reform 
because it provides a general theoretical explanation for the relative unpredictability of 
legal transplantation as a policy or methodology of legal reform.824 Mere copying of legal 
rules and systems will not produce the same results in their new environment as were 
produced in their original environment because the new environment will respond to the 
transplanted law in novel ways peculiar to the new social environment, as it will be a 
function of the path dependant situation at reception and response to the novelty of the 
recipient society.  
 
8.2.4 Need for a clear Theory of Institutional Change 
The overarching thesis of North’s model is that neo-classical economic theory is static and 
as a consequence has tended to misinform policy makers deriving their inspiration from 
that theory. All too frequently this result in policy prescriptions that produce results at odds 
with intentions because policy derived from static theory in a dynamic setting is bound to 
produce unanticipated (and unpleasant) outcomes.825 While North advocates a clear theory 
of change, he realises that such a theory may not easily evolve but believes that it is 
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possible to have a limited but manageable approach to dealing with dynamic change. He 
sets out the following realities that may inform such an approach:826  
 
1. Changes in the human environment will broadly mirror the changes in institutions 
and will have as their source the underlying beliefs of those organizational 
entrepreneurs (political, social, and economic) in a position to enact alterations in 
the institutional environment.   
 
2. Such initial changes can alter the perceived opportunity costs of complementary or 
substitute organizations. Consequently there is need to have a detailed 
understanding of the complex interdependent institutional matrix to unravel those 
connections and to know the new opportunity costs of the affected organizations. 
North observes that ‘economics and political economy have not devoted resources 
to understanding the complex interdependent character of market structures so as 
to be self-conscious about the secondary consequences of an initial change.’827  
 
3. Therefore Policy makers need more detailed knowledge than is currently possessed 
of the institutional structure of an economy so that they are aware of the existing 
institutional matrix and therefore are self-conscious about the interconnections. 
This will put them in a position to perceive the alterations in the opportunity costs 
of affected organizations and take that information into account in making policies.  
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8.3 CHANGES OF FORMAL RULES 
By way of recapitulation, formal rules are constitutions, statutes, common laws and other 
governmental regulations.828 Unlike informal rules, formal rules are a policy variable 
because they can be changed by changing policies.829 Generally, formal rules can be 
introduced for one of the following purposes:830 
 
(i) Institutionalisation of customs and traditions in order to make informal rules more 
uniform, predictable, enforceable and transparent. 
(ii) Enactment of new rules in order to accommodate changes in the economic 
conditions of life so as to reduce transaction costs of economic exchange. 
(iii) New rules being introduced as an outcome of top-down decision making process in 
response to the majority rule, lobbying and the pressure from rent-seeking 
groups.  
Formal rules may therefore be altered through legislative changes like enactment of new 
statute, judicial changes through court decisions, regulatory changes enacted by regulatory 
agencies and as a result of constitutional rule changes that alter the rules by which other 
rules are made.831 According to Perjovich the incentives and constraints under which the 
makers of laws and regulations operate are crucial to the process of institutional change.832  
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8.4 CHANGES OF INFORMAL RULES 
As stated above, changes in informal rules occur gradually and sometimes quite 
unconsciously as individuals evolve alternative patterns of behaviour consistent with their 
newly perceived evaluation of costs and benefits.833 This may occur through a gradual 
withering away of an accepted norm or social convention or the gradual adoption of a new 
one as the nature of the political, social, or economic exchange gradually changes.834 
Informal rules change slowly because they are essentially a synthesis of a community’s 
traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs and all other informal norms of behaviour 
that have passed the test of time and that bind the generations.835 Informal rules may 
change due to factors either coming from within the institutional system (endogenously) or 
from outside the system (exogenously).836 
 
8.4.1 Exogenous change of Informal Rules. 
This mainly involves changes to informal rules that are effected through deliberate change 
of formal rules in a bid to bring about behavioural change in society. North asserts that 
institutional change is induced by organisations and their entrepreneurs.837  The question 
whether formal rules can change informal rules has generated considerable scholarly 
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debate. Richard McAdams838 has argued that new formal rules are capable of changing 
informal rules and has cited laws restricting smoking, bans on duelling, and anti-
discrimination laws in the United States as examples of formal rules that created incentives 
resulting in behavioural modifications.  On the other hand, it is argued that formal rules 
cannot change informal institutions but rather they can only suppress them.839 Perjovich840 
has argued that McAdams’ observations do not have general validity as economic history is 
full of formal rules and ideologies that have failed to change prevailing informal rules.841 
They agree that in cases relied on by McAdams there were observable changes in informal 
rules but argued that McAdams failed to distinguish between formal rules that support the 
already emerging changes in informal rules and formal rules that do not.842 They therefore 
suggest that formal rules can only institutionalise ongoing cultural changes.843 This study 
agrees with Perjorvich’s position that informal rules will only change exogenously where a 
cultural shift is already underway.  
 
8.4.2 Endogenous Change of Informal Rules 
This occurs when informal rules change from within the system. According to Perjovich et al, 
cultural changes from within a given institutional system can be properly understood by 
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using the margin of acceptable behaviour, which is a line that separates intramarginal from 
submarginal behaviours.844 An addition of a previously submarginal behaviour to the set of 
acceptable rules result from a change in the margin of acceptable behaviour.845   In order to 
change the margin of acceptable behaviour there must be an individual willing and able to 
take the risk of overcoming the objective and subjective costs of carrying out the 
submarginal activity.846  
 
In this regard, the process of change will start with the emergence of a new idea or 
opportunity in a community or an organisation and perception of prospects of personal gain 
from exploiting the opportunity by a member of the community or organisation.847  The new 
opportunity may require a sub marginal behaviour and given the potential gains from 
exploiting the opportunity, some individuals might choose to pursue actions that are below 
the margin of acceptable behaviour and consequently attract strong opposition and bear 
the costs of breaching the norm.848  If engaging in the sub marginal activity turns out to 
provide the pathfinder (the risk taker) with a differential return, incentives will be created 
for others to pursue the same activity. Continued returns from the activity will result in an 
ever-increasing number of individuals joining in and this will eventually lead to spontaneous 
                                                 
844
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pressures from within the system to ‘incorporate the novelty’849 into informal rules.  This 
process shall however be subject to the realities that arise from uncertainty and non-
egordicity as expounded within North’s model. 
 
In order to increase the rate of change in informal rules, the costs of carrying out sub 
marginal activities will have to be lowered.850  
 
8.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN FORMAL RULES AND INFORMAL RULES 
Another concept that is helpful in understanding the process of institutional change is the 
nature of the interaction between formal and informal rules in a given economy. Formal 
rules and informal rules interact at different levels depending on the prevailing incentive 
structure at any given time. According to J Winiecki,851 the starting point is the balance 
conditions between formal and informal rules, which result from harmonious co-existence 
of the prevailing formal and informal rules so that little further behavioural adaptations are 
necessary on the part of economic agents.852 The balance conditions entail that neither 
decision makers nor economic agents perceive that their interests require fundamental 
institutional change.853 In practical terms this will be a situation where rulers do not feel, 
according to their belief system at the time, the need to change the structure of incentives 
by introducing new formal rules in order to increase their share of created wealth or where 
no organised groups of economic agents is able to successfully lobby for changes in formal 
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rules to improve the structure of incentives that would increase wealth creating capability 
of the economy that would allow them increase their wealth.854     
 
Winiecki perfectly depicted the possible interaction scenarios by using the cross-tabular 
form set out in Table 5 below. 
Table 5 : Interaction between Formal and Informal Rules 
 
FORMAL RULES 
 
Continue 
Unchanged 
Change 
 
I
N
F
O
R
M
A
L  
 
 
R
U
L
E
S 
 
     Continue 
Unchanged 
 
1 
Balance 
 
[No need to make fundamental 
adaptations] 
 
 
 
 
2 
Imbalance 
 
[Informal Rules adapt] 
 
 
Change 
3 
Imbalance 
 
[Formal Rules adapt] 
4 
Extreme Imbalance 
 
[Few rules in discord with each 
other] 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Adapted from J. Winieki855 at page 154 
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The above cross-tabulation serves as a very helpful tool in understanding what happens 
when changes are made to formal rules or informal rules or both. Quadrant 1 depicts the 
stable situation where no adjustments are attempted because there is no force either 
willing or able to change the existing formal rules. Quadrants 2 and 3 represent the situation 
of imbalance where there is potential of adjustments. Quadrant 2 shows that when formal 
rules change while informal rules remain unchanged, there will be an imbalance as the 
existing informal rules are adapting. On the other hand, quadrant 3 shows that changes to 
informal rules will result in another imbalance situation as existing formal rules may have to 
be changed to adapt to the new informal rules. Finally, quadrant 4 depicts a situation where 
both formal rules and informal rules are changed at the same time and rapidly. This scenario 
will result in ‘extreme fluidity’856 as there will be a discordance of some rules as the system 
stabilises.  Obviously the situation in quadrant 4 is one of great uncertainty for 
organisations.   
 
There may be different causes of adjustments/adaptations to both informal rules and 
formal rules. Informal rules may adjust either because the structure of incentives in new 
formal rules is so rewarding that it overwhelms the resistance of informal rules despite the 
latter being in conflict with the former or because the new structure of incentives is only 
moderately more rewarding than the old one but the informal rules have already been 
roughly in concordance with the new formal rules.857 In the case of formal rules, adaptations 
may be due to the fact that either the resistance of new informal rules is very strong in spite 
of relatively strong influence of formal rules or the structure of incentives provided by 
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formal rules now only influences the behaviour of economic agents relatively weakly such 
that existing informal rules prevail.858   
 
It is therefore important to have these possible interaction scenarios in mind when 
designing any institutional reform agenda in order to predict possible outcomes of the 
reform process and to be able to choose the most optimal outcome. The probability of 
success of any reform program is negatively correlated with the degree of discordance 
between formal rules and informal rules. Thus the smaller the divergence, the greater the 
probability of success.859 
 
8.6 THE INTERACTION THESIS 
The above discussion has shown that the interaction between new formal rules and 
informal rules is very crucial to the process of institutional change. Perjorvich has 
encapsulated the relationship between new formal rules and prevailing informal rules as 
discussed above into what he calls the Interaction Thesis.860 According to Perjorvich, when a 
new formal rule is enacted, it creates new choices for human interactions or modifies the 
old choices thereby changing the opportunity set or the incentive structure within which 
exchange occurs861. The actual economic outcome of a new formal rule is, therefore 
dependent on how individuals perceive and subjectively evaluate new incentives862. This 
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means that the effect of a new formal rule on economic performance is the joint product of 
the interaction of the new rule with the prevailing informal rules and it is not possible to 
evaluate the impact of the new rule alone to the total result.863 
 
A new formal rule may be in conflict with old formal rules and/or prevailing informal rules. 
Given that, as stated above, formal rules are a policy variable, the rulers may enact 
secondary rules to reduce or eradicate the conflict between the new rule and the old formal 
rules but there is little, if any, that the authorities can do to avoid the conflict between the 
new formal rule and prevailing informal rules.864   The significance of prevailing informal 
rules is that they determine the transaction costs of integrating the new formal rule into the 
prevailing institutional structure.865  Specific transaction costs that derive from the reaction 
of the prevailing informal rules to the enactment of a new formal rule include the effect of 
the new rule on the predictability of behaviour, the risks associated with non-routine 
behaviours imposed by the new rule, the estrangement of those who are quicker to accept 
the new rule from friends and neighbours who are slower in abandoning old rules, sunken 
investments in the prevailing informal rules, and the resistance of the groups and coalitions 
that stand to gain from preserving the status quo.866 
 
According to Winiecki, interaction of formal rules and prevailing informal rules will produce 
two alternative outcomes.867 On the one hand, where new formal rules are largely in 
harmony with the prevailing informal rules, harmonious interaction will rapidly reduce 
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transaction costs by releasing resources from their present uses to those with greater 
potential for increases in wealth.868  On the other hand, if formal rules conflicts with 
informal rules, the resultant friction ties resources largely where they have already been 
employed and limits gains from expected reduction in transaction costs.869 This shows that 
discordance between formal rules and informal rules creates an economy with higher 
transaction costs than otherwise would have been the case.   
 
The interaction thesis therefore posits that: 
 
When the members of the community perceive the consequences of a new formal rule 
to be in conflict with their prevailing culture, the transaction costs of integrating that 
rule into the institutional framework will be high, consume more resources, and reduce 
the production of wealth. And when the members of the community perceive the 
consequences of a new formal rule to be in harmony with their prevailing culture, the 
transaction costs of integrating that rule into the institutional framework will be low, 
consume fewer resources, and increase the production of wealth.
870
 
    
According to Perjovich871 the conflict between the prevailing culture and new formal rule 
manifests in three major ways: 
 
(i)      Massive resistance to the new rule that result in an increase in illegal activities 
beyond government’s control.872 
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(ii)       Increased cost of enforcement of the new rule. Cost of enforcement will increase 
either because there will be more offenders or because people shall develop 
sophisticated ways of circumventing the new rule. 
 
(iii)       Need for secondary or follow up laws or regulations either to compromise or 
strengthen the scope or sting of the new rule. This is always a costly exercise at 
the expense of the tax payer. 
 
Understanding the effect of interaction between new formal rules and prevailing informal 
rules as discussed above is vital to the process of designing and implementing effective 
reform programmes.  
 
8.7 THE THEORY OF EFFICIENCY-FRIENDLY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Using insights gleaned from the relationship and interaction between formal rules and 
informal rules as discussed above, Perjovich873 has put together a theory of efficiency – 
friendly institutional change within the framework of tradition, which may be used as a tool 
for the implementation of efficiency-friendly institutional change.  According to Perjovich, 
the theory has both a positive component and a normative component. The positive 
component is that the process of institutional change should be consistent with economic 
efficiency, economic efficiency being the process through which voluntary interactions are 
                                                                                                                                                        
872
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carried out leading to known results.874 The normative component of the theory is that the 
process of making rules should encourage voluntary choice of capitalism so that capitalism 
develops voluntarily and from within the community.875     
 
The concept of ‘efficiency-friendly institutional change’ is based on the understanding that, 
in a world of uncertainty and incomplete information we can never be sure whether an 
outcome of a new rule is efficient and therefore that any method of analysis of economic 
exchange can do no more than determine whether the incentive effects of new rules are 
expected to move scarce resources from lower to higher valued uses.876 As such a formal or 
informal rule would be regarded more efficient than another rule if it offers greater 
incentives for voluntary interactions than the other rule that provides weaker incentives for 
free exchange.877  
 
The theory of efficiency-friendly institutional change is said to be based on the interaction 
thesis discussed above, on two postulates, which are the rule of law and markets for 
institutions and on three building blocks namely, the agents of change, formal rules and 
informal rules.878 The theory states that: 
 
“The four basic institutions of capitalism embodied in the rule of law, namely, 
the law of contract, private property rights, a constitution and an independent 
judiciary, promote economic progress because of their incentive effects and the 
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efficiency of that economic progress depends on the interaction between 
formal and informal institutions.”
879
 
 
The rule of law is thus said to be the foundation from which capitalism has emerged and 
upon which it rests.880   According to Perjovich, private property rights and the law of 
contract generate efficiency friendly incentives that move resources to their highest-valued 
uses while an independent judiciary and constitution protect those incentives from decision 
makers in government, rent seeking coalitions and majority rule. The incentive effects of the 
rule of law include (i) reducing the transaction costs of identifying and exploiting all 
exchange opportunities i.e. allocative efficiency (ii) encouraging the acceptance of risks 
associated with creating new opportunities of exchange (entrepreneurship)  (iii) eliminating 
bias against decisions that have long-lived consequences and (iv) enhancing the adaptive 
behaviour.  
 
This entails that the involvement of government in the process of institutional change 
should be limited to the enactment of new formal rules that will promote rule of law as its 
incentive effects would reduce the cost for individuals, as agents of institutional change, 
who shall have freedom of choice to determine the direction of institutional change.881  
 
In terms of the second postulate of the theory, the market for institutions, it is stated that 
given that both formal and informal rules change, albeit slowly, with respect to informal 
rules, there is a market for institutions and what is important is to ensure that the market of 
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institutions that exists is economically efficient.882 A set of institutions will be regarded as 
more efficient if it offers greater incentives for new rules to emerge and reduces transaction 
costs of their voluntary acceptance than another set of institutions that offers weaker 
incentives.883  The efficiency of the market for institutions depends on the incentives of rule 
makers, the procedures for making rules and the constraints under which the rule makers 
operate.884  
 
With regards to the building blocks of the theory, agents as carriers of change contribute to 
efficiency friendly institutional change in that as more entrepreneurs operate in a 
competitive market they reach a point where prevailing formal rules are impeding further 
expansion of extent of their exchange resulting in high transaction costs.885  The 
entrepreneurs’ bid to reduce rising transaction costs shall create incentives to lobby for new 
rules that support available exchange opportunities and adjustments in formal rules that 
shall result from this process are likely to be efficiency-friendly.886 
 
With respect to formal rules as stated above, formal rules may be institutionalised customs 
or traditions or may be enacted in order to accommodate changes in the economic 
conditions of life or may be a result of top-down decision making process. According to 
efficiency-friendly theory of institutional change, formal rules arising from the first two 
sources are efficiency-friendly as they adjust rules ‘to the requirements of the game’ 
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whereas formal rules imposed from above force the game to adjust to new rules making its 
efficiency to be accidental or incidental and at best uncertain.887 
 
With regard to informal rules, it is said that changes in culture are efficiency-friendly 
because the carriers of change, who are the pathfinders, bear the cost of their attempts to 
change the margin of acceptable behaviour and at the same time capture the benefits as 
the margin of acceptable behaviour can only be changed when the benefits to the 
pathfinders are greater than the costs they have to bear like community’s resistance.888 
Because the changes in informal rules are always voluntary, they are efficiency-friendly.  
 
The above assertion however may not always be true as it is possible for a pathfinder to 
instigate an informal rule change that may turn out to be inefficient for example where the 
benefits are wholly appropriated to the pathfinder who may manage to lock out 
competitions.889  
 
Finally, as stated above the theory of efficient friendly institutional change hinges on the 
interaction thesis as discussed earlier in that the question whether a new formal rule is 
efficiency-friendly will in the end be answered by the overall effect of the interaction 
between the new rule and the prevailing informal rules which is itself dependent on the 
transaction costs involved in integrating the new rule in the social system.890 
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The theory of efficiency-friendly institutional change shows that both the “Law and 
Development movement” and “Washington Consensus” ideologies were correct in so far as 
they emphasised on the importance of the rule of law. However, both concepts came 
unstuck due to their failure to recognise the importance of agents of change and the 
consequences of the interaction between formal rules and informal rules. 
 
 We consider the theory of efficiency-friendly institutional change to be a helpful step in the 
right direction in the search for an appropriate theory of institutional change. However as 
Perjovich891 himself conceded, only more research would confirm whether the interaction 
thesis provides a good roadmap for such a theory.  
 
8.8 INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONDUCIVE TO EFFICIENT 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. 
 
Winiecki892 has also provided a guide on how efficient institutional change could be 
implemented despite the conflict between formal and informal rules. According to Winiecki 
major changes in formal rules may succeed even if they are relatively clashing with the 
existing informal rules as long as the new structure of incentives is strongly and positively 
influencing choices made by economic agents.893 Winiecki’s method is premised on the 
observation that there is a range of generalisable institutional characteristics that intervene 
in a more or less predictable way in the interaction between a new formal rule and 
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prevailing informal rules and create either hospitable or inhospitable environment in which 
formal rules are passed or implemented resulting in informal rules affecting positively or 
negatively the economic outcome of the new formal rules.894 These institutional 
characteristics are regarded as institutional variables the presence or absence of which 
would help explain and predict economic outcomes of the interaction between formal rules 
and informal rules in any given economy. This would mean that in order to achieve efficient 
economic outcomes, authorities simply need to ensure that institutional change is 
implemented within the environment created by institutions with efficiency enhancing 
characteristics.  
 
The institutional characteristics in question are mostly derived from a given government 
system as it is the system of government that usually determine the incentive structure 
under which decision makers operate and constraints on their opportunity to pursue their 
own interests, which in turn determine the perception of opportunity sets and trade-offs 
they face in the decision making process.895 The institutional characteristics selected by 
Winiecki are discussed below. 
 
8.8.1 Centralization/Decentralisation of power 
Winiecki notes that decentralisation of power has historically created a conducive 
environment for the emergence of incentive structure encouraging economic agents to 
strive for the betterment of their conditions and has in turn given rise to vibrant 
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economies.896 Political decentralisation may be territorial where the right to make rules is 
given to lower level political units or may be functional where the right to make rules 
concerning different functions or behaviours are given to different institutions.897 Political 
decentralisation is important in economic decision making because it provides ‘greater 
room for manoeuvre’898 to economic agents.  Specifically, territorial decentralisation offers 
local economic rules that are usually more suitable for the economic and social conditions of 
life in a given local environment and insulates local economic activities, conducted in 
accordance with such suitably adapted rules from the arbitrariness of central power.899 
Another significance of decentralisation is offered by Lavoie900 who noted in his study that 
decentralisation of decision making in capitalist market economy, dramatically reduced the 
costs of experimenting as it was only experimenters and perhaps their relatives who 
suffered in case of failure.  
 
According to Winecki, therefore, the greater the level of decentralisation, the greater the 
probability that formal rules aimed at improving incentive structure to create wealth will 
encounter less friction in interaction with informal rules.901  
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8.8.2 Discretion/Interaction in Formal Rule-making 
Freedom of economic agents to voluntarily organise themselves and bargain with “the 
powers that be” is said to be crucial for the successful long run economic performance.902 
Bargaining during rule-making produces rules that are more conducive to the creation of 
wealth than to redistribution which is associated with rent-seeking. This is so because 
wherever potentially affected parties are able to interact with the decision maker and wield 
at least some power to wring concessions, there will be mutually acceptable rules and the 
probability that a formal rule made in such way will last and realise its full potential will be 
greatly strengthened.903 Further, informal rules will accommodate more easily to formal 
rules because active participation in the process of rule-making reshapes the old rules and 
shapes the new conventions in a given social setting.904 This may therefore mean that the 
more interaction there is between the ruler and the affected parties, the greater the 
potential for successful restructuring of incentives in the direction of wealth creation rather 
than redistribution.905 
 
8.8.3 Degree of Regulation vs. Degree of Economic Freedom 
The degree of economic freedom, that is, the degree of freedom of economic agents to 
eliminate existing errors and to pursue new trials to improve performance determines the 
competitiveness of markets.906 On the other hand, regulation constrain economic actors as 
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to what, when, where as well as how and from what they should produce.907 It follows that 
in overregulated markets, freedom to begin new trials and eliminate revealed errors is 
severely constrained. On the contrary in an environment where both formal and informal 
rules allow more economic freedom there would be less friction between the formal rules 
and informal rules as customs and other social conventions would not be expected to 
congeal because ongoing trials and errors would instil enough adaptability into the 
economy. Thus a sufficient degree of economic freedom shall breed adaptive efficiency.  
 
8.8.4 Existence/Non-existence of competitive pressures upon rulers to follow 
arrangements successful elsewhere. 
Existence and recognition of institutional competition by rulers of a given society will 
orchestrate imitation of technical, organizational and social innovations taking place in 
outside centres of political power. One way of initiating competitive pressures is said to be 
some regional political set-up where emulation of the more successful presses resistant 
rulers to accept solutions that would help them increase their country’s economic pie.908 
Winiecki cites the economic region in East and South East Asia as an example of a region 
where emulation of each other’s successes resulted in a progressively freer economic 
landscape throughout the region.909 By the same token, this offers an explanation why 
regimes like Communist China and Iran sought to cut their population from the international 
market place of ideas. 
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8.8.5 The Level of Corruption 
Corruption may exist as an informal rule in its own right but in some instances may exist as 
response to a conflict between a new formal rule and other informal rules. Where 
corruption exist as an informal rule, it may weaken or distort new formal rules by increasing 
transaction costs or cause transaction costs to decrease by much less than expected from 
the original restructuring of the property rights.910 It can therefore be concluded that the 
more corruption is already rooted in a given economy, the greater will be the conflict 
between formal rules and informal rules and therefore the greater the differential between 
the potential and actual effects of the wealth creation enhancing formal rules.911  
 
8.8.6 Belief System 
Belief system is considered as an institutional variable because systemic differences are 
observed between ethnic and other groups in their ability to better their living conditions 
and such differences are considered to emanate from divergent philosophies, worldviews, 
religious or ideological beliefs.912 Winiecki counsels that as part of the process of 
institutional change, an effort should be undertaken to evaluate what the actual belief 
system is and how it fits into the continuum along the collectivists/individualist lines and 
how it compares with a reference country or a group of countries.913 
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The foregoing approaches and theories are very helpful in the search for an effective theory 
for institutional change and all of them come very close to the approach that North is 
advocating. The only shortfall is their lack of emphasis on the significance of the mental 
construct of the institutional entrepreneurs which determine the extent, speed and 
direction of institutional change. Further some of these theories are premised on the neo-
classical presumptions of symmetric information and rational thinking individuals. It is for 
this reason that we should revert to North’s approach to institutional change and determine 
how his approach would help tie any loose ends in the above theories. 
 
8.9 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.  
In order to give some practical perspective of the theories or approaches to institutional 
change, discussed above, we shall look at some relevant practical examples of institutional 
change that, we consider aptly demonstrate the theoretical credibility of the said 
approaches. Specifically, these examples show that positive interaction between formal and 
informal institutions in a given society will result in economic development and vice versa. 
They also show economic development is “path dependent” on the institutional structure of 
a particular society.  
 
8.9.1 Chinese Capital Market Development Reform 
China adopted a very unique model of capital market development. When the Chinese 
authorities wanted to establish their modern day stock market, they were faced with the 
same problem faced by many developing economies seeking to establish capital markets 
  
- 307 - 
 
namely lack of effective legal and market governance structures.914 Despite this weakness 
however China was able to establish a relatively strong capital market in short order. Pistor 
and Xu915 argue that China managed to achieve rapid capital market development because it 
substituted legal governance with administrative governance of capital markets.  It is 
believed that ‘pre-existing modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that 
mitigated information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-IPO phase.’916 The Chinese 
authorities employed two unique institutions in order to kick start their stock exchanges. 
These were the quota system used for equity share issuance and the Special Treatment (ST) 
system which was used in relation to underperforming issuers. It is believed that these 
administrative governance structures compensated for corporate governance which was 
practically non-existent917. Caragliano notes that: 
 
“During the early years of China’s experiment with stock markets, ... these 
institutions filled a void and jump-started the markets in a way that newly 
introduced laws (mandatory disclosure and criminal and civil liability) and 
immature institutions (courts, market regulators, and intermediaries) could 
not.”918 
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The quota system involved the People’s Bank of China (PBC) establishing a certain amount 
of shares that firms would be allowed to issue to the public each year. This was followed by 
a negotiation process between the provincial government and the provincial branch of the 
China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) on the size of the quota for the region. Once 
an agreement has been reached, the request, together with information about the 
companies selected by the province to go to the market were submitted to CSRC who 
decided over the allocation of quotas to different provinces and ministries on the basis of 
the information and with the quantity constraint established by PBC.919 After allocating the 
regional quotas, the selected companies were subjected to an individual approval process. 
This involved vetting applicants for compliance with the formal merits and disclosure 
requirements prescribed within relevant statutes and regulations.920 Pistor and Xu observes 
that the quota system offered incentives to local owners of companies to provide accurate 
information about their firms (i) by offering carrots to regional governors in the form of 
future quotas and (ii) by threatening with sticks in the form of delisting firms and forced bail 
outs by the region in the case of underperformance.921   
 
On the other hand, the ST system was a delisting mechanism which involved labelling a 
listed company as an ST firm if it experienced one of the following:922 (1) negative net profits 
(loses) for two consecutive fiscal years; (2) the shareholders’ equity is lower than the 
registered capital (the par value of the shares); (3) negative opinions or inability to issue 
opinions by the firm’s auditors on its financial soundness; (4) a company’s financial 
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condition is considered abnormal by the stock exchanges or CSRC. The ST designation came 
with serious consequences for the designated firm. Firstly, the company’s interim report 
would be audited, and daily share price fluctuations would be limited to 5 percent to 
prevent market manipulation and secondly, if an ST company continued to incur losses for 
more than one year, it would be delisted.923 
 
Like the quota system, the ST system created a number of incentives that promoted 
information sharing and effective corporate governance of listed companies post IPO stage. 
For instance, once a company is labelled as an ST firm, it would usually face pressure from 
both its insiders and outsiders with an aim to pull the firm’s business operations and 
performance back onto the right track as soon as possible.924 Also, since regional quota 
allocations of IPO listings was dependent on the economic performance of a particular 
region including performance of individual listed companies, designation of ST status on a 
firm within a particular region and the possibility of its eventual delisting, had adverse effect 
on the region’s listing opportunities that it could obtain from the central government.925 
Finally, the ST designation incentivised the central regulatory authorities (CSRC) to 
effectively regulate the affected firms. It is noted that ‘by announcing a company with 
continuous unsatisfactory performance as an ST firm, the central regulatory authorities put 
themselves under public scrutiny for the fulfilment of their promise to delist a company 
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once the company’s operational performance keeps deteriorating.’926 This helped to make 
the delisting threat credible. 
 
The features of these two systems that make them compatible with the theory of 
institutional change as discussed above include the following: 
 
(i)       The two institutions were built on the basic premise of decentralisation of power. 
The central government delegated the task of selecting companies to go on the 
market to regional governments. According to the theory of institutional change 
decentralised decision making results in efficiency friendly institutional 
change.927 
 
(ii)      The two systems also offered the market players an opportunity to participate in 
key decision making and to bargain with authorities on matters concerning the 
market. This according to Winiecki is another key institutional characteristic that 
would guarantee effective restructuring of incentives.928  
 
(iii)       Competition among local leaders created significant pressure on the leaders to 
imitate technical and organisational know-how with regard to management and 
restructuring of their companies. 
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(iv)      By forcing poorly performing companies to be delisted from the market, the ST 
system ensured that ‘maladapted parts’ of market institutional structure were 
weeded off.929 
 
(v)      As stated above, the mechanics of both the quota system and the ST system 
created incentives to local corporate owners that encouraged disclosure of 
information both before and after IPO stage.  
 
8.9.2 The Integration of Traditional and British Governance Models in Botswana 
In their article, The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and Commitments to 
Legality in Former British Colonies,930 Daniels, Trebilcock and Carson, analyses the process of 
institutional building in selected British colonies931 specifically looking at how the degree of 
representation afforded to the native population in national legislative bodies and the 
extent to which indigenous and British dispute resolution systems were integrated to allow 
for a localized common law jurisprudence to develop.932 We find the observations of this 
study particularly relevant to this work especially with regard to the process of institutional 
change. We have selected Botswana because it is one of the countries in the SADC region 
and has a vibrant capital market compared to the rest of the countries in the region with the 
exception of South Africa. The history of Botswana’s institutional structure offers a good 
example of the process of efficient institutional change as discussed above.   
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Daniel's et al note that the colonial presence in Botswana was minimal as it was held as a 
protectorate rather than a colony until the years leading up to its independence. The British 
authorities implemented a cooperative indirect rule system which was administered 
through pre-existing indigenous institutions by according free rein to indigenous authorities, 
allowing them to organise and govern their communities as desired.933 As a result, for the 
majority of the colonial period, Tswana indigenous leaders retained significant autonomy, 
governing through largely traditional structures with enduring popular legitimacy.  
 
It is noted that Tswana lawmaking arrangements were broadly compatible with British rule 
of law values as they emphasised on public discussion and consultation.934 Under this 
arrangement each tribe was headed by a hereditary chief assisted by a Kglota, which was an 
assembly of tribesmen who would advise and inform the chief’s decisions. The opinions of 
the members of the Kglota carried weight and although the chiefs were not compelled to 
accept the advice given to them by their tribe, they usually did because individuals or groups 
who were not satisfied with their leader would vote with their feet by leaving the tribe and 
forming another of their own.935 
 
The Tswana lawmaking process was also broadly democratic in nature as the chief generally 
announced laws in public where all men had the right to speak.936  Further, the chief was 
not above the law and could even be tried in the Kglota if his subjects felt that he had 
abused his powers. This provided checks on executive power and promoted both the voice 
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and exit options for individuals who thought their leaders were protecting their interests 
ineffectively.937 
 
Because of the compatibility of the Tswana lawmaking process with British political values 
colonial authorities avoided legislating for the Botswana population, allowing the traditional 
chiefs to make, administer and enforce the laws.938  And when British administration did 
legislate, the chiefs often managed to secure an active dialogue with the administration in 
order to ensure that laws affecting the tribes would not depart radically from tradition.939 
 
As a result of the British colonial approach in Botswana, it is observed that the country has 
never suffered a period of authoritarian rule and has retained without interruption since 
independence a Westminster-style Parliament complete with checks and balances and a 
broad political base.940 Thus by respecting the colony’s traditional governance structures 
while still ensuring popular representation, the British were able to guarantee that the 
governing mechanisms in place at independence had legitimate roots in society.941 
 
The history of institutional development in Botswana demonstrate North’s approach to 
institutional development in that informal (indigenous) institutions were respected and 
retained and any new formal institutions that were subsequently introduced were not 
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imposed on the people of Botswana but allowed for consultation and dialogue with the local 
authorities.  
 
8.9.3 Path Dependence: The Divided Existence of the Population of the City of 
Nogales 
In their recent book, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty,942 
Acemoglu and Robinson, describe the diametrically opposite life experiences of the people 
of the city of Nogales that is situate along the border of United States of America and 
Mexico. The authors observes that in the American part of the city, Nogales Arizona, 
average household income is about $30,000 a year, most teenagers are in school and the 
majority of the adults are high school graduates. The population is relatively healthy with 
high life expectancy of around 65. The government provides electricity, telephones, sewage 
system, public health and law and order. The people of this part of the city can go about 
their daily activities without fear for life or safety. They are not constantly afraid of theft, 
expropriation, or other things that might jeopardize their investments in their businesses 
and houses. And most importantly, the people of Nogales, Arizona can vote to replace their 
mayor, congressmen and senators as well as vote in the presidential elections to determine 
the president of the country.943 
 
In contrast, life on the Mexican side of the city is completely different to that experienced 
by their American counterparts. The average household income of residents of Nogales, 
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Sonora, is about one-third that of Nogales, Arizona.944 Many teenagers are not in school and 
most adults in Nogales, Sonora do not have high school degree. There is high infant 
mortality rate and poor public health conditions.945 Law and order is in worse condition and 
high crime rate makes opening a business a risky activity because apart from risking 
robbery, getting all the permission will require greasing different palms which is not an easy 
endeavour.946 Further, democracy is a very recent experience for the residents of Nogales 
Sonora and as a result they live with politicians’ corruption and ineptitude every day.947 
 
The two halves of the city of Nogales, despite having the same geography and exposed to 
the same environment are this different simply because they lie on different sides of the 
border and are exposed to different institutional infrastructures.948 Inhabitants of Nogales 
Arizona have access to the economic institutions of the United States, which enable them to 
choose their occupations freely, acquire schooling and skills and encourage their employers 
to invest in the best technology resulting in higher wages for them.949 Further, the American 
residents of the city have access to political institutions that allow them to take part in the 
democratic process, to elect their representatives and replace them if they misbehave.950 
Consequently, politicians provide the basic services that the citizens demand. On the other 
hand the residents of Nogales Sonora live in a different world shaped by different 
institutions. The different institutions create very different incentives for the inhabitants of 
the two sides of the city and for the entrepreneurs and businesses willing to invest there. It 
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is these incentives created by the different institutions of the two halves of the city and the 
countries in which they are situated that give rise to differences in economic prosperity on 
the two sides of the border.951 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson observes that the institutional structure of the United States and 
Mexico are so different because of the way two countries were formed during the colonial 
period, which resulted in an institutional divergence with implications lasting into the 
present day. The political elites in Mexico deliberately kept institutions that would enrich 
them further at the expense of economic development of the country and any attempt to 
change such institutions to allow equal and fair distribution of wealth in the country would 
be opposed by the powerful politicians and businessmen. Consequently institutional reform 
in Mexico did not mean uprooting the colonial institutions and replacing them with 
institutions similar to those in United States. Rather their reform has been ‘path-dependent 
change leading only to the next stage of the institutions that had already made much of 
Latin America poor and unequal.’952    
  
8.10 THEORY OF LEGAL REFORMS. 
Finally in a bid to demonstrate the relevance of the above dynamics of institutional change 
to the process of legal reform we shall look at what has been referred to as the ‘theory of 
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legal reform’. In their article, Towards a theory of Legal Reform,953  Hay et al, looked at how 
legal rules in what they called a ‘dysfunctional legal system’ like Russia would be reformed 
in order to make private agents rely on the legal system rather than alternative systems like 
the mafia in structuring their transactions. Hay et al, identified some characteristics of a 
dysfunctional legal system that make people not to use the legal system to resolve disputes. 
While these characteristics were drawn from the Russian legal system they can be 
generalised to most legal systems in developing countries and therefore useful in this study.  
 
The first characteristic identified by Hay et al, is that private parties find the formal legal 
system expensive compared to other alternative methods of dispute resolution.954 This may 
be the case because of highly inflated court fees or because judges are corrupt such that 
parties have to bribe a judge in order to get a good outcome.955 Sometimes courts may be 
politicised so that they favour the political elite or high ranking government officials or may 
be so inefficient that it takes years to get a dispute resolved and when that happens the 
value of the collectable may have fallen to zero in real terms.956 In other instances courts 
may be unpredictable because they refuse to take some cases or because their decisions are 
difficult to forecast from the law or because judges are uninformed and incompetent. 
 
Another reason, identified by Hay et al, why parties shun away from the legal system is the 
existence of bad laws on the books.957 An example would be laws that contradict standard 
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business practice and common sense making it difficult for courts to reach a decision.958 It is 
observed that if laws on the books are so bad that courts cannot reach a decision then there 
would be no point for parties to use the court. Another problem with the available laws 
would be lack of clarity or specificity of the law making it difficult for courts to verify 
whether a violation has taken place. Hay et al cites Russian securities law which does not 
specify who is liable when a buyer of securities discovers that these securities have been 
previously stolen.959  It is observed that in well-functioning legal systems a great deal more 
information is verifiable in court and the body of law and precedent is much more extensive 
thereby providing courts with much more guidance on what to do.960  
 
Another prevalent problem in dysfunctional legal systems is lack of enforcement of court 
decisions by the coercive force of the state.961 Where parties have to enforce court 
decisions on their own they will usually choose alternative methods and in case of Russia 
parties resort to the mafia system.  
 
As stated above although the above problems were identified in the context of the Russian 
legal system, we find them to be of general application to legal systems in most, if not all, 
developing countries. Identification of problems like these would help reformers to devise 
targeted legal reforms aimed at reducing or eliminating all together the structural hurdles 
that make parties not to use the legal system. There is likely to be variations in different 
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countries but by using this methodology the process of legal reform would be guaranteed a 
fair chance of success.  
 
Hay et al suggests that any new laws that may be introduced by way of legal reform should 
take the following three effects. Firstly they should reverse the effects of the bad laws that 
keep private parties away from using the legal system more effectively.962 They observe that 
even the repeal of few bad rules on the margin brings more activity in the legal system.963  
Secondly, the new rules should facilitate and support the existing contractual arrangements 
and market transactions964. One way of doing this is to ensure that the new rules legalise 
already existing market transactions previously not recognised by the law.965 This would 
enable parties to rely on the legal system to resolve disputes in their already on-going 
activities. On the other hand if the new rules make existing business practices more difficult 
or out rightly outlaw them, parties will resort to other non legal alternatives to enforce the 
existing practices.966 Finally, the new rules should enable very imperfect courts to verify 
violations and correct wrongs.967 In this regard bright line rules should be used rather than 
vague rules which in most cases give the court too much discretion. Also since in most 
developing countries judges are often corrupt and/or incompetent; the vague rules may 
either not be used at all or may be abused by the courts. Bright-line rules would also help 
with the enforcement of the rules. It is observed that enforceable rules even with poorly run 
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courts serve the critical function of providing the threat points in private negotiations.968 
Thus introduction of a simple legal system that addresses the most egregious yet still 
verifiable cases of contract violation can do a great deal in facilitating private contract 
enforcement thereby reinforcing public contract enforcement.969 
 
According to Hay et al therefore, to get the rule of law in the intermediate term, the 
reforming country should begin with rules that are suitable to both private agents and 
courts and then allow the system to develop as the needs of private agents and the 
capabilities of the courts develop over time. As laws are used more, courts will begin to gain 
credibility for dispute resolution.970 They will also become more predictable as a body of 
precedents develop and private parties will begin to anticipate more clearly how courts 
make decision and eventually laws will converge to those of developed market economies 
although the initial system is more primitive.971 
 
8.11 CONCLUSION  
The foregoing shows that entrepreneurs or decision makers in organizations are the agents 
of change and that their subjective perceptions or mental models determine the choices 
they make. The sources of change are the opportunities or incentives perceived by 
entrepreneurs arising from either external changes in the environment or the acquisition of 
learning and skills and their incorporation in their mental constructs. One of such external 
changes is change in relative prices. Institutional change will occur through decision making 
                                                 
968
 Jonathan Hay, ‘Law without Enforcement: The Case of Russia, Mimeo (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA) 
quoted in Hay et al supra note 953  at p. 566. 
969
 Hay et al supra note 953 p. 566. 
970
 Ibid at p. 567 
971
 Ibid. 
  
- 321 - 
 
processes by entrepreneurs as well as the acquisition of knowledge and skills, which will 
lead to the construction of new mental models by entrepreneurs through which they will 
decipher the environment and in turn, the new models will alter perceived relative prices of 
potential choices. The process of institutional change will however usually be ‘path 
dependant’ as it is contingent on ‘cultural heritage’ of the society. This explains why similar 
changes to formal rules introduced in different countries produce different outcomes.   
 
While institutional change shall result from changes in formal and informal rules, it is the 
interaction between formal and informal rules that determines the efficiency of a particular 
institutional change. Efficiency-friendly institutional change shall be achieved by the 
introduction of new formal rules that are broadly in harmony with prevailing informal rules 
as this shall reduce transaction costs of integrating the new rule into the existing 
institutional framework. Harmonious integration between formal and informal rules is likely 
to result from, inter alia, decentralisation of power, participatory rule-making, sufficient 
degree of economic freedom and some level of pressure on authorities to learn from their 
neighbours.  
 
Since formal rules cannot, by themselves, change informal rules, the involvement of 
government in the process of institutional change should be limited to the enactment of 
new formal rules that will promote rule of law, which will in turn create an incentive 
structure that will reduce the cost to entrepreneurs and provide to them freedom of choice 
to determine the direction of institutional change.  
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The validity of North’s framework to institutional change is reflected in a number of 
practical institutional development processes including the legal reforms in Russia, the 
Quota system and the special treatment system employed by the Chinese authorities as part 
of their capital market reform, the development of legal system in Botswana and the 
parallel institutional development of the American and Mexican sides of the city of Nogales. 
 
The foregoing therefore provides the theoretical framework within which any institutional 
and legal reforms for purposes of capital market development ought to take place. The final 
chapter below seeks to set out some of the possible ways of implementing such reforms. 
However, as we sated before, the jury is still out on the most appropriate theory of 
institutional change and what we are attempting to do in this work is to suggest possible 
building blocks for such a theory in relation to capital market development in developing 
countries.   
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9 CHAPTER NINE: POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORTH’S 
FRAMEWORK THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORM 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
Given that North’s framework for institutional change, as discussed above, is a Meta theory, 
it is important that we look at how this framework would be implemented at practical level 
and in our case, through institutional and legal reform in order to orchestrate capital market 
development in developing market economies, like those in the SADC region. Any such 
reform process would involve changes of both government policies and legal rules. In this 
chapter therefore we shall look at different policy options that may form and inform any 
such reform agenda within the tenets of North’s framework. 
 
North emphasises the importance of specific institutional and social histories. Economic 
actors behave according to belief systems that have been formed by past experience. These 
belief systems are perpetuated by informal institutions. What we need is an analysis and 
methodology for taking these factors into account. North tells us why we cannot ignore the 
institutional structures, but is weaker on how we take them into account. Discussed below 
are some suggested methodologies that may be employed by policy makers in their bid to 
reform capital market institutional structures in their respective countries and/or economic 
regions. 
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9.2  POLICY REFORM WITHIN NORTH’S FRAMEWORK 
Industrial policy is one of the readily available levers of change that government can use in 
order to bring about institutional change. Policy is part of the formal institutions that can be 
changed at will. However as discussed above, care must always be exercised when seeking 
to change formal institutions so as to ensure that any such changes receive local legitimacy 
and recognition.  
 
Rodrik in his book, One Economics Many Recipes: Globalisation, Institutions and Economic 
Growth,972 offers a very good guide to the policy reform process that is capable of bearing 
fruit.  Rodrik posits that appropriate growth policies are invariably context-specific not 
because economics works differently in different settings but because the ‘environments’ in 
which households, firms, and investors operate differ in terms of opportunities and 
constraints they present.973 As such, while learning from other countries is useful, 
‘straightforward borrowing or rejection of policies without a full understanding of the 
context that enabled them to be successful or led them to be failures is a recipe for 
disaster.’974  
 
Rodrik further observes that many policy advisors look at economic problems exclusively 
from the perspective of their own area of speciality and as a result governments are 
presented with a long list of institutional reforms by different advisors. However, since 
governments are constrained by limits on their financial, administrative, human and political 
                                                 
972
 Dani Rodrik, One Economics Many Recipes: Globalisation, Institutions, and Economic Growth, (Princetown 
University Press, Oxford, 2007). 
973
 Ibid, p 4. 
974
 Ibid, p 5. 
  
- 325 - 
 
resources, implementation of such reforms proves difficult.975  Consequently, Rodrik has 
developed a three step approach to policy reform comprising (i) Growth Diagnostics (ii) 
Policy design and (iii) Institutionalising reform.  
 
Under the first step of growth diagnostics, Rodrik says that given the administrative and 
political limitations that governments face, it is imperative that they should know and make 
choices on which constraints on economic growth to attack first and what kind of reform 
they need to spend their political capital on. A reform agenda should therefore not take the 
form of a laundry list but rather should involve a diagnostic exercise that seeks to identify 
‘priorities based on local realities.’976   This entails that the first step in any reform process, 
should be to undertake a diagnostic analysis of the economic structure of the country in 
question to figure out where the most binding constraints on growth lie.977 This will help 
finding areas of reform that will yield greatest return. According to Rodrik, in developing 
countries, economic activity is usually constrained by at least one of the three factors (i) 
high cost of financing economic activities (ii) low economic (social) returns to economic 
activity and (iii) low private appropriability of the social returns. The first step in the 
diagnostic analysis should therefore be to find out which of these conditions more 
accurately characterises the economy in question. Once this analysis is put in motion further 
diagnostic signals will be identified that will help pining down the most binding constraints 
that need to be targeted first in the reform process. In the context of North’s framework, 
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this would essentially involve a detailed assessment binding informal institutions and 
underlying belief systems with some capability of interacting negatively with the proposed 
market reforms. 
 
The second step is policy design. The aim of this step is to provide an appropriate policy 
response to key problems that have been identified following the diagnostic analysis in step 
1. This process involves focusing on the market failures and distortions associated with 
identified binding constraints and target the response as closely as possible at the source of 
the distortion.978   It is also noted that in order to come up with best policy, policy designers 
need not concentrate on the ‘first-best’ responses to the identified constraints because 
usually they would be operating in a second-best environment due to other distortions or 
administrative and political constraints and as such first-best solutions are likely to produce 
other unforeseen complications and unexpected consequences.979 Experiences of different 
countries show that successful policy reform emanated not from first best responses but 
rather from second best recommendations.980 This entails that policy framers should not be 
quick to jump on what appear to be the first-best solutions to the identified problems 
because effective reform can be achieved in a variety of ways that usually take 
unconventional forms. This echoes North’s observation of path dependent nature of 
institutional change. What may be best policy in one country may be ineffective in another 
due to existing informal institutions and underlying belief systems. It is therefore important 
to be innovative in policy design and to look for home grown solutions and be prepared to 
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experiment.981  This will ensure that reform is appropriately tailored to the existing informal 
institutions as well as the underlying belief system. 
 
Finally, the last step involves institutionalising reform. It is observed that the identity of the 
binding constraint will change over time as the country’s economy grows. Thus while the 
poor quality of the judiciary may not be a binding constraint at a time of economic 
underdevelopment, legal and judicial shortcomings are likely to become a constraint when 
the economy develops and becomes more sophisticated. Similarly poor financial regulation 
may not be an issue while the financial markets are still underdeveloped but will pose real 
problems when the economy begins to boom.982   This dynamic nature of institutional 
change is at the centre of North’s framework, which is premised on the fact that we live in a 
non-ergodic world which is constantly changing and producing novel problems. According to 
North, the success of a given society depends on whether its institutional entrepreneurs 
have the necessary cultural heritage or belief system to deal with such problems and ‘make 
responses that make their environment predictable.’983  
 
Consequently, it is important to put in place strategies that will sustain development as the 
policies are deployed and begin to work. Policies must therefore ensure that the 
momentum is maintained with ongoing diversification into new areas of economic 
activity.984 The process of reform should, thus, be as extensive as possible so that it includes 
institutions that would support and sustain economic growth. For instance policy reform 
should aim at strengthening of domestic institutions of conflict management. This will 
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require strengthening the rule of law, solidifying democratic institutions, establishing 
participatory mechanisms and erecting social safety nets.985 This will provide economic 
growth with the necessary resilience and tenacity against external shocks like terms of trade 
decline or reversals in capital flows.986 
 
The above approach would be very useful to the process of capital market development 
reform in developing countries. It is indeed the case that different analysts have provided 
different policy prescriptions to these countries aimed at igniting growth of capital market 
activities. There is as such no single agreed policy response to the malaise of capital markets 
in developing countries including in the SADC region. However, a more targeted approach 
would be most appropriate and effective. What each country needs to do is to carry out a 
detailed diagnostic analysis to figure out which of the constraints, as we have outlined in 
chapter 5 above, presents the most binding constraints to capital market development in 
their country. This would help to innovatively think of the best policy response that would 
accurately target the constraint/s identified. This would need to be underpinned by the 
necessary institutions that would help sustain the resultant market growth. 
 
9.3   SUGGESTED POLICITY PRIORITIES FOR THE SADC REGION 
 
In light of the Rhodrik’s theory of policy reform as discussed above, policy makers in the 
SADC region will need to concentrate on the most binding constraints to capital market 
development from Black’s list of preconditions for strong capital markets as discussed in 
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chapter 6 above. We recommend the following as a priority list of capital market reform 
areas in the SADC region. 
 
9.3.1 Enforcement Institutions 
As discussed above, local enforcement of rules is one of the most crucial ingredients of 
strong capital markets. Strong enforcement regime instils confidence in prospective 
investors that they would be in a position to recover the value of their investment in the 
event of wrongful appropriation of the same by managers.   As discussed in chapter 7 
above, most countries in SADC region are characterised by weak enforcement regimes and 
as a result, investors are scared away from their respective capital markets. Policy makers 
should therefore, first and foremost, concentrate on establishing and strengthening local 
enforcement agencies, including investigators, prosecutors and the judiciary.   
  
9.3.2 Market Transparency 
 
Transparent markets attract both issuers and investors. As discussed above, where 
investors do not have full information about securities being offered on the market, they 
will discount the prices they are willing to offer for the securities. This would lead to a 
lemon market which would drive honest issuers and investors away due to undervalued 
securities circulating on the market. Policy makers in the SADC countries therefore will be 
well advised to put in place robust information disclosure rules, not only at the IPO stage 
but throughout the trading life of any exchange traded securities.  
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9.3.3 Liability for Insider dealing and market abuse 
 
The third priority area for policy makers in the SADC countries would be putting in place 
rules that would attach sufficient liability to market players engaging in insider dealing and 
market abuse. Again such liability regimes would serve to assure investors that they would 
have sufficient recourse in the event of their investment being misappropriated. Currently, 
the anti-insider dealing and market abuse regimes in most SADC countries are not robust 
enough. Therefore policies that would sufficiently deal with this issue need to be 
prioritised. 
 
9.3.4 Investor Education. 
 
Finally investor education needs to be prioritised in SADC region in order to develop its 
capital markets. As discussed in the previous chapters, lack of knowledge of capital 
markets as alternative investment platform has resulted in thin markets because only a 
small proportion of a given country’s population participate in the market. The majority of 
the people are yet to be convinced that they can secure better returns on their capital if 
they invest on the capital market instead of depositing their money in the bank. 
Converting many people to capital market investment would result in a broader base of 
investors and this would, in turn, give rise to liquid markets that would appeal to more 
investors. Policy makers should therefore develop education programs to reach out to the 
masses in order to increase the number of market participants.  
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9.4 LEGAL REFORM FOR CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Apart from policy reform, North’s framework will also need to be reflected in legal reform. 
This will be more relevant with regards to reforming regulatory regimes for capital markets 
in developing countries.  The exact nature and content of capital market regulatory reforms 
has attracted a lot of debate and there is yet to be a convergence of views on optimal policy 
initiatives with regard to capital market development. Three distinct strands of opinions on 
optimal capital market regulatory arrangements can be identified from the debate so far.987   
 
The first school of thought holds that the most effective government policy is to leave 
securities markets unregulated.988 This view is premised on the belief that issuers of 
securities will have sufficient incentive to disclose all available information to obtain higher 
prices as failure to disclose would cause investors to assume the worst.989  Credibility of 
such voluntary disclosures would be ensured through other mechanisms like reputational, 
legal, and contractual penalties for misreporting as well as through auditors and 
underwriters who could credibly certify the quality of the securities being offered to 
safeguard their reputation and avoid liability under contract or tort law.990 Also, private 
stock exchanges would help in this regard by mandating optimal disclosure and monitor 
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compliance by listed firms to facilitate trading.991 According to the proponents of 
unregulated market, therefore, these market and legal mechanisms would be sufficient for 
securities markets to prosper.992   
 
The second school of thought advocates active regulation of capital markets putting 
emphasis on the need for government to ‘standardize the private contracting framework to 
improve market discipline and private litigation.’993 According to this hypothesis, in the 
absence of such standardization, litigation will be governed by general contract and tort law, 
with grave uncertainty about outcomes because such matters as intent and negligence need 
to be sorted out in court through the medium of judges.994  Such standardization would be 
in a form of a law mandating disclosure of particular information, such as profitability and 
ownership structure, in the prospectus. Where such rules are complied with they would 
make it easier for investors to value companies and therefore more willing to invest and 
where they are breached, they would create a prima facie liability of issuers or 
intermediaries.995 Another aspect of the standardization would be rules specifying the 
liability standards facing issuers and intermediaries when investors seek to recover damages 
from ‘companies that follow affirmative disclosure rules but fail to reveal potentially 
material information.’996 This would significantly reduce the uncertainties and the costs of 
private litigation, in turn benefiting markets.997 
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The final hypothesis is also premised on the ‘law matters’ point of view arguing that 
reputations and contract and tort law are insufficient to keep issuers from cheating 
investors because the payoff from cheating is too high and private tort and contract 
litigation is too expensive and unpredictable to serve as a deterrent.998 However, unlike the 
second hypothesis that argues that the optimal government policy response would be to 
standardise disclosure of information and issuers’ liability, this hypothesis advocates 
government intervention by way of public enforcement of securities laws. 
 
Proponents of this hypothesis argue that even in the presence of a securities law that 
specifies both the disclosure obligations of various parties and liability standards, private 
enforcement incentives are often insufficient to elicit honesty from issuers.999 As such, a 
public enforcer with the capacity to intervene ex ante, by clarifying legal obligations, or ex 
post, by imposing its own penalties or bringing lawsuits, would be needed to support the 
market.1000 In order for public enforcement to work the enforcer must be independent and 
focused so that it can regulate markets free from political interference1001. The public 
enforcer can introduce regulations of market participants and impose sanctions. In this way 
the public enforcer will be in a position to secure information from issuers and market 
participants through subpoena, discovery, or other means more effectively than private 
plaintiffs.1002 According to this view therefore, the optimal government policy for purposes 
of developing capital markets would be to strength its public enforcement capability.   
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In their research, Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer1003, sought to explore the level of 
impact on the development of capital market of standardization of disclosure rules as well 
as liability of issuers and intermediaries and public enforcement of market regulation.  The 
findings of this research confirmed the ‘law matters’ hypothesis concluding that financial 
markets would not prosper if left to market forces alone.1004 With regards to what should be 
the main emphasis of government intervention, Laporta et al concluded that securities laws 
matter because they facilitate private contracting rather than provide for public regulatory 
enforcement. In their findings, aspects of public enforcement, like having an independent 
and/or focused regulator or criminal sanctions, do not matter. On the other hand they did 
find that both extensive disclosure requirements and standards of liability facilitating 
investor recovery of losses were associated with larger stock markets. 
 
As stated before, there is still no universal agreement on which of these and other 
competing points of view with regards to optimal capital market regulatory arrangement. 
This is more so in developing countries. The null hypothesis would clearly not be suitable to 
developing countries as it is premised on the assumption of the existence of legal 
mechanisms (rule of law) and market mechanisms that are either non-existent in these 
countries or in their infancy stage.  In any event the argument that specific capital market 
rules and regulations do not matter for purposes of capital market development would not 
fully conform to the North’s framework which clearly recognises the role and significance of 
formal rules. Further, the null hypothesis presupposes the existence of symmetric 
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information as well as the existence of rational market players, which are the key elements 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. As exposed by North, the market operates on 
asymmetric information and it is full of players who make irrational decisions depending on 
their mental constructs.   
 
With regard to the alternative hypotheses of facilitating private contracting by way of 
standardisation of disclosure requirements and liability of issuers and intermediaries and 
supplementation of private enforcement with a strong public enforcement regime, this 
again is dependent on the existing informal institutions as dictated by the underlying belief 
system of the market players. The existence of standard disclosure requirements or liability 
of issuers would be ineffective in the midst of corrupt issuers who can bribe their way out of 
such obligations or incompetent regulators or judges who are not able to effectively 
interpret such disclosure requirements or liability to ensure robust enforcement of the 
same.1005  
 
However, as a starting point, we would recommend parallel adoption and implementation 
of both approaches. The introduction of disclosure and liability standards would help to deal 
with uncertainty in the market and strong public enforcement would help to lend efficacy to 
the rules. Further both of the two approaches would be appropriate and relevant to capital 
markets in developing countries. Standardisation of disclosure requirements and liability of 
issuers and intermediaries would clarify legal obligations of market participants and the 
consequences of breach thereof. This would reduce opportunities for manipulation or 
deliberate misinterpretation of the principles of disclosure by self-interested issuers or 
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other intermediaries or unsophisticated or corrupt lawyers and judges.1006 Similarly public 
enforcement would bring about early intervention on noncompliance thereby saving parties 
from expensive litigation or whimsical determination of disputes by the courts. 
 
The foregoing chimes with the comparative case studies in chapter 7 above and the 
discussion of the analysis of Black’s preconditions in chapter 6, which clearly shows that all 
successful regulatory structures in existence abjure the first option and have laws that 
support private enforcement through disclosure and publicity and give enforcement powers 
to State institutions. In all the three case studies considered in chapter 7 above, there are 
statutory provisions on disclosure requirements and liability of issuers bolstered by public 
enforcement of the same. However, as it was observed, the existence of disclosure and 
liability standards as well as public enforcement regimes in South Africa and Malawi are less 
effective than those in the United Kingdom due to the differences in informal institutions 
that exist in these countries. 
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9.5 STRUCTURAL REFORMS: DISPERSED SHARE OWNERSHIP 
Getting capital markets in developing countries up on their feet may require some level of 
structural reforms of the markets. One area of reform would be the share ownership 
structures. There are basically two models of ownership structures, namely, concentrated 
ownership and dispersed ownership. Markets potentially thrive where there is dispersed 
ownership as there are ‘many small shareholders who will constantly be making portfolio 
revision decisions and trading as a result.’1007 In other words, shares are likely to change 
hands more when they are held by a diverse group of people. Dispersed ownership 
therefore has the potential of increasing share trading, which in turn increase market 
liquidity. 
 
It is further said that where ownership is concentrated in the hands of few share holders or 
blocks of shareholders, there is relatively low protection of minority investors and 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders is rampant.1008 It 
may therefore be said that concentrated share ownership increases risk of exploitation 
especially in countries with underdeveloped enforcement regimes. Unfortunately, 
concentrated shareholding is prevalent in developing countries, which makes it difficult for 
minority shareholders to effectively control the affairs of the firms in which they have stake. 
This may result in investors, especially small investors to shun the markets. 
 
It is of course important to mention that, while in theory dispersed share ownership would 
guarantee protection to minority shareholders, there are practical problems for minority 
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shareholders to effectively enforce their rights against the majority shareholders due to 
prohibitive enforcement costs. The minority shareholders may therefore feel that it is 
better to sell their shares and take the loss than attempt to obtain a remedy through 
legal action, which some may consider to be ‘throwing good money after bad’. Further, 
as it was observed by Berle & Means1009 dispersed share ownership structure brings to bare 
the problem of separation of ownership and control whereby managers who own few 
shares or none may lack the owner-entrepreneur’s incentive to maximise profits and who, 
motivated by desire for personal monetary gain, could use their power position against the 
interest of ownership. 
 
The problem of concentrated ownership may be explained through the concept of ‘Limited 
Access Orders’ (LAO) and ‘Open Access Orders’ (AOA) as developed by Douglass North et 
al1010 as discussed in chapter 5 above.  According to North et al, LAOs are characterised by 
limited access to economic activities imposed by the ruling elite. As such LAOs constrain 
economic development in that ‘limited access to organisations and economic rights limits 
competition and economic productivity.’1011 Also LAOs breed local monopolies and 
restrictions on economic entry thereby hindering competitive markets and long-term 
economic growth.1012 LAOs are likely to shore up concentrated share ownership structures 
as access to the capital market activities would be limited to the powerful elites and their 
cronies. The purpose would be to keep control of the economy in the hands of the ruling 
elite.    
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On the other hand, OAOs are characterised by institutions that support open access and 
political as well as economic competition. In OAOs ‘entry into economic, political, religious, 
and educational activities is open to all citizens as long as they meet standard (impersonal) 
requirements.’1013 OAOs thrive within the milieu of functional rule of law. OAOs are likely to 
promote dispersed share ownership as there are no barriers to access to the capital market. 
 
In order for a LAO to transition to an OAO there is need to put in place institutional 
arrangements that support impersonal exchange1014 and members of the dominant coalition 
must find it in their interest to expand impersonal exchange. The result will be a 
transformation from a system of ‘limited access rent creation to open access entry.’1015  
 
Structural reforms may therefore be needed in developing countries to move from 
concentrated ownership of shares (an equivalent of North et al’s LAO) to dispensed 
ownership, which would bring similar benefits as those of an OAO. However it is 
acknowledged that the transition process from LAO to OAO is slow moving and according to 
North et al, the transition will only be realised after some ‘door step conditions’1016 have 
been institutionalised.  
 
Concentrated ownership systems are characterised by a controlling shareholder, a family 
group, or a small number of block holders holding either majority or de facto control and 
                                                 
1013
 Ibid at P. 16. 
1014
 Ibid at p 17. 
1015
 Ibid. 
1016
 These include the following (i) the rule of law for elites; (ii) perpetually lived organisations in the public and 
private spheres; and (iii) consolidated, civilian control of the military and legally accepted organisations with 
violence potential. See Ibid at p.17. 
  
- 340 - 
 
places their representatives on the controlled firm’s board of directors1017. On the other 
hand, under dispersed shareholding system there is separation of ownership and control 
and neither the directors nor the senior executives hold significant blocks of the company’s 
shares but share ownership is dispersed among many institutional and retail 
shareholders.1018 
 
Perhaps the most pertinent question for policy makers in developing countries is how can 
dispersed ownership be induced, maintained and combined with effective corporate 
governance in their respective countries. The study by Coffee1019 in which he sought to 
understand the drivers of the transition process from concentrated to dispensed ownership 
in USA and United Kingdom would offer some practical policy tools for inducing dispersed 
share ownership that may be deployed by policy reformers in developing countries. 
According to this study, dispersed ownership in USA was mainly orchestrated by the 
following factors: 
 
(i) Emergence of financial intermediaries like investment banks who, among 
other things, helped with the process of share sales through their 
underwriting and advisory roles and also served as guardians of shareholder 
interests thereby attracting more individual and outside investors to buy 
shares off hitherto holders of blocks of shares.1020  
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(ii) Introduction of competition laws1021 that resulted in a merger boom in 1890s. 
As a consequence the industry-wide mergers diluted controlling shareholding 
at individual firms creating dispersed ownership in the process. Also such 
mergers provided incentives to controlling shareholders to sell out their 
shareholding at a premium.1022 
 
(iii) The emergence of self-regulatory organisation like the New York Stock 
Exchange which helped to inspire confidence in the market through its 
stringent listing standards and activist approach to corporate governance 
issues for its listed companies. The New York Exchange therefore assumed 
the role of a ‘guardian of public shareholders.’1023     
 
It has been observed that the dispensation of dispersed ownership in United Kingdom 
happened at a much later stage after the American transition and that a different set of 
forces orchestrated the transition process in the United Kingdom.1024 The factors that played 
a role in bringing dispersed ownership in UK included the following: 
 
(i) The rise of institutional investors. It is noted that between 1952 to 1990 there 
was a significant paradigm shift in the share ownership structure in UK with 
individual shareholders who held blocks of shares constantly selling their 
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shares and institutional shareholders mainly insurance companies and 
investment funds acquiring most shares in the market and significantly 
increasing their portfolio in the process. One of the explanations for the 
growth of institutional shareholding is post-World War II changes in British 
corporate law and stock exchange regulations, which may have encouraged 
controlling shareholders to sell and institutional investors to buy shares1025.   
   
(ii) British merger activities that became common around mid-20th century 
resulted in the dilution of ownership. In order to make shares attractive to 
prospective buyers, most shares were given equal voting rights thereby 
reducing controlling power of shareholders.1026 
 
(iii) Tax law also played a significant role in inducing dispersed share ownership in 
UK in that various tax considerations compelled controlling shareholders to 
sell off their holding on one hand and encouraged institutional shareholders 
to buy shares on the other. Examples of tax rules that forced block holders to 
liquidate their holdings include, high corporate tax rates introduced on the 
eve of World War II, which significantly reduced corporate profits, the 
provision that prevented director controlled companies from deducting 
remuneration paid to employee directors from corporate profits for tax 
purposes, a special surcharge on investment income, and an estate duty of 
between 50% - 80% charged on deceased estate above £100000 introduced 
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by Labour government after World War II. The cumulative effect of all these 
tax measures was that there was no incentive to have controlling 
shareholding in British firms, hence the decision of controlling shareholders 
to sell.1027 
 
(iv) On the other side institutional shareholders were encouraged to buy due to 
favourable tax treatment of pensions and insurance products resulting in 
pension and insurance products growing significantly and excess assets were 
channelled into equity markets.1028 This was coupled with exchange control 
regime that limited UK institutional shareholders from investing in foreign 
equities.1029    
 
It is however important to note from the outset that the transition from concentrated to 
dispersed ownership, like any other transition concerned with informal constraints, will not 
happen overnight. 
 
9.6 SELF-REGULATION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 
As stated above, self-regulation played a very significant role in the transition process from 
concentrated ownership system to dispersed ownership system especially in the USA. 
According to Coffee, due to the stiff competition between the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) and other regional exchanges like the Boston Stock Exchange, the NYSE took a 
different approach in its admission and supervision of companies listed with the 
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exchange.1030 The NYSE sought to differentiate itself as a high-quality exchange by only 
listing companies that were considered ‘safe and low-risk.’1031 The exchange insisted on an 
adequate earnings track record before listing an issuer and was prepared to reject listing 
companies that did not meet its listing standards. In so doing the NYSE distinguished itself 
from its competitors and branded itself as the guardian of public shareholders.1032 Coffee 
notes as follows: 
 
“This guardian role manifested itself in two concrete ways: (1) the NYSE, beginning in 1900, insisted 
that its listed companies publish annual audited financial statements, and (2) it protected shareholder 
voting rights by resisting attempts by issuers to deviate from the norm of ‘one share, one vote.’ These 
steps were taken by a private body as a matter of self-regulation, not mandatory law, but the result 
was to attract public shareholders to invest in NYSE stocks as safer and better monitored.”
1033
 
 
The NYSE, therefore, did not only contribute to the development of dispersed ownership in 
USA but also provided a monitoring and quality assurance mechanism that protected 
investors against the ‘Berle and Means’ fears. This shows that there is a special role that 
self-regulation could play as part of the process of developing capital markets in developing 
countries.  
 
Self-regulation refers to the regulation of an industry by its own members, usually by means 
of a committee that issues guidance and sets standards that it then enforces.  Self-
regulation therefore allows those to be regulated to set their own rules and voluntarily 
comply with the rules. In this respect, self-regulation conforms to the tenets of North’s 
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framework, which advocates a bottom-up approach to rule setting. When considered within 
the context of the formal rules - informal rules spectrum, self-regulation would be regarded 
as a very important ‘transistor’ that would help smooth transition from formal to informal 
rules. As discussed above, the process of change from formal to informal rules is always 
slow and sometimes when the change has occurred, it may give rise to unwanted 
consequences. By providing a ‘bridge’ between informal and formal rules, self-regulation 
may help to bring about change with fewer shocks. 
 
With respect to developing countries self-regulation would play a vital role to the process of 
capital market development in more than one ways. Firstly, it would help to minimise the 
pervasiveness of the political elites in the regulation and operation of capital markets. 
Having rules set by market participants themselves, would create collective ownership of 
the rules as well as collective will to enforce them. Such collective responsibility would make 
it difficult for political elites to influence some of the members of the relevant self-
regulatory organisation (SRO) to pervert the operation and enforcement of the rules. In 
other words it would be easier for members of the SRO to stand up to political pressure in 
defence of self-regulation than it would be the case with regards to statutory regulation. 
Further, non-observance of self-regulation, which takes the form of quasi-informal rules, 
would ultimately result in the alienation, in the form of expulsion, of the member from the 
group. This would discourage members from breaching self-regulation as they would fear 
the consequences of expulsion, which would include losing their licence and/or 
accreditation by the SRO.   
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As discussed above (section 8.3.2), one of the main drivers of institutional change is 
education. Self-regulation can be considered as a starting point of the learning process on 
the part of market players. Self-regulation would allow stakeholders to design rules 
according to their level of understanding of the industry at the time. As the rules are 
complied with and positive outcomes are registered, market players would be incentivised 
to modify the rules, as their level of understanding improves, for maximum impact. 
Ultimately, the rules may develop into fully fledged formal rules with a statutory 
foundation.   
 
Further, self-regulation provides market players with some level of economic freedom 
which according to Winiecki1034 is one of the institutional characteristics conducive to 
efficient institutional change (see section 8.9 above). It is believed that where more 
economic freedom is allowed there would be less friction between the formal rules and 
informal rules thereby breeding adaptive efficiency. 
 
Historically, self-regulation has been associated with stock-exchanges.1035 However, over the 
years the nature and scope of SROs has grown wider giving rise to a variety of organisation 
opting for self-regulation. According to a survey that was undertaken by the International 
Council of Securities Associations (ICSA),1036 all SROs have the following core characteristics 
‘(1) share a common set of public policy objectives including the enhancement of market 
integrity, market efficiency and investor protection; (2) are actively supervised by 
                                                 
1034
 J. Winiecki, Supra note 369 at 156 
1035
 Early self-regulatory organisations include the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). 
1036
 International Council of Securities Associations, ‘Self-Regulation In Financial Markets: An Exploratory 
Survey’, ICSA Secretariat, September 2006. 
  
- 347 - 
 
government regulators; (3) have statutory regulatory authority and/or authority delegated 
by the government regulator(s); (4) establish rules and regulations for firms and individuals 
subject to their regulatory authority; (5) monitor compliance with those rules and 
regulations; (6) have the authority to discipline firms and individuals that violate their rules 
and regulations; (7) include industry representatives on their Boards or otherwise ensure 
that industry representatives have a meaningful role in governance; and (8) maintain 
structures, policies and procedures intended to ensure that conflicts of interest between 
their commercial and regulatory activities are appropriately managed.’1037  
 
Examples of SROs besides exchanges include Investment Dealers Associations, Securities 
Dealers Associations, Securities Investment Advisers Associations and Mutual Fund Dealers 
Associations. As it was the case with the NYSE, SROs collectively promote market confidence 
and efficiency resulting in many people being attracted to buying and owning shares 
available on the market. This would in the long run bring about dispersed ownership 
structure. 
 
One area of reform therefore that developing countries may consider embarking on is the 
promotion of self-regulation by market participants. This can be done through, inter alia, 
competition law reform and tax law reform. 
 
                                                 
1037
 Ibid at p. 3. 
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9.7 THE SELF-ENFORCING MODEL OF CORPORATE LAW 
Another practical model of legal reform that may form and inform the agenda for reforming 
laws to promote capital market development in developing countries is the ‘self-enforcing’ 
approach to drafting corporate law1038 for emerging capitalist economies. This approach was 
developed by Black and Kraakman based on their work on Russian Corporate Law.1039 
Although their work is based on a case study of Russia, the considerations behind this model 
is capable of being generalised to most developing countries like those in the SADC region. 
Also the model is of particular relevance to this study given that we have adopted Black’s 
recommendations on institutions that are necessary for a nascent capital market to develop, 
which were also based on his practical involvement in the institutional development in 
Russia and some Asian countries.1040 In this model Black et al offer some solutions, in the 
form of the content of law reform that would help to deal with the institutional obstacles 
they observed. 
 
Black et al note that although the problems that corporate law seeks to address are 
universal, the nature and content of corporate law is context-based.1041 As such the law that 
works for developed economy may not work as effectively when transplanted to an 
emerging economy.1042 It is further noted that based on the general economic function of 
corporate law, which is maximising the value of corporate enterprises to investors and 
therefore to society and minimise the sum of transaction and agency costs of contracting 
                                                 
1038
 Law is used here in its broad sense and it encompasses company law as well as securities law. 
1039
 Bernard Black and Reiner Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law 
Review 1911-1982. 
1040
 Black, (2001) supra note 370.  See Chapter 6 above. 
1041
 Black et al, (1996) supra note 1039 at p. 2. 
1042
 Ibid. 
  
- 349 - 
 
through the corporate form, corporate law should provide a set of rules that encourage 
profit maximising business decisions, provide professional managers with adequate 
discretion and authority, and protect outside shareholders and in some respects, creditors 
against opportunism by managers and other corporate insiders.1043    
 
Black et al, however, observe that in developed countries corporate law accomplishes these 
objectives with the help of other control mechanisms that limit departures from the profit-
maximisation norm. For instance managers are under pressure to enhance firm value 
through the existence of a competitive product market, a reasonably efficient capital 
market, an active market for corporate control, incentive compensation for managers. Also, 
sophisticated professional accountants, elaborate financial disclosure, an active press and 
strict anti-fraud provisions assure shareholders of reliable information about company 
performance. And finally sophisticated courts, administrative agencies and self-regulatory 
organisations help to detect and deter ‘corporate skulduggery.’1044 For this reason, 
corporate law play more or less a complimentary law in developed countries. 
 
On the contrary, most of these mechanisms do not exist in developing countries. For this 
reason, Black et al, opine that corporate law must address a broader set of goals and that 
                                                 
1043
 Ibid, at p.8 
10441044 Ibid. This is reflected by the observation of Pouncy (2002) supra note 26, where he observed as follows: 
 
“The development of stock markets in England and the United States took place in an 
environment permeated by the common law, which had been in development for 
hundreds of years. The common law "filled in the blanks" necessarily created by the 
establishment of a new financial institution. The profession of lawyering was also well 
developed and formalized through education, practical experience, and judicial 
supervision. The professions of accountancy and bookkeeping were well established and 
were able to provide the ancillary services needed to maintain an exchange. 
Additionally, the fiduciary principles underlying the agency relationship were present to 
govern broker-client interactions." (at p. 111) 
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the balance between investor protection and the business discretion of corporate managers 
needed to achieve this goal will be quite different to that in developed economies.1045 They 
suggest that corporate law in developing countries should be protective in nature due to 
severe information asymmetries, less efficient markets, high contracting costs as standard 
practices are not yet developed, weak courts, less experienced market participants, lack of 
reputable intermediaries or affordable intermediaries and most of the time weak 
economies.1046 
 
Black et al, identify the following specific limitations that may constrain the discharge of 
protective corporate law in developing economies. The first constraint is lack of legal and 
market controls.1047 While developed countries have sophisticated enforcement institutions 
that can implement complex and finely nuanced rules, in developing countries enforcement 
institutions are less sophisticated and as such simpler and more easily administrable rules 
would be more suitable.  The most common limitation on enforcement is weak judicial 
enforcement. This may be caused by ill-defined or inadequate substantive legal remedies 
available to judges,1048 cumbersome judicial procedures, overtaxed court system, which 
makes timely judicial action impossible to obtain, or the judges may lack experience in 
corporate law cases, or may be corrupt or may not be adequately paid to attract skilled 
lawyers to become judges.1049  
 
                                                 
1045
 Ibid, p 9. 
1046
 Ibid, p 11 
1047
 Ibid, p. 13. 
1048
 Black et al cites the absence of a rule permitting judges to adjust damages for inflation in Russia as an 
example of such inadequate legal remedies. 
1049
 Black et al (1996) supra note 1039 at p.14 
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Another source of enforcement limitation in developing countries is lack of proper 
administrative agencies to offer detailed rulemaking and administrative enforcement on 
issues like financial enforcement.1050 Further, as observed above, developing countries do 
not have non legal enforcement resources like self-regulatory institutions or reputational 
intermediaries that protect clients and help reduce informational asymmetries.1051 Also 
accounting rules are usually weak or non-existent altogether. Finally, in developing 
countries full disclosure is always problematic as companies are afraid of exposing 
themselves to extortionate tax regimes or mafia groups who may target them based on 
disclosed financial information. Consequently investors may not want the company they 
have invested in to make an honest report of their profits.1052   
 
The second limitation for corporate law to be effective in its protective role in developing 
countries is the cultural norms for managers and large shareholder behaviour.1053 In 
developed countries managers and shareholders generally operate in a culture that 
discourages opportunism and that reflects the underlying legal norms and the penalties for 
violating those norms and as such formal enforcement is infrequently needed as the said 
cultural attitudes exist independently of and reinforce the available legal norms.1054 The 
culture that exists in developing countries however makes it difficult for business to fully 
follow the law and exist. Black et al observe that Russian enterprises ‘must lie about their 
income to tax authorities, bribe the tax inspector, the custom inspector, the local police, and 
                                                 
1050
 Ibid 
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 Ibid 
1052
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many other government officials, pay off the local mafia’1055 in order to stay in business.   
Other managerial cultural attitudes are reflected in lack of transparency with regards to 
share ownership, excluding unwanted shareholders from meetings, refusing to transfer 
shares if managers and internal shareholders disapprove of the new owner and other similar 
behaviours. In these countries, therefore corporate law needs to play a larger role by 
ensuring that standards by which corporate managers shall conduct themselves are clearly 
stipulated in order to instil a managerial culture of duty to shareholders. 
 
It is against this background that Black et al recommends the adoption of a self-
enforcement approach to corporate law in developing countries in order to protect 
investors and instil investor confidence in their respective underdeveloped capital markets. 
As stated above, we believe that this approach would be useful in designing a capital market 
development reform agenda. So what is the essence of the self-enforcement model to 
corporate law?  
 
Basically, the self-enforcement approach seeks to build legal norms that managers and large 
shareholders will see as reasonable and comply with voluntarily.1056 The desired outcome of 
this approach is to develop a set of rules that create corporate decision making processes 
that allow minority shareholders to protect themselves by their own voting decisions and by 
exercising transactional rights.1057 As the aim is to induce voluntary compliance, procedural 
rather than substantive protection is preferred. By emphasising voluntary compliance, the 
self-enforcing approach diminishes the need to rely on courts and administrative agencies 
                                                 
1055
 Ibid. 
1056
 Ibid. P. 5. Obviously this is congruent with SRO and the need to assimilate elite concerns to bring them into 
a cooperative stance. 
1057
 Ibid, p 17. 
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for enforcement, making it more apt for developing countries, which have weak 
enforcement institutions. 
 
There are two elements of the self-enforcing model. The first element seeks to create 
structural constraints to decision making both at shareholder level and at the level of board 
of directors. At shareholder level, such constraints may be created by shareholder voting 
requirements or transactional rights1058 triggered by specific corporate actions.  For instance 
the law may require supermajority shareholder approval for key business decisions such as 
mergers, rather than simple majority approval.1059  Also the law may require shareholder 
approval for a broader range of corporate actions like decisions to issue significant amounts 
of new equity or to purchase major assets. Also instead of proscribing out right self-
interested transactions between the company and its directors, officers, or large 
shareholders, a self-enforcing statute may require approval by independent directors, a 
majority of non-interested shareholders, or both.1060 In terms of the voting mechanism 
itself, the law may provide for a one share, one vote rule to prevent insiders from acquiring 
voting power not commensurate with their economic interest in the company. Procedures 
may also be put in place to ensure honest voting, confidential voting and independent vote 
tabulation. In order to increase influence of outside shareholders, a universal ballot can be 
provided to enable them to place cheaply and easily director nominations and other 
proposals on the voting agenda.1061   And quality of information available to shareholders 
                                                 
1058
 Transactional rights include put options (the right to sell shares) and call options (a right to buy shares). 
1059
 Black et al, (1996) supra note 1039 at p. 20. This concept was first recognised in the case of Quin & Axtens 
v. Salmon, [1909] A.C. 442, where the court rejected a resolution of a company passed by only one of the 
companies two directors because the company’s Articles provided that decisions of that nature should be 
made with consent of both directors.  
1060
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1061
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can be improved by mandatory disclosure rules and by cumulative voting as these would 
enhance large shareholders’ access to information about the company.1062  
 
Voting provisions may also be augmented by transactional rights that individual 
shareholders may exercise. Thus if a shareholder is unhappy with a particular corporate 
decision or action, he would be entitled to sell his shares. The law may also provide 
mandatory pre-emptive rights for shareholders to acquire shares in proportion to one’s 
ownership stake, as protection against underpriced stock issues or give shareholders rights 
to sell their shares to a new controlling shareholder, as protection against transfer of control 
from ‘known hands to less trusted ones.’1063    
 
With regards to board of directors’ level structural constraints, the law may provide for a 
prescribed proportion of independent directors who should be vested with authority over 
crucial corporate decisions such as approval of self-interested transactions.1064 The law may 
also provide for mandatory board structures like audit committees. Other features of the 
statute may be cumulative voting rule1065 for election of directors, complemented by a 
mandatory minimum board size and a ban on staggered terms of office.1066 
 
The second element of the self-enforcing model is the introduction of simple, bright-line 
rules and strong remedies. As discussed above one of the problems in developing countries 
is weak enforcement institutions. This limitation can be minimized by simple, bright-line 
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 Ibid. 
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rules and strong sanctions for violating the rules. The rules must be elaborate, precise, 
prescriptive and instructive in their content. The aim here is to give the judges, who may be 
unsophisticated or corrupt, as narrow room for manoeuvre as possible. Thus a rule requiring 
a shareholder approval of a decision to sell assets of the firm will need to clearly stipulate 
the threshold point of the value of the assets to be sold that will trigger a shareholder vote. 
For instance, the provision would need to state that any sale or purchase of assets that 
equals 50% or more of the book value of the firm’s assets will require shareholder vote.1067 
The self-enforcing approach also discourages incorporation of ambiguous concepts like 
‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ in the rules as these may be open to interpretation, thereby 
exposing the effectiveness of the rules to the possible incompetence or corruption of the 
judges and directors.1068 However when the rules are clear and comprehensive, the judges 
and directors would struggle to get round the intended purpose of the rule to favour 
company insiders or they will find it very easy to follow and apply the rule regardless of their 
competence levels.  
 
Black summarises the key ingredients of the self-enforcing model as follows: 
 
(i) “Enforcement, as much as possible, through actions by direct participants in the corporate 
enterprise (shareholders, directors, and managers), rather than indirect participants (judges, 
regulators, legal and accounting professionals, and the financial press). 
 
(ii) Greater protection of outside shareholders than is common in developed economies, to 
respond to a high incidence of insider-controlled companies, the weakness of other 
                                                 
1067
 Ibid. 
1068
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constraints on self-dealing by managers and controlling shareholders, and the need to 
control self-dealing to strengthen the political credibility of a market economy. 
 
(iii) Reliance on procedural protections -- such as transaction approval by independent directors, 
independent shareholders, or both -- rather than on flat prohibitions of suspect categories of 
transactions. The use of procedural devices balances the need for shareholder protection 
against the need for business flexibility. 
 
(iv) Whenever possible, use of bright-line rules, rather than standards, to define proper and 
improper behaviour. Bright-line rules can be understood by those who must comply with 
them and have a better chance of being enforced. Standards, in contrast, require judicial 
interpretation, which is often unavailable in emerging markets, and presume a shared 
cultural understanding of the regulatory policy that underlies the standards, which may also 
be absent. 
 
(v) Strong legal remedies on paper, to compensate for the low probability that the sanctions will 
be applied in fact.”
1069
  
 
 The self-enforcing approach, through its structural constraints and the simple, bright line 
rules as well as strong remedies, is likely to inculcate a culture of compliance in key market 
participants, over time as the mental constructs and ultimately the belief system, of 
shareholders, directors, judges and other market participants shift. It is of course noted that 
the self-enforcing approach would introduce new transactional costs, like costs for 
conducting shareholder voting and the associated delay this may cause.1070  However, these 
costs are far less compared to the cost of having a ‘lemon’ market caused by lack of investor 
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confidence in the market.1071 It is however important that each country carries out a cost-
benefit balance of the different rules in line with the strength of other institutions that are 
available in that country.1072 
 
Black et al’s self-enforcing approach to corporation law offers a real and possible framework 
for implementing institutional and legal reform within the context of North’s framework for 
institutional change. This approach recognises the different environments in which markets 
operate and that therefore company and securities laws need to be designed at the level of 
the existing institutional framework of the country in question. The general direction of 
these rules in developing countries should be towards more protection of outside 
shareholders who are particularly at risk due to the prevalence of insider dealing and 
market manipulation. The recommended content of the actual rules is aimed at getting 
round the inherent limitations of weak enforcement regimes as well as corporate culture 
that exist in developing countries.  
 
The suggested structural constraints through shareholder and independent director 
approvals of key corporate decisions and simple, bright line rules together with strong 
remedies would be vital in an environment where mental models or belief systems of inside 
shareholders, directors, judges and regulators are not supportive of the development and 
growth of an impersonal market.  With such structural constraints and rules in place, it 
would be very difficult for these groups of market participants to ignore the due process in 
favour of their own self-interested pursuits. At the same time these groups can benefit from 
regular and impersonal rules. In the long run, this is likely to bring a cultural shift in the 
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markets towards honesty and more compliance. Consequently, more investors will be 
attracted and the market will ultimately achieve sustained growth. 
 
Finally, the self-enforcement model would also provide a perfect starting point of the 
learning process that would ultimately entrench advanced knowledge and understanding of 
the mechanics of strong capital markets. By seeking to build legal norms that managers and 
large shareholders would find reasonable and comply with voluntarily and emphasising 
simple and bright-line rules for easy application by managers and shareholders and where 
necessary, by lawyers and judges, self-enforcement model would serve to build the initial 
knowledge base for market players, which would gradually advance to full understanding of 
the various preconditions for strong capital markets.   
 
However, it is important to note that Black records failures on both formal and informal 
institutional arrangements, and misconduct by elite individuals who negotiate personal 
deals with public authorities. His analysis is generally consonant with North’s general thesis, 
but he is concerned with a lower level of generality. Further the self-enforcement model is 
predicated on two crucial assumptions whereupon its efficacy may be hinged: 
 
(i) That the share ownership structure is fairly dispersed 
(ii) That there is a significant level of shareholder activism such that minority 
shareholders are prepared to actively exercise their rights in the 
management of the company. 
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By emphasising on shareholder approvals, shareholder appraisal rights, call and put options, 
the self-enforcing model seeks to operate primarily on Hirschman’s1073 ‘voice’ and ‘Exit’ 
mechanism for corporate governance. Voice refers to ‘articulation of one’s critical 
opinion’1074 in a bid to influence corporate decision making. Voice is typical of political 
association.  ‘Exit’ refers to a situation where a dissatisfied shareholder sells off his 
shareholding in protest of unfavourable decision. Exit is typical of economic association. In 
practice however not many shareholders exercise their rights through voice. This is so 
because, as it was observed by Berle and Means,1075 shareholdings in large public companies 
are typically widely dispersed and shareholder’s very small stakes make it economically 
irrational for them to incur the costs, including the costs of obtaining information and co-
operating with other members, necessary for them to exercise their control rights.1076 Even 
where a shareholder is able to exercise his right to exit, through such rights as the right to 
sell in the market, the purpose of the self-enforcing model, which is protection of minority 
shareholder from managerial arbitrary decision, would be defeated. Effective corporate 
governance seems to require the use of voice by shareholders.  
 
Perhaps the only way the right to exit would have significant impact on corporate 
managerial decision would be where there is a forced buy back of the issued shares at a 
non-market price,1077 and listing was linked to issued share capital so that exit of a 
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substantial number of shareholders would expose the company to the risk of being delisted. 
Otherwise it is unlikely to be effective.  
 
 
9.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The construction of a capital market development reform agenda in developing countries is 
likely to be a tall order. The very concept of capital market, which is predicated on the idea 
of capitalism, is not fully understood in most developing countries. As stated above, the 
majority of capital markets were established on the back of the neoliberal philosophies of 
Washington Consensus, which as we have observed and discussed, was, inherently 
misconceived as a development theory. Most capital markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
including those in the SADC region were established at the behest of the Word Bank and the 
IMF as an additional element of the structural reform programmes1078. One of the key 
purposes of stock exchanges that were being established in SSA was to use them to float 
issues of privatised firms.1079 It is noted that most of the IPOs on SSA stock exchanges have 
emanated from privatisations.1080 
 
Upon their establishment, these capital markets were underpinned by institutional and legal 
frameworks modelled on the regulatory frameworks for capital markets in developed 
countries, mainly through legal and policy ‘transplantation’. However, as Pouncy has 
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observed, “the financial, political, social, and technological environments in which post 
colonial SSA stock exchanges were created differ dramatically from the conditions under 
which they originally arose in the West.”1081 
 
The foregoing shows that although almost each and every SADC country has now 
established a capital market of some sort, , there is a lot of work, at institutional and 
regulatory level, to orchestrate some level of growth of these capital markets. This will 
require a careful diagnosis of capital market stagnation in SADC countries in order to come 
up with effective policy recommendations to governments and other relevant authorities in 
these countries. As Black has observed (chapter 6 above), capital markets will only thrive 
within the milieu of a network of specific institutions and organisations most of which are 
currently either present but not properly developed and/or executed or completely absent 
in SADC countries.   
 
According to this study, North’s framework for economic change offers a very good starting 
point in a bid to understand the nature and scope of this problem. As discussed in this work, 
North’s framework offers policy designers with a very helpful tool of analysis. By 
emphasising on the role of mental models and belief systems of economic or political actors, 
North’s framework has the ability to explain why different countries have different 
development trajectories.  North’s framework also offers a very helpful explanation of why 
wholesale transplant of institutions (rules and organisations) has failed to yield intended 
outcomes in most developing countries including SADC countries as the comparative case 
study in chapter 7 has confirmed.  According to North, the belief system is an outward 
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expression of the collective mental models of the social, economic and political 
entrepreneurs of a given society. These entrepreneurs are subject to the informal rules of 
society and at the same time are entrusted with the interpretation and implementation of 
formal rules. The entrepreneurs are therefore very crucial agents of change.  
 
As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, capital market growth in developing countries face a lot of 
hurdles due to lack of the necessary institutions to underpin it. These include macro-
institutions such as the rule of law, property rights and an independent judiciary, as well as 
micro-institutions such as reputational intermediaries, sophisticated market professionals 
(accountants, lawyers etc) and effective disclosure and insider dealing rules. The informal 
rules that exist in these countries such as corruption, a culture of dishonesty and general 
distrust of the judicial system, make the task of designing and implementing capital market 
development reform even more daunting.   
   
Further, it has been noted in chapter 8 that the actual process of change is significantly 
complex. While formal rules can be changed at will, informal rules change over a 
considerable period of time and do not ordinarily change through mere introduction of 
formal rules. When there is a conflict between new formal rules and existing informal rules, 
the formal rules will be resisted and consequently robbed of their intended effect. There is 
therefore always a need to seek to balance the interaction between formal and informal 
rules.1082  
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However by using North’s framework as a tool of analysis, policy makers in developing 
countries stand a chance of coming up with effectual policies capable of sparking and 
sustaining capital market development. The approaches discussed in this chapter perfectly 
fit into North’s framework in that they all recognise the sensitivity of institutional reform to 
local conditions. The three stages of policy reform advocated by Rodrik provide a very 
helpful tool for reform in developing countries where clarity of policy prescriptions is in 
short supply. By carrying out clear diagnostic analysis to identify the most binding formal 
and informal constraints (as discussed in chapters 5 and 6) and designing targeted policy 
response to these constraints, institutional reform is likely to be effective.  
 
One such binding constraint is the prevalence of concentrated share ownership structure in 
developing countries. Corporate ownership is concentrated in the hands of the privileged 
few - the elite. These block owners, which in a way create a form of a Limited Access Order, 
will not be easily amenable to market mechanisms that have strengthened capital markets 
in developed countries. As discussed above, some structural reforms may therefore be 
necessary to ignite the transition from concentrated ownership to dispersed ownership.  
Transformation of LAO to OAO depends upon recruiting elites to reforms that when 
generalised will benefit non-elites. In the short term this means the interests of elite groups 
must feature prominently in the policy design. Elite interests must be taken into account so 
that in the medium term the benefits they enjoy can be generalised and shared more 
widely. 
 
In terms of the reform of relevant laws, Black et al’s ‘self-enforcing’ approach provides 
useful suggestions, at micro level, of implementing corporate law reform that would result 
  
- 364 - 
 
in the development of capital markets. The emphasis of this approach is the introduction of 
simple and clear rules that would be easy to implement by the company directors as well as 
regulators and judges. There is, however, a need for more research in order to identify 
effective policy and legal tools, within the tenets of North’s framework that may accelerate 
the process of capital market development in developing countries, including SADC 
Countries. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, part of the methodology of this work was to seek support from 
related empirical studies based on different philosophical underpinnings but that confirm 
our working hypothesis, which was based on North’s framework. We have looked at 
different studies some of which were not necessarily based on the new institutional 
economics (NIE) paradigm but their findings confirmed the underlying thesis of North’s 
framework.  
 
For instance, the study of Berkowtz et al,1083 found that where law develops internally 
through a process of trial and error, innovation and correction and with the participation or 
involvement of users of the law, legal professionals and other interested parties, legal 
institutions tend to be highly effective. By contrast where foreign law is imposed and legal 
evolution is external rather than internal, legal institutions tend to be weak. This is a clear 
affirmation of North’s thesis. Also Black in chapter 6 engaged into a very interest analysis of 
the ease with which, a country can adapt other countries’ institutions for its own use and 
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concluded that while reliance on foreign institutions is feasible, only a few institutions are 
easily transplantable.1084 This also bears out the underlying theme of North’s framework.  
 
Further, in their study of why most people in Russia do not use the legal system to resolve 
disputes, Hay et al,1085 found that one reason for this was that most of the laws on the 
statute books in Russia contradicted standard business practice and common sense of the 
Russian society and that this made it difficult for courts to reach “locally sensible” 
decisions.1086 Again this is a classic illustration of ineffectiveness of imposed formal rules 
that do not conform with the informal rules on the ground. The foregoing therefore 
confirms North’s framework for economic change as a credible tool for designing an agenda 
for capital market reform. 
 
Finally, North’s framework bears resonance with the work of William Easterly in his recent 
book, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the 
Poor,1087 In this work, Easterly identifies what he calls three critical mistakes that 
technocrats and development experts today make in their approach to development as 
follows: 
 
(i) They treat developing countries as “blank slates” when prescribing development 
solutions using a top-down approach that attempts to use specific interventions with 
                                                 
1084
 ibid 
1085
 Hay et al,  ‘Towards a theory of Legal Reform’, (1996) supra note 953. 
1086
 Hay et al, cites articles 56 and 105 of the Russian Civil Code which requires courts to enforce debts of a 
bankrupt company against its shareholders because there is no limited liability principle.  
1087
 William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor, 
(Basic Books, New York, 2013). 
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measurable results ignoring the history of societal development1088. This observation 
is similar to North’s concept of path dependence of development.  
 
(ii) They focus on development at the national level and sideline individual rights and 
ignore migration, people groups, and broader regional dynamics1089. Easterly 
recognises that individuals not nations are the proper agents of development. He 
says development policies should not only be directed at nations but should first and 
foremost target individual nationals.1090 Again this chimes with North’s emphasis on 
entrepreneurs and organisations as agents for developmental change. 
 
(iii) Development experts and leaders approach problems by consciously designing 
solutions, while historically, the best problem-solving strategies have come about 
through the freedom for numerous people to experiment and come up with their 
own solutions.1091 Easterly emphasises that we should rely upon bottom up 
spontaneous development rather than consciously designed solutions. This 
recognises the role of informal rules and the fact that top-down imposition of formal 
rules would take away the legitimacy of the rules. It is North’s central observation 
that the path of development is discovered by trial and error and as such freedom to 
experiment on the part of entrepreneurs is vital. 
 
As stated above, however, more research may be needed on the most effective practical 
ways of integrating North’s framework into economic development.   
                                                 
1088
 Ibid p. 123 
1089
 Ibid p.199. 
1090
 Ibid. P. 215-216. 
1091
 Ibid, p.237. 
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In terms of original contribution to knowledge, this work has clearly made a significant 
academic contribution to the economic development discourse generally and the 
development of capital markets specifically. The aim of this research was to help fill the gap 
in the current debate about capital market development. As it was observed in chapter 1, 
although most countries in the SADC region have established capital markets in the last 20 
years, these capital markets are stuck at the infancy stage. Different policy prescriptions 
have been made but these have failed to stimulate measurable capital market growth. 
 
 This work has helped to provide a new diagnosis of this problem using the NIE scholarship. 
Specifically, this work has attempted to synthesise elements of the rather abstract North’s 
framework for economic development with the more particular and anecdotal Black’s core 
institutional requirements for capital market development. By linking NIE to legal discourse 
and to capital market development via Black’s analysis, a new and more realistically 
theorised discourse is made possible. The analysis provided in this work is capable of 
facilitating the evolution of intellectual synthesis that will allow cross disciplinary scholarship 
and contribution to policy formation in the future. 
 
By looking at the desirable institutional framework that would provide genuine incentives 
for investors, it is hoped that this work will be of real relevance to the current reform 
initiatives in the SADC region and other developing countries. Also, by setting in motion the 
quest for a theory for capital market development; this research will inform the agenda for 
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future policy research on capital market development. Currently, the policy discourse on 
capital market development in the SADC region has revolved around the concept of capital 
market integration.1092 However, as we have shown in this work, capital market integration, 
in itself, may not be a solution in so far as there is a misalliance between formal rules for 
capital markets and the informal rules on the ground. 
 
Finally, this work has engaged in a unique comparative analysis of capital market regimes in 
three carefully selected jurisdictions by way of testing the theoretical framework derived 
from the synthesis of North’s framework and Black’s recommendations. Through this 
comparative analysis, as informed by the theoretical framework developed, this work has 
identified reasons for the observed differing outcomes in different jurisdictions in developed 
and developing countries. The contrasting development trajectories of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange and other stock exchanges in the SADC region such as the Malawi Stock 
Exchange is significantly telling of the role that institutional structures play in capital market 
development. This exposition should therefore help policy framers in the region as well as in 
other developing countries to focus on constraints that are relevant to their jurisdiction 
rather than engage in a one-size-fits-all approach to capital market reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1092
 K.K. Mwenda, supra note 638. 
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